' SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J.--- A suit for awarding damages and compensation amounting to 1,57,600 U.S. Dollars was instituted by the appellant before the Civil Court at Faisalabad. The break up of the claim for damages was stated in paragraph 12 whereas the cause of action for the same was disclosed in paragraph 13 of the plaint. The suit was contested by raising number of preliminary objections as also on merits by filing written statement by the respondent-defendant. Several issues were framed by the trial Court. The appellant-plaintiff produced documentary evidence and Ilyas Mahmood appeared as P.W,1 and Muhammad Abu Bakar as P.W.2. Further production of the evidence was, however, closed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 512-2000. On 20-12-2000, an application for permission to produce documents was filed which was dismissed by the learned trial Court on 22-12-2000, where after the evidence produced by the respondent-defendant was recorded and Shahzad Malik D.W.1 got recorded his deposition. Vide judgment, dated 17-1-2001, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit. This regular first appeal has been filed there against.
2. Apart from assailing adverse finding recorded by the trial Court in the judgment under appeal, the appellant has assailed the correctness and legality of order, dated 22-12-2000, whereby the application for production of documents had been dismissed. The learned counsel contends that the application was rejected by the trial Court without disclosing any cogent reason and without appreciating the relevance and importance of the documents mentioned therein. It is contended that order dated 5-12-2000, whereby evidence of the appellant-plaintiff was closed by the trial Court could not stand in the way of the Court to permit the production of the documents mentioned in the application. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that the appellant- plaintiff himself had got a direction issued from this Court for expeditious decision of the suit and the application, therefore, was rightly dismissed by the trial Court as the Court felt obliged and duty bound to dispose of the case expeditiously. It is contended that since the documents had not been relied upon or produced earlier, the application was rightly dismissed by the Court.
3. There is a specific grievance made by the appellant qua order, dated 22-12-2000 in the memo.
Of appeal (clause-L) that the application for production of the evidence was rejected without cogent reasons and accordingly it has been prayed that:-- "It is further prayed that the application for the grant of additional evidence may kindly be accepted and the order of the learned Civil Judge dated 22-12-2000 passed contrary to law may as well be set aside."
' In that view of the matter, we have considered it appropriate to examine the legality of order, dated 22-12-2000 passed by the trial Court. Suffice it to observe that in paragraph 3 of the application, it was averred that the documents mentioned therein inadvertently could not be produced and if the same are not allowed to be produced the appellant would suffer an irreparable loss. The documents so mentioned are:-- "(1) Bill of Lading issued by Maersk Line dated 10-2-1997. (1-A) Bill of Lading issued by Maersk Line dated 10-10-1996.
(2) Bill of Lading issued by Maersk Line dated 20-5-1996.
(3) Bill of Lading issued by Evergreen dated 8-10-1995.
(4) Authority Letter issued by the Directors Dawood Exports (Pvt.) Ltd. Dated 15-11-1998."
' The said application was supported by affidavit of Ilyas Mahmood Director of the plaintiff- company. The said application was contested by filing written reply without any counter-affidavit.
However, the reason which prevailed with the learned trial Court in rejecting the application was that the evidence of the plaintiff had already been closed on 5-12-2000 and that in view of direction issued by High Court, the suit was to be decided within specified period, which was going to expire. It shows that instead of keeping in view the provisions of rule 2 of Order 13, C.P.C., which are attracted to such an application the Court acted under influence of direction issued by High Court for deciding the suit expeditiously. It was obliged to consider and decide the application in accordance with law on its merits despite the fact that in view of the direction for expeditious trial of the suit the evidence of the plaintiff had already been closed on 5-12-2000.
' It may be observed that in paragraph 7 of the written statement, the defendant had come out with its plea and explanation for non-delivery of the goods at the port of destination. It as averred that:- "The factual position is that all cargoes which are meant for the port of Asuncion, Paraguay, are carried through the port of Buenos Aires, Argentine due to the reason that the port Asuncion is not capable of receiving big vessels and only smaller vessels/ barges can be handled at the said port.
It is the normal practice by carriers to onward carry the cargo meant for Asuncion in small vessels or barges."
' Since such a plea had come up for the first time through the written statement, non-reliance upon the said documents particularly at Serial Nos.1 to 4 of the application along with the plaint was of no worth or relevance. The appellant-plaintiff through these documents wanted to show and prove his plea to counter the one raised in paragraph 7 of the written statement. The documents so sought to be produced had thus, material bearing and relevance to the controversy involved, in particular qua issue No,5. In The Lahore Improvement Trust v. Messrs Khuda Bakhsh-Meral Din PLD 1956 Lah. 252, it was observed that the object of Order 13, rule 2, C.P.C. Was to exclude forged documents and not to exclude genuine documents. It was further observed that the Court had the discretion in permitting or refusing production of documents which it was required to exercise keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. In United Bank Ltd. Karachi v. Shabbir Ahmad Abbasi and another PLD 1981 Kar. 255, it was observed that while exercising judicial discretion to receive or reject documents the Court should construe the procedural provisions liberally and in favour of reception of documents rather than rejection. Similar was the view taken in Shabbir Ahmed Abbasi v. United Bank Limited Karachi and others PLD 1981 Kar.
596. It may be observed that in the reply filed by the respondent the authenticity of the documents was not disputed in so many words rather it was pleaded that "they are all private documents and would need formal proof which, if granted would go against the order of the High Court for early disposal". The documents sought to be produced by the appellant-plaintiff would undoubtedly have been of relevance and importance for the decision of the matter. The rejection of the application that if permission was allowed, it would run counter to the direction of the High Court (whereby the Court had been asked to decide the case expeditiously), was based on extraneous reasons, unsustainable in law. We agree with the learned counsel that the respondent-defendant should have also an equal opportunity to rebut/disprove the assertion of the appellant-plaintiff.
We are also conscious of the fact that the appellant-plaintiff should have made such a move before the trial Court soon after the written statement had been filed by the respondent-defendant and would, therefore, for such a lapse burden the appellant-plaintiff with costs of Rs,5,000 subject to which the application for production of the documents is allowed and would set aside order, dated 22-12-2000. As a consequence whereof, the judgment and decree loses its validity.
' In view of the above, we allow this appeal and remand the case to the trial Court for fresh decision in accordance with law. No order as to costs.