' JAVED IQBAL, J.--- The above captioned petitions for leave to appeal arising out of the common judgment, dated 4-11-2003 of learned Federal Service Tribunal involving a similar questions of law and facts are being disposed of by this common judgment which can conveniently be categorized in the following three categories:--- ' First Category ' Civil Petitions Nos.4-K to 89-K of 2004
2. In the above petitions vires as contemplated in Regulation No.72(9) of the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (Service) Regulations, 1984, (hereinafter referred to as the "P.N.S.C.
Regulations") were challenged but subsequently the order qua forced leave was withdrawn and resultantly the issue being not alive, the learned Federal Service Tribunal held the same as infructuous.
' Second Category ' Civil Petitions Nos.108-K to 199-K of 2004
3. Judgment of the learned Federal Service Tribunal has been assailed on a limited point i.e. Leave with pay should have been granted instead of leave due.
' Third Category ' Civil Petitions Nos.84 to 186 of 2004
4. The petitions are preferred on behalf of Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as the "P.N.SC.") assailing the judgment of learned Federal Service Tribunal passed on 4-11-2003 whereby the respondents were reinstated.
5. First of all we intend to take the First Category of petitions (Civil Petitions Nos.4-K to 89-K of 2004).
It is an admitted feature of the case that these petitions have become infructuous for the simple reason that the petitioners had challenged their forced leave granted pursuant to the provisions as contained in Regulation -72(9) of the P.N.S.C. Regulations, vires whereof were challenged but before the question of its legality and validity could be determined the Services of petitioners were dispensed with in terms of Regulation No.12(1) of the P.N.S.C. Regulations and thus all the petitioners questioning the vires of Regulation No.72(9) of the P.N.S.C. Regulations became infructuous.
6. Mr. Manzoor Ali Khan, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioners also agreed to it.
Now it would be an academic exercise to discuss the import, impact and legality of the P.N.S.C.
Regulations as it is not a live issue at all which would be examined in some appropriate case.
' Second Category (Civil Petitions Nos.108-K to 199-K of 2004)
7. After having heard Mr. Manzoor Ali Khan, learned Advocate Supreme Court, Mr. Ghulam Qadir Jatoi, learned Advoate Supreme Court and. Hafiz S.A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, the main grievance of the petitioners seems to be against the observation made by the learned , Federal Service Tribunal in the judgment impugned, which is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:--- "The intervening period from the date of their dispensation from service, till joining will be treated as leave of the kind due."
'8. We are not persuaded to agree with the prime contention of Mr. Manzoor Ali Khan, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioners that leave of the kind due be converted into leave with pay for the simple reason that this exercise is to be done by the P.N.S.C. Itself after reinstatement of each employee on case to case basis. Leave with pay if admissible that would.
Surely be granted to the petitioners. No record could be produced by Mr. Manzoor Ali Khan, learned Advocate Supreme Court showing the actual length of service of each employee, leave available at his credit and kind of leave available, therefore, no yardstick can be fixed on the basis whereof entitlement of each employee could be determined.
9. The benefit such as gratuity and G.P. Fund if received by any employee that should be returned within one month positively. The petitioners must not ignore that their reinstatement by the learned Federal Service Tribunal is subject to the payment of amount already received by them which must be adhered to in letter and spirit. In case of non-compliance the P.N.S.C. May take appropriate action in accordance with law. This set of petitions are disposed of in above terms.
' Civil Petition No.100-K of 2004 ' Syed Sadiq Raza----Petitioner versus ' Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and others----Respondents
10. The above petition, preferred by Syed Sadiq Raza who argued for himself, is also disposed of in above terms. Third Category (Civil Petitions Nos.84 to 186 of 2004)
11. Hafiz S.A. Rehman, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court entered appearance on behalf of the P.N.S.C. And urged strenuously that the P.N.S.C. Regulations and the letter of appointment did not contain any provision for pensionary benefits which could not have been granted by the learned Federal Service Tribunal. It is argued that the legal and factual aspects of the controversy have not been examined in its true perspective by the learned Federal. Service Tribunal by ignoring that the order of termination was not passed as a result of any disciplinary action, hence the question of show-cause notice or personal hearing does not arise. It is contended that termination being simplicitor and free from any stigma and in view of the retrenchment policy framed by the P:N.S.C.
Due to financial crises could not have been interfered by the learned Federal Service Tribunal as the matter does not fall within its domain of jurisdiction. It is further pointed out that the retrenchment policy was not mala fide which was essential for the survival of P.N.S.C. And to save it from financial collapse. It is also pointed out that the P.N.S.C. Had sustained loss of Rs.582 million after taxation and had an accumulated carried over loss of Rs.1052 million and suffered a further loss for the year 2001 in tune of Rs.312 million after taxation which increased the accumulated carried over loss of Rs.1364 million, thereby wiping out the entire paid up share capital including its reserves. It is urged emphatically that the petitioners had received full benefits after dispensation of their services and now it would be too late to challenge the order of termination as their appeals were hit by principle of estoppel which aspect of the matter has been ignored by the learned Federal Service Tribunal without any rhyme and reason. It is contended strenuously that in view of the principle of "master and servant" between P.N.S.C. And its employees the learned Federal Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction to dilate upon and decided the controversy and the provisions as contained in section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the "Act", has been misinterpreted and misconstrued.
12. Mr. Manzoor Ali Khan, learned Advocate Supreme Court along with Mr. Ghulam Qadir Jatoi, learned Advocate Supreme Court entered appearance on behalf of the respondents and controverted the view point as portraited on behalf of the P.N.S.C. By supporting the judgment impugned for the reasons enumerated therein except that the learned Federal Service Tribunal should have declared the intervening period on leave with pay instead of leave due. It is also contended that the learned . Federal Service Tribunal had complete jurisdiction to decide thee controversy pursuant to the provisions as contained in section 2-A of the Act and moreso, this objection was never agitated before the learned Service Tribunal and this point being a new one cannot be agitated now.
13. We have carefully examined the contentions of both the parties in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. We have minutely perused the judgment impugned. It is worth- mentioning that no objection qua the jurisdiction of learned Federal Service Tribunal was ever made while arguing the appeal before it. It is worth-mentioning that it was never agitated before the learned Federal Service Tribunal that principle of 'master and servant' would be applicable. We are conscious of the fact that law point can be raised at any time but in view of the nature of objection raised first time before this Court, in our considered view, it should have been agitated before the learned Federal Service Tribunal. It is to be noted that even the above so called law points are not included in these petitions. It must not be lost sight of that no blanket authority can be conferred upon the learned counsel to raise such an objection or law point according to his whims and wishes but it should have been done at the first opportune moment.
14. We have examined the principle of 'master and servant' as pressed time and again by Hafiz S.A.
Rehman, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of P.N.S.C. Who ignored that general law of 'master and servant' has undergone redical changes during the last couple of years mainly due to insertion of section 2-A in the Act, which was discussed on different occasions in various cases by this Court and at present there is little scope for any further interpretation. While discussing the provisions as contained in section 2-A of the Act in case titled Zahir Ullah v.
Chairman, WAPDA 2000 SCM R 826, it was held as under:- "The above view taken by the learned Tribunal does not appear to be correct as section 2-A which was inserted in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, by its own force, created a class of Government servants by fiction, for the purpose of allowing them to avail remedy of appeal before the learned Service Tribunal. Section 2-A ibid while providing that the service under any authority, corporation, body or organization established by or under a Federal Law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal GovernMent has a controlling share of interest is declared to be the service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such corporation or organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purpose of Service Tribunals Act, does not make any differentiation between the employees working in such organization either as regular employees or contract employees or workmen. We are, therefore, of the view that as the appellants were covered by the provisions of section 2-A for the purposes of availing remedy before the Service Tribunal. The fact that they were employed in the organization/corporation on contract basis, could not disentitle them to the remedy of appeal which became available to them on account of incorporation of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Accordingly, the above appeals are allowed, the order of the learned Service Tribunal is set aside and the cases are remanded to the learned Service Tribunal with the direction to decide the same afresh in the light of above observations. There will, however, be no order as to costs."
15. The scope and object of section 2-A of the Act was also discussed in Abdul Hafeez Abbasi v.
Managing Director P.I.A.0 2002 SCM R 1034 by a Full Bench of this Court wherein it was held as under:--- " At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that the employees of the Authority, body or organization established under a Federal Law or is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has controlling share or interest have been treated/declared to be in the service of Pakistan only for the limited purposes under section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 namely that every such person shall be deemed to be civil servant for the purpose of the Act, otherwise for all practical purposes employees of such organizations cannot be treated in the service of Pakistan nor they enjoy rights/obligations available to a civil servant under Civil Servants Act, 1973. Admittedly when a civil servant having protection of statutory rules and regulations intends to approach the Service Tribunal he is required to prefer departmental appeal under section 4 but when an employee like members of P.I.A.C. Who have no statutory rules for controlling the affairs of their service they would not be obliged to approach the departmental authority for the redressal of their grievance, therefore, such employees legally cannot be compelled to do so and they can directly approach the Service Tribunal for the redressal of their grievance because they have been treated civil servants for limited purpose i.e. To seek redressal of their grievance relating to terms and conditions of their services from the Service Tribunal.
' It is also to be borne in mind that the Court/Tribunal seized with the matter is competent to interpret the law liberally with the object to extend its benefits largely to the aggrieved persons provided such interpretation has not violated the spirit of the law. Moreover it seems that section 2- A of Service Tribunals Act, 1973 after its promulgation has extended right to all the employees of the category falling within its ambit to have forum of Federal Service Tribunal for redressal of their grievances expeditiously instead of approaching the Civil Courts. Thus while reiterating the conclusions drawn hereinabove, it is held that the employees of P.I.A.C. Or employees of such other organizations which have no statutory rules governing the affairs of their services of their employees, can without filing departmental appeals, review or representation to the next higher authorities can directly approach the Federal Service Tribunal. As a result of above discussion we are of the opinion that judgments in the Gulbat Khan 1992 SCM R 1789 and Engineer Narain Das and others PLD 2001 SC 555 are distinguishable on facts as well as on law."
16. It was also held in United Bank Limited v. Shahmim Ahmed Khan PLD 1999 SC 990 that:--- "Section 2-A, Service Tribunals Act, 1973 which has been introduced in the Act through amendment, declares the service of any authority, corporation, body or organization established by or under a Federal Law and which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which Federal Government has any share or interest, as the Service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such authority, corporation, body or organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purpose of the Act.
' The intention of the Legislature is quite manifest. The Legislature by introducing section 2-A, in the Act, only wanted to provide a right of appeal before the Service Tribunals to an aggrieved employee of a corporation, authority, body or organization established under a Federal Law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest. It is significant that while section 2-A, has been introduced in the Act which deals with the rights of appeal of civil servants, no corresponding amendment has been made in the Civil Servants Act, which determines the terms and conditions of service of civil servants. If the Legislature intended to confer on the employees of Corporatio I controlled by the Federal Government, the status of a civil servant, they could have provided so by introducing appropriate amendments in the relevant service laws governing the Federal Government employees. In the absence of such amendments, the laws applicable to Federal Government employees could not automatically extend to the employees of the Bank. The contention that if the intention of Legislature was only to provide a remedy to an aggrieved employee of the Bank before the Service Tribunal, it was not necessary to declare the service of the Bank as the Service of Pakistan as this purpose could be achieved by simply declaring such employees as civil servants for the purpose of the Act, is misconceived.
' The Service Tribunals established under Article 212 of Constitution of Pakistan 1973, through Act, of appropriate Legislature, has exclusive jurisdiction to take cognizance of matters relating to terms and conditions of persons who are or have been in the Service of Pakistan including disciplinary matters. Therefore, in order to oust the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts and to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Service Tribunal in respect of matters relating to terms and conditions of service of bank employees, it was necessary that the employment under the bank be first declared to be the service of Pakistan. The declaration in section 2-A, of the Act to the effect that the service under an authority, corporation, body or organization established by or under a Federal Law or which is owned and controlled by the Federal Government or in which Federal Government has a controlling share or interest, shall be deemed to be in Service of Pakistan and the persons holding any post in such authority, corporation or body were deemed to be civil servants for the purpose of the Act, was meant only for the limited purpose of conferring a right on the aggrieved employees of such organization/corporation to avail the remedy of appeal before the Service Tribunal.
Therefore, insertion of section 2-A, in the Act did not change the status of the employee of the bank into civil servant for any other purpose. The employees of the bank notwithstanding the fact that they were deemed to be in the service of Pakistan and a civil servant for the purpose of the act to avail the remedy by way of appeal before the Tribunal in respect of their terms and conditions of service, continued to be governed by their existing terms and conditions of employment with the bank. The change in the forum of remedy could not alter their terms and conditions of service. In spite of above declaration by the Legislature under section 2-A of the Act that the employee will be deemed to be civil servant for the purpose of the Act, the corporate status of the bank was not affected or changed. Before the introduction of section 2-A, in the Act, the service of the bank employees were governed under Rules, which were framed by the Board of Directors of the Bank.
The rules governing employment of the employees with the bank had no statutory backing.
' The introduction of section 2-A, in the Act, did not change the status of the employees of the Bank into civil servants in so far their terms and conditions of service were concerned. In spite of introduction of section 2-A in the Act they continue to be governed by the same terms and conditions of service which applied to them before introduction of section 2-A, in the Act. The only effect of introduction of section 2-A, in the Act was that instead of ordinary remedy available to an aggrieved employee of the bank, in respect of his terms and conditions of service, he became entitled to take his grievance before the Service Tribunal established under Article 212 of the Constitution which alone could determine it now."
17. The judicial consensus seems to be that an employee of any corporation irrespective of the fact whether it has got statutory rules or not can approach the Service Tribunal for redressal of his grievances pursuant to the provisions as contained in section 2-A of the Act. The relationship of 'master and servant' pressed time and again by Hafiz S.A. Rehman, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court does not confer unbridled or unfettered powers to act whimsically or capriciously in violation of the principle of natural justice and well-settled norms of justice. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum laid down in case titled Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Nasir Jamal Malik 2001 SCM R 934 which is as under:--- "We have considered the arguments so advanced by both the sides in this behalf. It may be noted that in the judicial history of our country as well as in those countries where identical/ corresponding system of administration of justice is in vogue the principle enshrined in the maxim audi alteram partem has been made applicable expressly or impliedly in every instrument governing the proceedings which may be statutory or otherwise and if its absence is conspicuous by not making it a part of the instrument governing the proceedings. Though the principle of audi alteram partem is not universally accepted principle but emphasis on its application has always been made on those proceedings where adverse action is being contemplated to be taken against the person/persons who have at least a right to defend such action or during course of time they have acquired a right to negate allegations on basis of which an action adversely affecting their interest is being taken. To strengthen the arguments reference may be made to Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 45, (ii) Messrs Faridsons Limited, Karachi v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1961 SC 537, (iii) Abdur Rehman v. Collector and Deputy Commissioner, Bahawalnagar and others PLD 1964 SC 461, (iv) Abul A'la Maudoodi v.
Government of West Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 673, (v) University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmed PLD 1965 SC 90, (vi) Muhammad Hayat v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 321, (vii) Messrs Eastend Exports, Karachi v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Rawalpindi PLD 1965 SC 605, (viii)
Pakistan and others v. Public , at large PLD 1987 SC 304, (ix) Khaliluz Zaman v. Supreme Appellate Court, Lahore PLD 1994 SC 885, (x) Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi v. Additional District and Sessions Judge/Returning Officer, NA 158, Naushero Feroze 1994 SCM R 1299 and (xi) Faqir Ullah v. Khalil-uz- Zaman 1999 SCM R 2203.
' It may be noted that in the case of University of Dacca (ibid) question of consideration before this Court was as to whether the principle of Natural Justice (audi alteram partem) in the cases of expulsion of student, by University Authorities, for alleged indiscipline, misconduct and rowdyism is applicable. In this context it was held that in all proceedings by whomsoever held, whether judicial or administrative, the principle of natural justice have to be observed if the proceedings might result in consequences affecting the person or property or other right of the parties concerned. This rule applies even though there may be no positive words in the statute of legal document whereby their powers is vested to take such proceedings, for, in such cases this requirement is to be implied into it as the minimum requirement of fairness.
' As far as services of respondents are concerned though the principle of master and servant is applicable but in the case of Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. And others 1994 SCM R 2232 it was held that the action of the Corporation violating the principles of natural justice will be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. It was further held that violation of the maxim could be equated with the violation of the principle of law warranting pressing into service Constitutional jurisdiction.
Thus, we are inclined to hold that in the instant case appellants terminated the services of the respondents in violation of the principles of natural justice because before passing impugned order no opportunity was given to them to defend themselves against an unilateral adverse action intended to be taken against them?
' It may be observed that as per details of the service of each of the respondents noted in the above paras they were in the employment of the appellants for more than a period of 6 months, therefore, at least a right to defend had accrued to them against the proposed action of termination of their services which is some of the.Cases had taken place without assigning any reason whereas in some of the cases it was alleged that they managed their induction in the employment of P.I.A.C. Under the directions of Prime Minister's Secretariat but before the Federal Service Tribunal a consistent stand was taken due to their influence etc. Thus apparent contradictions in the reasons disclosed in the termination orders as well as the stand taken by the appellants, before the Federal Service Tribunal reflects mala fides of the appellants in removing the respondents from their services."
18. The law laid down in Nasir Jamal's case (supra) was also followed by this Court in case titled Abdul Hafeez Abbasi v. Managing Director P.I.A.C. 2002 SCM R 1034. The above aspect of the matter was also dealt by this Court in case titled Sui Southern Gas Company v. Narain Das PLD 2001 SC 555 wherein it was observed as follows:--- "18. Mr. Waseem Sajjad was right in contending that the application of master and servant rule is a common law concept which falls in the realm of contract. Clearly, in view of insertion of section 2-A in the Act, if the services of any person covered by the said enactment were wrongly illegally terminated, his grievance could be appropriately remedied by the appropriate Service Tribunal under section 5 of the Act, which reads thus:
5. Power of Tribunals.---(1) A Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against.
(2) A Tribunal shall, for the purpose of deciding any appeal, be deemed to be a Civil Court' and shall have the. Same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), including the powers of--
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) compelling the production of documents;
(c) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and documents.'
' It is, therefore, wrong to contend that on the theory of master and servant relationship the Tribunal is not authorized to reinstate an employee whose services have been illegally terminated. At this juncture, Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim argued that even if the respondents/employees are permitted to avail the benefit of the Rules they are not entitled to reinstatement in view of rule 21.1 of the Rules, which contemplates termination of services on three months' notice in case of permanent employees and, on one month's notice as contemplated under rule 6.1 read with 6.2 and 6.3 in case of temporary employees. Even this plea does not advance the case of the petitioner/Company any further. Messrs Wasim 'Sajjad and Muhammad Akram Shaikh are quite right in contending that after having elected to apply the constraints of contract/temporary assignment against the respondent/employees the petitioner-Company could not make a U-turn by placing reliance 'on rule 21.1 of the Rules."
19. The principle of 'master and servant' hardly renders any assistance to the case of the P.N.S.C.
20. We have adverted to the question that the respondents had received financial benefits after termination of their services which has also been decided by the learned Federal Service Tribunal holding that the amount so received shall be returned. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, reinstatement order passed by the learned Federal Service Tribunal is conditional and the entire financial benefits will have to be returned by the employees who had received it. It is, however, to be noted that merely receiving such an amount would not constitute estoppel and the appropriate legal remedy could be sought. In this regard reference can be made to case titled Enmay Zed Publication v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal 2001 SCM R 565. The learned Federal Service Tribunal has dilated upon all the contentions as agitated before it on behalf of the P.N.S.C. And decided the same by means of judgment impugned, relevant portion whereof is reproduced herein below for ready reference:--- "No doubt, counsel for the respondents has vehemently opposed the contentions raised by the Advocates for the appellants and has contended that it was a Retrenchment Policy which was even approved by Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of United Bank v. Shahmim Ahmed and 41 others reported in PLD 1999 SC 990 but in our view the said authority is distinguishable as the United Bank Ltd. Had introduced Retrenchment Scheme whereby payment of benefits under Golden Hand Shake Scheme was also introduced but in the instant appeals the appellants who had been offered payment of 3 months' salary in spite of the fact that they had put in service of more than 25 years. Even in Naseer Ahmed v. President United Bank reported in 2001 SCMR 786 and also in case of Tariq Inayat v. U.B.L. In C.P.L.A. No.2292' of 2001 vide judgment, dated 22-11-2001 pensionary benefits were ordered to be granted in accordance with Service Rules of the Bank concerned to those who had served for 25 or more years but the respondents have taken altogether view in cases of these appellants whereby they have deprived the appellants to serve the Department to complete the qualifying service for retirement. Even the Policy of last in first go was not adopted and main attack was made whereby they dispensed with service of those who were on the verge of reaching the age of superannuation or had in fact crossed such age. At the same time, the question of sustaining of losses has been disputed by the appellants as previous losses have been deducted from the profits earned in the recent years. Since this question has become controversial, we are not inclined' to go into further details as full accounts have not been placed before us nor this Tribunal is required to make thorough probe in the matter relating to such disputes.
16. The respondents had neither taken the plea of certain payments to the appellants in their Parawise Comments nor such mention has been made in the Affidavit-in-Sur-Rejoinder. Even nothing was said about certain payments during the course of arguments and when the counsel for the respondents was on the last leg of his arguments, he informed us that certain payments have been made to the appellants, proof of which has been filed after the arguments were heard.
These vouchers speak of the fact that the respondents had made calculations till 1996, whereas the dispensation order was passed on 30-1-2001. Some vouchers appear to have been prepared in 2002 and some letters appear to have been sent to the appellants in 2001 for collecting their cheques which shows that some of the appellants have received their gratuity and GPF, whereas some of them have not received the said amount meaning thereby that the respondents themselves were not sure about the final settlement and this was the reason that they were not in a position to raise this plea in their comments as well as their arguments. If at all any payment has been received by the appellants it would not operate as an estoppel against them as has been held in 2001 SCM R 565.
17. Since the entire exercise made by the respondents was in violation of the principles of natural justice and the action of dispensing with the service was initiated by the respondents was to deprive the appellants from getting their pensionary benefits, we would set aside the impugned order, dated 30-1-2001 and direct the respondents to reinstate the appellants and to make a fresh exercise of releasing those who have-reached the age of superannuation with, all pensionary benefits according to law and those who have not yet reached the age of superannuation to continue till they reach that particular age, considering their date of birth and also the date of their joining the job. In case any appellant has received some amount towards gratuity and GPF, the same would be returned by him within three months of his joining. The intervening period from the date of their dispensation from service, till the date of joining will be treated as leave of the kind due with continuity of service, whereas Appeals Nos.21 to 100 and 110 to 136 stand disposed of as the same have become redundant."
21. In sequel to above mentioned discussion the petitions being devoid of merits are dismissed. The P.N.S.C. May initiate fresh action, if so desired, in accordance with law and subject to all legal exceptions. Civil Petition No.32 of 2004 Pakistan National Shipping Corporation and others----Petitioners versus Aslam Malik----Respondent
22. This petition involving similar question of law and facts arising out of the same judgment of the learned Federal Service Tribunal, dated 4-11-2003 is also dismissed for the reasons as mentioned hereinabove.