1. The above cited eleven identical appeals are directed against the common order, dated 11-6-2004 whereby Customs Appeals No. K-803 to 813 of 2002 were dismissed by the Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi Bench III, Karachi, being barred by limitation.
2. Mr. Akhlaq Ahmad Siddiqui, learned counsel for the appellant, has vehemently contended that, though, the appeals preferred before the Tribunal were, according to the appellants on case, time- barred by 66 days but in the applications under section 224 of the Customs Act, 1969, filed along with these appeals, plausible explanation was furnished, which had entitled the appellants for condonation of such delay in,filing of appeals and adjudication on merits. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance upon one case from Indian jurisdiction reported as 2003 Current Civil Cases 180 (Lakhan Chandra Paramanik and others v. Bihar State Housing Board and another).
3. Having heard the arguments of the learned counsel and on perusal of material placed on record we are of the opinion that no illegality has been committed by the Tribunal while passing the impugned order, thereby dismissing the appeals of the appellant, being barred by limitation.
4. Indeed, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable for condonation of delay in customs appeals but even for considering the question of condonation of delay under section 224 of the Customs Act, 1969, equitable principles of law, safeguarding legal rights of both the parties, are to be adhered to. Thus, it is to be seen that whether delay caused was due to the reason beyond the control of party and a plausible explanation, not shadowed by negligence, has been furnished by the defaulting party for condonation of such delay, which seems to be lacking the instant cases. Once the appeals preferred by the appellant before the Tribunal were found time-barred by over two months, valuable rights have accrued in favour of opposite party which cannot be brushed aside/done away lightly.
5. Moreover, the appellants, being Government functionary, are not entitled for any special treatment in the matter of condonation of delay as has been held by the Superior Courts time and again.
6. Reference in this A regard may be made to the following observations of the apex Court in the case of Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and another v. Ghulam Ghaus and others (1974 SCM R 38);-- ."--- It is, firmly established principle that when a litigant has allowed the normal period of limitation for a legal proceeding to expire, he has to explain each day's delay beyond a period of limitation. This Court has always adhered to the view that in civil matters, delay in filing appeals or petitions, save in exceptional cases should not be lightly condoned, for a valuable right has accrued to the other party of which it cannot be deprived except for very substantial reasons. To make departments of Government exception to this rule would be placing a premium on the negligence and want of proper diligence in public offices. It is pertinent to observe that where Legislature considers it necessary to make the Government an exception to the ordinary rule of limitation, it always makes express provisions in that behalf. Sixty years limitation for suits by the Government under Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (Act IX of 1908) and six months limitation for appeal against acquittal by the Government are instances in point."
7. For the forgoing reasons all the above titled appeals are dismissed in limine along with the listed- applications. .