This is an appeal against the decision of the learned Chairman of the First West Pakistan Labour Court, Karachi, dated 30th January 1970, on an application under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordnance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), for prohibiting the continuance of strike by the appellants. The facts giving rise to the present appeal briefly put are these.
2. The respondents, Shalimar Silk Mills Limited, made an application against the appellants, under section 34 of the Ordinance and prayed that the Court may be pleased to adjudicate the dispute between the parties that under the settlement arrived at between the Mill and the Union the latter was barred from raising any financial demand 'against the former. Subsequent to the application under section 31 of the Ordinance, the Mill made an application under section 45 of the Ordinance for prohibiting the Union to discontinue the strike. The learned Court was pleased to order the discontinuance of the strike. The appeal is directed against the said order.
3. Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned Representative for the respondents, has rats-.d a preliminary objection that the appeal is not maintainable, as the order on an application under section 45 of the Ordinance does rot amount to an award.
4. I have heard Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Mahmood A: Ghani, the learned Representative for the respondents. I have come to the con--clusion that a decision under section 45 of the Ordinance does not amount to an award. Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned Advocate for the appellants rightly contended that the Court has to look to the order in order to decide as to whether it is an award or a mere decision. Award is defined under section 2(it) of the Ordinance. It reads as under:-- "'award' means the determination by a Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award ;"
5. Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned Advocate for the appel--lants very strenuously contended that the prohibition of the strike amounts to a decision relating to an industrial dispute Kid, therefore, it is an award. In my opinion, any matter relating thereto must be read ejusdem generis with industrial dispute. A general meaning cannot be given to "any matter relating thereto", so as to include an order passed on an application under section 45 of the Ordinance. The underlying idea under Ina the Ordinance appears to be to expeditiously resolve the differences and the disputes between the workers and the Management. It is only where the decision can be said to be a determination Tri of industrial dispute that appeal has been provided. The idea appears to be that if the Court has prohibited lock-out, it should be the end of the matter. Similarly, if the Court has prohibited strike, the party against whom the order ha been passed must accept it gracefully and carry out the order in the interest of labour and the Management. There is no doubt that section 37 of the Ordinance makes clear distinction between a decision and the award. It is only an award which is' appealable and not a decision. Mr. Ghani, the learned Representative for the respondents drew my attention to the old provision of section 26 .of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 (herein--after called the repealed Ordinance), which is equivalent to section 45 of the Ordinance. A decision under section 26 of the repealed Ordinance was specifically made appealable raider section 16 of the repealed Ordinance. The framers of the present Ordinance were award of the provision of sec--tion 16 of the repealed Ordinance. The omission to make a decision under section 45 of the Ordinance appealable seems to be with a purpose. The purpose being, as I have a already observed, to resolve the dispute between the parties quickly, so that the Union and the Management resume their respective duties to the advantage of both the parties.
6. Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned Advocate for the appel--lants contended that a perusal of the order of the learned Court would show that it had decided the dispute between the arties by holding the strike as illegal and, therefore, it amounts to determination of the industrial dispute between the patties. I do not think so. A decision under sec--tion 45 of the Ordinance is a discretionary one. It is not an arbitrary decision, but a judicial one. The learned Court has to give some grounds for pro-- hibiting the strike. It is not necessary for me at this stage to go into the grounds given by the learned Court for having come to the conclusion that it was a fit case for prohibition of the strike.
Admittedly, the application under section 34 of the Ordinance is still pending adjudication. The Legislature for good reasons did not deem it proper, in the interest of the labour and the Management, that an interim order pending a dispute under section 34 of the Ordinance be made appealable.
7. For these reasons, I would hold that no appeal lies. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.