' Precisely put, facts giving rise to the filing of instant revision petition are that Ishaq Ahmed Khalil, plaintiff instituted a suit against the Frontier Provincial Co-operative Bank, Limited, through its Registrar Peshawar and others, defendants for declaration that order dated 16-5-1993 issued by defendant No.3, subsequent Orders Nos. 20, 21 and 35 issued in compliance thereof and the appellate, order passed by defendant No. 2 communicated to the plaintiff vide letter dated 26-9- 1993, are void, arbitrary, malatide, without lawful authority and as such, ineffective qua the rights of the plaintiff and are liable to be set aside. The plaintiff also prayed for grant of permanent injunction directing the defendants to restore Grade-II of the plaintiff with effect from the reversion and pay all the difference of his monthly salary etc., which has accrued or may occur due to his degration Grade-III and not to make any recovery of the amount in dispute as ordered by the Appellate Authority i.e defendant No.2 from the monthly salary of the plaintiff and in case any recovery is started by the defendants during the pendency of the suit, same may be refunded.
2. The suit was resisted on all grounds legal as well as factual and the impugned orders were stated to have been passed strictly in accordance with Bank rules and prescribed procedure.
During pendency of the suit, an application was moved on behalf of the defendants, seeking return of plaint. Learned Civil Judge, Peshawar, seized of the matter, by his judgment and decree dated 17-6-2002 accepted the application and returned the plaint under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C, for presentation to the proper forum holding that Civil Court had no jurisdiction under the provisions of section 70-A of Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, as the defendant bank stands wound up by the order dated 19-3-2002 and no legal proceedings are permissible without the leave of Registrar Cooperative Societies. Feeling aggrieved, an appeal was preferred thereagainst, which was accepted by learned Additional District Judge, Peshawar by his order dated 19-12-2002. The impugned order of learned trial Judge was set aside and case was remanded to the trial Court with direction to decide the same on merit after recording pro and contra evidence.
3. The Frontier Provincial Cooperative Bank Limited feeling dissatisfied has filed instant revision petition under section 115 C.P.C.
4. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner bank, Mr. Aamir Javed, Advocate contended, inter alia, that the order impugned exhibits lack of conscious application of mind; that the order is not only deficient in its contents but also incorrect in its result; and that the learned appellate Court has erred in law while appreciating the statutory mandate of section 51 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, whereby when a winding up order has been made, no suit or legal proceedings shall lie against the society except for the leave of the Registrar. The learned counsel added that the appellate Court has not cared to deliberate the fact that the defendants so arrayed in the plaint were no more in existence and hence no effective/executable order could be passed against them.
The learned counsel also reiterated that the plaintiff was proceeded against under the Service Regulations of the Frontier Provincial Cooperative Bank Limited after issuance of show-cause notice and proper inquiry in accordance with law by the competent authority and the said order was upheld by the appellate authority as well. Concluding the arguments, the learned counsel maintained that the Appellate Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it by law but has exercised the same illegally which is not sustainable. To support the submissions, reliance was placed on Rizwanullah v. Registrar/President Cooperative Societies, N.-W.F.P, Peshawar and 3 others (PLD 2003 Peshawar 203).
5. Mr. Abdul Mabood Khattak, Advocate for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the impugned order maintaining that the provisions of sections 51 and 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 are not applicable in this case as the same relate to society whereas the respondent is an ex-employee of the petitioner bank and action has been taken against him under rule 32 of the Provincial Regulation and not under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925. The appellate Court had valid reasons to accept the appeal and remand the case to the trial Court for decision on merit after providing an opportunity to the parties to produce evidence in support of their respective contentions. In this regard reliance was placed on Haji Shamsur Rehman and another v.
Nadar Khan and 6 others (2005 CLC 215) and Abbasia Cooperative Bank (Now Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd.) through Manager and another v. Hakeem Hafiz Muhamamd Ghaus and 5 others (PLD 1997 Supreme Court 3).
6. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties at some length with reference to the material on the file and the case-law cited at the bar.
7. Undoubtedly section 54 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 speaks of disputes:-- "(a) between members or past members of the society or persons claiming through a member or past member; or .(b) between members or past members or persons so claiming and any past or present officer, agent or servant of the society; or
(c) between the society or its committee, and any past or present member of the society; or
(d) between the society or its committee, and any pa ,t or present officer, agent or servant of the society, or a surety or such officer, agent or servant, whether such surety is or is nor a member of the society; or
(e) between a fmancing bank authorized under subsection (1) of section 34 and a person who is not a member of a society.
' But does not speak of any dispute between the society and an outsider. In this respect reference can be made to a case reported in PLD 1961 SC 215, wherein it was observed:-- "We are, therefore in agreement with the High Court that the enlargement of the definition of a `dispute' did not also operate to enlarge the category of persons between whom the dispute must exist. In our view, the dispute must still relate some kind of transaction in which the categories of persons mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of the said section have interest in that capacity. The accident merely of a person also falling under any one of the said categories is not sufficient to bring a dispute between him and a cooperative society within the ambit of the said section. To hold otherwise would amount to rendering clauses (a) to (e) of section 54 nugatory. It is, furthermore, inconceivable that the Legislature intended that any or every kind of dispute, if it merely touched the business of the society, should be dealt with in the manner provided in the said section, for then anyone, dealing with a Cooperative Society will have to do so at the peril of being deprived of his ordinary remedies under the general law of the land. Such an intention we cannot possibly impute to the Legislature."
8. A plain reading of section 70-A of the Act ibid clearly indicates that jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred only in such cases which are to be decided by the statutory functionaries under the Act by virtue of the provisions of the Act or the Rules or bye-laws framed thereunder. If the dispute could not be referred under section 54 of the Act to arbitration section 70-A does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In the instant case I fmd that Ishaq Ahmad Khalil respondent is an ex- employee of the petitioner bank. A disciplinary action has been, initiated against him under rule 32 of the Provincial Regulations and not under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, in consequence whereof the respondent has been downgraded. It is true that the amount has been deposited by the respondent but his cause of action is still alive. In this connection, reference can be made to Abbasia Cooperative Bank (Now Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd.) through Manager and another v. Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghaus and 5 others (PLD 1997 Supreme Court 3).
9. Having considered the matter from all angles, I am of the view that the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner bank do not carry weight. The learned appellate Court has rightly remanded the case to the trial Court decision on merit holding that civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. The case-law cited on behalf of the petitioner bank is distinguishable and proceeds on different facts. The impugned order is unexceptionable and hardly calls for interference of this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The revision petition is devoid of merits. The same is dismissed with no order as to costs and the impugned order is maintained.