A case has been registered against Mr. Hussain Naqi (hereinafter called as the detenu), Bureau Chief of the Pakistan Press International, as well as Mr. Mazhar Ali Khan, Editor, Weekly "View Point", Lahore under section 3/5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (hereinafter called the Act), vide F. I. R. No. 542 of 1978 at Civil Lines, Police Station, Lahore for publishing an article, "Leftists beware" in the issue of the Weekly "View Point", dated 6-8-1978, incorporating various portions of a top-secret directive issued under the orders of the Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan and basing thereupon the said article.
2. After the registration of the case warrants for the arrest of both the aforesaid persons were issued and they were arrested on 3-12-1978. Writ Petition No. 5874/78 under Article 199 of the Constitution was filed on behalf of both the persons challenging the detention of both of them. The petition qua Hussain Naqi was dismissed while Mr. Mazhar Ali Khan was released on bail.
3. During the pendency of the writ petition both the persons were remanded to Police custody from time to time by Mr. Khalid Bashir Tarrar, M. I. C., Lahore. The first remand order was passed by the learned Magistrate on 4-12-78 on the application submitted by an Inspector of Police, Special Branch, Lahore. It was stated in the application that since the source from where the above mentioned top-secret document was obtained bad not been disclowd by the accused persons, therefore, they should be remanded to police custody for further interrogation. This cause having been accepted to be valid their custody was remanded to the police till 14-12-1978, on which date, for the same reasons, they were given in the custody of the police till 17-12-1978. Again on the said date, a similar application was made by the said Inspector, Police. It was stated in the application that since the source, which supplied the aforesaid document to both the persons, had not been discovered during the investigation, therefore, both the persons should be remanded to judicial custody. It was submitted that for the said reasons complaint/challan in the case had not been completed and submitted. The learned Magistrate, on this submission, remanded both the persons to judicial custody till 30-12-1978. On this date the Investigating Agency, again, requested the learned Magistrate for further remand to judicial custody of the detenu herein, alone, as Mr. Mazhar Ali Khan by that time had been released on bail by the High Court.
While passing the remand orders, the learned Magistrate always referred to the reasons given by the Investigating Agency in its applications for remanding the custody of the accused persons. Mr. Hussain Naqi, the detenu, was remanded to judicial custody on 30-12-1978 till 18-1-1979.
4. However the present criminal miscellaneous was filed by the detenu on 31-12-1978 on which my learned brother Rustam S. Sidhwa, J., directed the respondents to produce the detenu in the Court on 2-1-1979 and to show cause under what lawful authority he had been detained. It is admitted on record that the detenu instead of being produced first in the High Court was produced before the learned Special Judge (Central), Lahore, who has been appointed specially to hear this case vide notification dated 30-9-1978. The detenu told the Special Judge that under the orders of the High Court he was to be produced there. Mr. Muhammad Asghar, D. S. P., Special Branch, Lahore, who appeared along with the detenu, told the Special Judge that he had no knowledge about any order passed by the High Court in this regard. At this, the learned Special Judge directed the Police Official to produce the detenu before the High Court after ascertaining about the above-- mentioned order of the High Court. He further directed that if there was no order for releasing the detenu on bail by the High Court, then he would be remanded to judicial custody for a period of fourteen days, as the investiga--tion of the case had not yet been completed and the detenu was directed to be produced before him on 16-1-1979.
5. The learned counsel for the detenu while appearing before the Special Judge on 16-1-1979 opposed further remand of the detenu to judicial custody. He also challenged the validity of the notification appointing the Special Judge as such to bear the case and objected to his jurisdiction on that basis. He further told the Special Judge that such legal questions had already been raised by him before the High Court in the present case. On this the learned Special Judge did not pass any order with regard to remand of the custody of the detenu till the matter was taken up by the High Court.
Meanwhile the record of the learned Special Judge was summoned by this Court and when this case was taken up the same day by this Court after tea-break, the said order of the learned Special Judge was brought to its notice, on which it was observed that it was within the jurisdiction of the learned Special Judge to remand or not to remand the detenu to judicial custody, as the points raised with regard to jurisdiction and invalidity of the notification bad not yet been decided in favour of the detenu; and the record of the learned Special Judge was sent back for that purpose the very day.
6. It was submitted before the Special Judge on behalf of the prosecu--tion that investigation in the case had not been completed, as the source which supplied the above-mentioned top-secret document to the accused persons for publication in the Weekly had not yet been discovered. It was f urther submitted that investigation was also pending with regard to the third accused, Mr. Ahmad Aziz Zia, publisher of the Weekly. Considering the reasons given by the prosecution to be valid, the detenu was remanded by the learned Special Judge to judicial custody for a period of fifteen days with a direction to produce him before the Special Judge on 1-2-1979.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following points:
(a) All the orders passed by the learned Magistrate as well as the learned Special Judge remanding the detenu to police or judicial custody, as the case may be, being not in consonance with the provisions as contained in section 167/344, Cr. P. C., are liable to be set aside and the detenu should be set at liberty.
(b) If the first order of remand was illegal then such illegality could not be rectified by passing a valid order subsequently.
(c) The detenu was produced before the learned Special Judge on 2-1-1979 in violation of the order of the High Court passed on 31-12-1978 in order to rectify the illegality committed in the remand orders passed by the learned Magistrate.
(d) The learned Special Judge has not applied his mind while passing the impugned orders on various dates after lst January, 1979, in spite of the fact that challan was submitted before him on 2-1-1979.
(e) The Special Judge had been notified on 30-9-1978 to try the present case, but in spite of that remand was always obtained by the prosecu--tion from Mr. Khalid Bashir Tarrar, M. I. C., Lahore, who was otherwise functus ofdo under the law and could not pass any order in view of the said notification.
(f) According to section 13(1) of the Act, no Court, other than that of a Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered in this behalf by the appropriate Government, which is inferior to that of a District Magistrate, can try this case. Since the Special Judge, entrusted wittrthis case, holds the rank of.Additional Sessions Judge, therefore,cannot try this case. He as such being not competent to hear the case, all the orders passed by him remanding the custody of the detenu are illegal.
(g) No Court can take cognizance of any offence under the Act, except upon a complaint made by order or under authority from the Government or some Officer empowered by the Government in this behalf. Since the complaint/challan in this case has been filed by an Inspector, Police, Special Branch and not by the kdditional Inspector--General of Police, Special Branch, Lahore, '' ..Ore, the complaint/ challan being incompetent, proceedings - .Sod thereupon cannot take place.
(h) Proceedings in this case can take place only on the basis of a complaint before the Special Judge and not on the basis of a challan, as provided in subsection (3) of section 13 of the Ad.
8. According to section 167 (2), Cr. P. C. a Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this provision, whether he has jurisdiction to try the case or not, may from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as he deems fit for a term not exceeding 15 days in whole. This provision is attracted when an accused person is produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest by the Investigating Agency, mainly on the ground that investigation of the case cannot be completed within the aforesaid period. It is, however, clear that at the time of remanding an accused to police custody under this provision a Magistrate is required to apply his mind, before passing any order in the given circumstances of the case. The relevant record along with a police report in writing of acts constituting the offence must be produced before him.
9. The record shows that the first order under section 167, Cr. P. C., as discussed in para. 3 of the judgment, was passed by the learned Magistrate on 4-12-1978 when the detenu along with his co- accused, Mr. Mazhar Ali Khan was produced before him. It was mentioned in the police report submitted before the Magistrate that both the accused persons had been arrested for publishing a top-secret document containing the secret instructions of the C. M. L. A. In the shape of an article titled, "Leftists ! Beware" in the Weekly "View Point". They both were required to disclose the source from where copy of the aforesaid secret document had been obtained by them. The learned Magistrate while passing the remand order has referred to this aspect of the case being a reason advanced by the prosecution for remanding the accused to the police custody till 14-12-1978. The same position obtained on 14-12-1978 and since the source had not been disclosed nor traced out by the Investigating Agency, therefore, further remand was requested. The learned Magistrate acceded to the request of the prosecution on the basis of these reasons and extended the period of remand to 17-12-1978. As mentioned above, both these orders were passed under section 167, Cr.
P. C.
10. Since the source from where the said document bad been obtained bad not been disclosed or traced out, nor the investigation in that behalf had been completed, application was made on 17- 12-1918 for remanding the accused persons to judicial custody for a period of fifteen days. This plea was accepted for the reasons given in the application and the accused were remanded to judicial custody till 30-12-1978. Similar position, again, obtained on 31-12-1978 when extension of period of remand to judicial custody was requested by means of an application dated 30-12-1978. The learned Magistrate while referring to the reason given in the application by the prosecution remanded the detenu to judicial custody till 18-1-1979.
11. As discussed above, the learned Special Judge, in whose Court challan/complaint was submitted by the prosecution on 2-1-1979, passed necessary orders on the said date and on 16-1- 1979 remanding the detenu to judicial custody. By the last order the custody of the detenu has been remanded to judicial lock-up till 1-2-1979. All remand orders have been passed by the learned Special Judge (Central) mainly on the ground that the source .Which supplied copy of the secret document to the accused persons has not been disclosed nor traced out, nor the investigation in that behalf has been completed.
12. It is not denied that relevant record of the case including the F. I. R. As well as the police report in writing of acts constituting the offence was always produced before the Special Judge. The detenu was also always present when the remand orders were passed by the Court concerned.
According to law the relevant material of the case containing evidence, if so recorded, and the police report containing the facts with regard to the offence should be produced before the Court at the time of grant of remand. As mentioned above, in the present case necessary material including the police report was always produced at the time of grant or otherwise of the remand.
Both the Courts granting remand appear to have passed the respective remand orders after having applied their mind to the facts of the case, major fact being that the source which supplied copy of the secret document for publication had not been traced out and the investigation in the case had not been completed.
In the circumstances, it cannot be said that any of the remand order mentioned above, has not been passed in accordance with law.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon certain authorities such as State v. Shad Muhammad and 48 others PLD 1972 Quetta 76, Rashid v. State and 2 others PLD 1970 Lah. 389, Ghazi and others v. The Slate PLD 1977 B J 20, Syed Muhammad Aziz and 5 others v. The State and 5 others PLD 1970 Quetta 27, Darshan Singh and others v. The State and others PLD 1957 Kar. 210, Muhammad Rafi v. The State and 2 others 1969 P Cr. L J 873, Dost Muhammad v. The State and another 1971 P Cr. L J 885, Muhammad lshaque v. The State1973 P Cr. L J 92, Dr. Ejaz Hussain v. The Government of Punjab PLD 1977 Lah. 1304 and Iqbal Ahmad Khan, Advocate and 51 others v. The State PLD 1977 Lah. 1337 in order to show that there should be some material before the Judicial Officer concerned, a report in writing by the police giving reasons for remand of the accused to police custody or the judicial custody, as the case may be, and order in that behalf should be passed after due application of mind; the Judicial Officer while granting remand should weigh the evidence to decide whether the accused should be detained in custody or not; the remand to police or judicial custody should not be granted B in a mechanical manner, application of mind is a must and should be granted in case of real necessity; and in the absence of a reasonable cause no further remand should be granted.
14. The main point involved in PLD 1972 Quetta 76 was as to when and under what circumstances the provisions as contained in sections 167 and 344, Cr. P. C. Would be applicable. It was held that section 167, contemplated a remand during investigation while section 344 contemplated remand after initiation of proceedings in the Court, which cannot commence unless a report or complaint is filed before the Court. It was further held that section 167, Cr. P. C. Provided that remand could be obtained even from a Magistrate, who had no jurisdiction to try the case.
In PLD 1970 Lah. 389 no reason, whatsoever, had been given by the Magistrate while remanding an under-trial prisoner to judicial custody and in view of that the remand order, as such, was held to be illegal. , However, since the charge-sheet had been filed in the Court and the Magistrate had summoned the prosecution evidence, therefore, it was held that irrespective of the illegal remand order, it was validated by the subsequent order passed under section 344, C. P. C.
In PLD 1977 B J 20 remand order had not been signed by the Presiding Officer, but by his Reader and as such the same was held to be illegal. It was .Further held that adjournment of proceedings or examination of accused person could not be granted repeatedly and mechanically without good cause. The case, according to that report, had been adjourned for months on the ground that it was under scrutiny by Prosecution Branch. Order passed in that behalf was held to be not justified.
It was held in PLD 1970 Quetta 27, in the given circumstances of the case, that the Court has to apply its mind to the evidence already obtained against the accused and has to be satisfied with the grant of his custody to the police for the collection of further evidence. The main point involved in that case was as to when a Presiding Officer takes cognizance of a case.
In PLD 1957 Kar. 210, it was found that the Magistrate concerned while allowing remand neither recorded any reason for doing so nor obtained previous sanction of the relevant Government in taking cognizance of the case as provided by subsection (2) of section 3 of the Passport (Offences)
Act, 1952. Consequently it was held that detention of the accused in custody by the police was not warranted by law.
In 1969 P Cr. L J 873 an accused person had been remanded to police custody by the Magistrate while sitting at the Police Station and the order in that behalf had been passed without giving any reason.
In 1971 P Cr. L J 885 neither challan nor F. I. R. Was submitted to the Magistrate at the time when he passed the remand order. It was found that he had no material before him at the relevant time. As such, the remand order passed by him was set aside being illegal.
In 1973 P Cr. L J 92 the main question involved was whether extension of period of detention of the accused from time to time under a warrant of remand to judicial custody by the Magistrate without taking cognizance of the case was legal. It was held on the basis of the Supreme Court authority, State v. Fateh Muhammad, that it was not illegal. It was, however, observed, in the given circumstances of the case, that cognizance and commencement of the inquiry and trial cannot be postponed for unreasonable period of time.'
In PLD 1977 Lah. 1304 no order of remand, whatsoever, had been passed in spite of reminders by the Jail authorities. As such, the accused persons were found to have been detained without any legal orders Similarly in PLD 1977 Lah. 1337 a single member of the Special Tribunal while visiting the. Jail used to pass orders of remand and that too in the absence of the accused, who was never summoned nor afforded any opportunity of being heard. In the circumstances the order remanding the custody of the accused to judicial lock-up was set aside.
15. The above discussion would show that none of the points involved in the cases referred to above is involved in the present case. In the instant case, every time when the remand order was passed by the Magistrate or the Special Judge the police file was available before the Court and an application in writing was always submitted by the prosecution containing some reason for remanding the custody of the accused. The main ground on the basis of which remand of the accused was demanded was that the source which supplied copy of the secret document had neither been disclosed nor traced out. I have seen the secret document in question, some of the contents of which have been reproduced in the F. I. R. It involves our relations with some of the neighbouring countries and in view of that the prosecution always considered necessary to stress upon the Court that disclosure or tracing out of the source which supplied copy of the said document to the accused was necessary in order to complete the investigation and submission of the complaint. This plea appears to be quite reasonable in the given circumstances and the remand orders passed on the basis of that cause cannot be held to be unreasonable or unjustified.
Since all the remand orders have been based upon the abovementioned reasonable cause, therefore, question of their being illegal and having been rectified by subsequent orders of remand does not arise.
16. It has been stated at the bar by the learned Advocate-General that neither the Jail authorities nor the Police Official concerned, who produced the detenu before the Special Judge on 2-1-1979 had any knowledge about the order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court for his (detenu's) production in the High Court on the said date. Nothing has been brought on record to show that any such order had been conveyed to the said authorities, or the Advocate-General, at least, so as to enable them to comply with the order of the High Court. Further, when the remand orders passed by the Magistrate have been held to be legal, the contention raised by the learned counsel in this behalf has lost its significance.
Since report under section 173, Cr. P. C. Had been drawn, therefore, the same was submitted before the Special Judge on 2-1-1979 The detenu was produced before the Court along with that so as to provide him an opportunity of being heard by the Court.
17. There is no doubt that Rao Iqbal Ahmad Khan, Special Judge (Central) was appointed as such for the trial of the accused persons in this case on 30-9-1.978 by means of a notification issued by the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan. However, according to section 13(3) of the Official Secrets Act, he could not take cognizance of the case until complaint under section 13 was made to him by a person duly authorised by the Government. It has further b.-en provided in this section that a person otherwise charged with an offence under the Act may be arrested or a warrant for his arrest may be issued or executed and any such person may be remanded in custody or enlarged on bail notwishstanding the fact that such complaint has not been made, but no further or other proceedings shall he taken until such complaint has been made. The aforesaid provision lays clown that a Special Judge duly appointed by the Government can take cognizance of only such offence regarding which complaint is made to him. In the present case, as mentioned above, complaint/challan was submitted before him on 2-1-1979 and as such before the aforesaid date he could not deal with the matter. Section 13 of the Act clearly provides that in the absence of any complaint having been submitted a person accused of an offence under the Act can be arrested and remanded to custody, o enlarged on bail by a Judicial Officer though he may not have jurisdiction to try the case. As provided in sub section (3) of section 13, no Court unless specially empowered by the Government, can take cognizance of any offence under the Act ; meaning thereby, as held in Alam Din v. State PLD 1973 Lah. 304, that any such cognizance can be taken by a judicial action ; when the Court applies its mind to the suspected commission of the offence as disclosed in the police report or the private complaint for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code for holding an inquiry or trial as the case may be. It shows that before cognizance can be taken by the Special Judge, remand orders can be passed l by any Presiding Officer.
Even if it is accepted for argument's sake that any remand order passed by the Magistrate concerned is defective, the same being not in consonanc F with the relevant provision of law, the last orders dated 2-1-1979 an 16-1-1979 being quite valid, it cannot be said that the detenu is at presen in illegal confinement. Such plea was taken in Abdul Hamid Khan v. The D. M., Larkana (PLD 1973 Kar. 344) but the same was repelled by holding that the detenu in that case was in custody by reason of the order later passed by the Government in a lawful manner. It was held that the Court was concerned at the relevant time to see whether the detenu was at that time illegally confined or not and if at some earlier time he was illegally confined, that would not be relevant unless it was shown that such an illegality would affect the legality of the order under which he was lastly detained. Similar view was taken previously by the Federal Court of India in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. The Emperor (AIR 1945 FC 18). It was held that where the order of detention was defective merely on formal grounds, there was nothing to preclude proper order of detention being based upon the pre-existing grounds themselves. It was further held that order of detention can be passed against a person who was already under detention. It was further held that the question involved was not whether the later order validated the earlier detention, but whether in the face of the latter the Court could direct the release of the petitioner.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon Government of East Pakistan v. Roshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan (PLD 1966 SC 286), Begum Sardar Muhummad Hayat Khan of Tumman v.
Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1969 Lah. 985) and Begum Nazir Abdul Hamid v. Pakistan (Federal Government) through Secretary Interior (PLD 1974 Lah. 7), in order to show that where the previous detention order is illegal, its extension by a subsequent order would not be valid and detention would continue to be illegal.
I am afraid, this question is not involved in the present case. It has been held above that each and every remand order has been passed in a lawful manner. In 1966 SC 286 the grounds of detention furnished to the detenu were held to be insufficient and for that reason the order of detention was held to be illegal and in the circumstances the extension of detention based upon the first (illegal) order was held to be invalid. It was held that there was substantial distinction between a fresh order of detention and one extending a previous illegal order of detention and since the subsequent order of detention purported merely to extend the previous detention, which had been found to be illegal, therefore, the subsequent order of detention was held to be not valid. This authority was followed in 1969 Lahore 985 as well as in 1974 Lahore. In 1969 Lah. 985 grounds of first detention were found to the illegal and as such the order passed on the basis thereof was also held to be illegal. The extension of detention based on that order was, therefore, held to be invalid. In 1974 Lahore the Review Board had held the order of detention dated 14-8-1973 as invalid being violative of clause (7) of Article 10 of the then Constitution of Pakistan and since the impugned order before the High Court was in continuaticn of the previous order, therefore, it was held to be without lawful authority.
In the circumstances, the aforesaid authorities are not applicable to the present case. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this behalf is, therefore, hereby repelled.
18. It has been contended that appointment of the Special Judge (Central) being not covered by the provision contained in subsection (1) of section 13 of the Act, he is not competent to try the case.
I am afraid, this contention has no force. It is provided by the said section that no Court, which is inferior to that of a District Magistrate, except that of a Magistrate of the Ist Class specially empowered in this behalf; shall try any offence under the Act. According to Chapter II, Part C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Criminal Courts have been classified a3 under
(i) Court of Session.
(ii) Magistrates of the First Class.
(iii) Magistrates of the Third Class.
According to section 10, Cr. P. C. In every district the Provincial Government shall appoint a Magistrate of the First Class, who shall be called the District Magistrate, meaning thereby that any Magistrate of the First Class can be appointed as District Magistrate. In the heirarchy of the Criminal Courts, Court of Session has been placed at number one and then comes the Court of the Magistrate of the First Class, who can also be appointed as District Magistrate. Even otherwise, appeal or revision., as the case may be, lies to the Court of Session against the orders passed by the Magistrates. It is also admitted that Sessions Judge appointed under the Code also enjoys the powers of First Class Magistrate as well as under Section 30 of the Code.
In this view of the matter, Rao Iqbal Ahmad Khan, who is holding the C rank of Sessions Judge, having the powers of Magistrate of Ist Class is not inferior to a District Magistrate. The appointment of .>J--, lqbal Ahmad Khan as such is fully covered by the provision as contai"N. , section 13(1) of the Act and he is competent to try the case. '
19. It has been contended that since the complaint/challan in this case has been filed by an Inspector Police, Special Branch and not by the Additional Inspector-General Police, Special Branch, as empowered in the notification dated 30-9-1978, therefore, the complaint having been submitted by an incompetent person cannot be proceeded with.
This objection is also without any force. The examination of the coin plaint shows that it was drawn by an Inspector, Police, but was submitted b Mr. Abdul Qayyume. Additional Inspector-General, Police, Special Branch, Punjab, Lahore. His endorsement to that effect is very much available on R the complaint and as such the provision as contained in subsection (2) o section 1 of the Act has been fully complied with. The complaint having been filed by a competent person, duly empowered by the notification, is liable to be proceeded with by the Special Judge.
20. It has been lastly argued that since the complaint as defined id section 4 of the Cr. P. C. Has not been submitted before the Special Judge, therefore, he has no jurisdiction to proceed with the same. The word "complaint" has not been defined in the Official Secrets Act. However, it has been defined in section 4(h), Cr. P. C., as an allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Code that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a Police Officer. The definition of the word "complaint", as given in the Cr. P. C.. Has not been adopted by any provision of the Official Secrets Act. The form in which a complaint can be made ha not been prescribed either in the Code or in the Official Secrets Act itself. The complaint can be filed by any person including a Police Officer, who may be authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned. What after all is to be indicated in a complaint is that such and such offence has been committed by such and such person. The necessary particulars constituting the offence may be incorporated therein. The word "complaint" as used in section 13(3) of the Act will be only applicable in the present case and not within the meaning of its definition as given in the Code of Criminal Procedure. As mentioned above, since intimation with regard to a particular offence having been committed by particular persons has been furnished in writing by the official concerned duly authorised by the Government, therefore, that writing containing necessary information constitutes a complaint within the meanings of section 13(3) of the Act.
21. The above view gains strength from Barkat and another v. The Emperor AIR 1943 All.
6. In that case a civil Court Amin was obstructed by a person while performing his official duty. He lodged a complaint with the police, who forwarded the same in the shape of a report to the learned Magistrate who tried the case. He sentenced the accused under section 186, Penal Code on the basis of the police report. It was held that the term complaint as defined is section 4 of the Cr. P. C.
Though did not include report of a Police Officer, but the term complaint as used in section 195 of the Code was not used in the technical sense in which it was defined in section 4. The intention of section 195, Cr. P. C. Was held to be that the Magistrate should not punish any person, except at the instance of the Public Officer concerned or his superior. It was held that where such Officer made complaint to the Police, the Magistrate acting on the police report had before him at the time of convicting the accused, complaint of the civil Court Amin made to the police.
It may be mentioned that any offence punishable under sections 172 to 180, Penal Code cannot be punished under section 195, Cr. P. C. Except upon a complaint in writing by the Public Servant concerned, while in the aforesaid case punishment was awarded on the basis of the police report.
22. Even if it is accepted for argument's sake that there is an omission on the part of the official concerned in submitting report instead of complaint, the omission is liable to be rectified under section 537, Cr. P. C. And the proceedings based thereon would not be held to be invalid. Since purpose of the complaint to be submitted before the Special Judge has been fulfilled by due Intimation to that Court about the nature of the offence and the persons involved in the commission of the offence, therefore, the intimation furnished by the Additional Inspector-General Police, Special Branch, Punjab, Lahore is a complaint within the meanings of section 13 (3) of the Act. As such, the contention raised in this behalf having no force is hereby repelled.
23. As a result of the above discussion, there being no force in the writ petition the same in hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.