The brief facts out of which the present appeal arises are that Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 found that appellant has committed professional misconduct as contained in Clause 3 of Para 4 of Schedule I of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 in respect of non-payment of stipend to the students vide intimation dated 27th April 1995. The appellant being aggrieved filed appeal under Section 20(k) of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961.
2. The learned counsel of Respondents Nos, 1 & 2 raised a preliminary objection qua the maintainability of the appeal before this Court on account of territorial jurisdiction. He submits that show cause notice was issued to the appellant by Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 from Karachi on 13.7.1993. Final decision was also taken against the appellant by Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 at Karachi and intimation as also sent by Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 to the appellant from Karachi on 27.4.1995. The competent authority has framed the regulations under the provisions of the Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1965. According to Regulation No, 136 location of the office of the Institute be located at Karachi, therefore, appellant has to file appeal before the High Court at Karachi as the Tribunal below, who has decided the case against the appellant does not fall tinder the territorial jurisdiction/subordination of the Lahore High Court, and provisions of Sections 15 to 20 C.P.C. are not applicable in view of Section 120 C.P.C. as the impugned order was passed by Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 against the appellant under the provisions of Special Law. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments:- Ahmed Nawaz and others vs. Abdul Khalique and others (2002 MLD 1783).
Mahmood Hussain vs. Pakistan International Airlines (1989 PLC (C.S.) 549).
M/s. Nadia Ghee Mill (Pvt.) Limited vs. The Federation of Pakistan and others (1992 MLD 2154).
He further submits that precedents on the subject under Constitutional jurisdiction are not attracted in the present case as in the present case the Tribunal below has decided the, case under Special Law. He further ,urges that no cause of action accrued wholly or partially at Lahore, therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to take the cognizance of the matter. He further urges that Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 are the real contesting respondents whereas remaining respondents are proforma respondents. He further submits that Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 have no sub-office at Lahore, therefore, appeal is not maintainable before this Court. He further. submits that ministerial proceedings were held in Lahore and Islamabad, which does not reveal that cause of action has accrued wholly or partially to the appellant at Lahore.
3. Learned counsel of the appellant submits that Respondents Nos, 6 to 10 are trainee students and secure apprenticeship with the appellant, who have submitted complaint to Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 from Lahore to Karachi pointing out 'certain allegations qua alleged misconduct against the appellant under the provisions of Chartered Accountants Ordinance, 1961 and rules and regulations framed there-under. Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 issued a show-cause notice to the appellant from Karachi on the basis of the said complaint on 17.7.1993. The appellant submitted reply to Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 sent the same from Lahore to Karachi. The complaint was entrusted to the investigation committee by Respondent Nos, 1 and 2. The investigation committee constituted a sub-committee to probe into the matter in November, 1993. The sub-committee investigated the matter at Lahore. The sub-committee submitted its report to the investigation committee, which considered the report of the sub-committee in its meeting held on 10.11.1993 at Islamabad. The Investigation Committee submitted its report to the Council and the Council provided personal hearing to the appellant at Lahore on 2/3.10.1994. The Council decided the case against the appellant in its meeting held on 22.1.995, 23.1.1995 at Karachi and intimation was sent from Karachi to Lahore to the appellant on 27.4.1995. Learned counsel of the appellant on the basis of the aforesaid facts submits that cause of action wholly or partially accrued to the appellant at Lahore and alleged misconduct was also committed by the appellant at Lahore. Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 have also sub office at Lahore situated at Thokar Niaz Baig, Lahore, therefore, appeal is competent before this Court in view of Section 20(c) Explanation-II. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments:-- "Messrs Brady & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. vs. Messrs Sayed Saigol Industries Ltd. (1981 SCMR 494).
Muhammad Yasin vs. Ch. Muhammad Abdul Aziz (PLD 1993 SC 395).
He further submits that all the ministerial proceedings were conducted by Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 against the appellant either in Lahore or at Islamabad and thereafter malafide Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 have taken the decision against the appellant at Karachi. Meaning thereby Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 have provided hearing to the appellant at Lahore and announced the Judgment at Karachi, therefore, appeal filed by the appellant before this Court is maintainable. In support of his contention, he relied upon Piao Gul vs. The State (PLD 1960 S.C. 307). He further submits that Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 cannot raise objection on the well known principle of estoppel and waiver as the respondents have filed C-Reference No, 1-C of 1992 titled as The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan vs. Mr. S.M. Masood F.C.A. Managing Partner, M/s S.M. Masood and Company, before the Lahore High Court. The learned counsel of Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 did not deny the fact that Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 have filed the aforesaid reference before the Lahore High Court.
4. Learned counsel of Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 in rebuttal submits that proceedings were initiated against the appellant at Karachi and final decision was also taken against the appellant at Karachi. The remaining proceedings although ministerial proceedings were conducted against the appellant at Lahore or Islamabad and Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 have no sub-office at Lahore.
Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 have only ministerial office at Lahore for the purpose of conducting examinations and others.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the record.
6. It is better and appropriate to produce Section 120 C.P.C. to resolve the controversy between the parties:-- Section 120. Provisions of applicable to High Court in original jurisdiction.--(1) The following provisions shall not apply to High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, namely Sections 16, 17 and 20."
The aforesaid provision of law as interpreted by the Karachi High Court in M/s Fateh Textile Cotton Mills' case (PLD 1964 (W.P.) Karachi 11). The relevant observation in as follows:-- "12. Sections 16, 17 and 20 and Clause 12 of the Letters Patent prescribed the forum and the place for suing. But these sections do not apply to High Court. Section 5 of the High Court of West Pakistan Establishment Order, 1955 and also Section 8 of Sindh Act VII of 1926 do not prescribe the place of suing. Section 5, only saves the jurisdiction of Karachi Bench as exercised by it under Section 8 of Sindh Act of 1926. It is my view that the jurisdiction of the High Court has been enlarged rather than restricted by removing altogether the restrictions contained in Sections 16, 17 and 20. The Legislature could never have intended to take away the jurisdiction of the West Pakistan High Court (Chief Court of Sindh) altogether, since the High Court got that jurisdiction as a place of suing through these sections. Two alternative conclusions can arise from the non-applicability of Sections 16,..17 and 20. C.P.C. to the High Courts. Firstly that the West Pakistan High Court could not entertain any suit, whatsoever and secondly. it could entertain suits from all places' within its jurisdiction. It is true that all the District Courts except Karachi District Court have no limit prescribed to their pecuniary jurisdiction. The present suit could, therefore, be filed at Hyderabad. The question for decision, however, before me is whether it could not be instituted in the High Court at Karachi.
The restrictions prescribed by Sections 16, 17 and 20, C.P.C. having been removed the original jurisdiction of the High Court is enlarged and it has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit."
It is pertinent to mention here that the aforesaid provision of law was subsequently considered by the Karachi High Court and reaffirmed the earlier View in Dr. Muhammad Shabbir Khan vs. Messrs Abdul Dhabi Petroleum Co. Ltd., Karachi (PLD 1975 Kar. 138) and laid down the following principle:-- In the absence of statutory provisions regarding the place and forum of suing applicable to the High Court, the general principle of law was applicable according to which the plaintiff has no right to sue a defendant in a personal action except when he resides or carries on business within the jurisdiction of the Court."
Section 120 C.P.C. was also interpreted and reaffirmed the earlier view taken by the Karachi High Court in Syed Muhammad Anwar IOW vs. Messrs Bangladesh Shipping Corporation (1991 CLC 473).
Section 120 of C.P.C. was also interpreted by Karachi High Court in Messrs Agricides (Put.) Ltd. vs. Messrs Ali Agro Supply -Corporation Ltd. (1988 CLC. 59) and laid down a principle that provisions of Section 120 CPC does not in no way restricted jurisdiction of High Court but on the contrary, enlarged the same. .The aforesaid view was also reaffirmed by the Karachi High Court in Abdul Majeed's case 988 CLC 2451). The aforesaid provisions of law was again interpreted by the Karachi High Court in M/s Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. vs M/s Nisar Rice Mills etc. (NLR 1994 CLJ 46), The relevant observation is as follows:-- "These, on principle, may be either the defendant's residing or carrying on business or in cases of plurality one of the defendants being so subject or the cause of action, wholly or in part, arising or a' property, subject-matter of the suit, being situate or a defendant-firm or company having main of branch office within the jurisdiction, which can attract the Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court.
In the absence of at least one of these aspects the jurisdiction would not be attracted. The presence of Section 120 on the statute book cannot mean and was never mean to meant that a High Court covered by that section could exercise jurisdiction merely for the asking without any jurisdictional fact being pleaded or shown. The only logical effect of Section 120 of the Code seems to be that, subject to discretion of the Court itself, the technicalities in Sections 16. 17 and 20 cannot be pressed into service to divest a High Court of its Original Civil Jurisdiction if such. on general principles, is otherwise attracted."
The general principles of C.P.C. are applicable in spite of exclusion in Section 120 C.P.C. has the law laid down in Syed Muhammad Anwar lqbal. vs. M/S. Bangladesh Shipping Corporation (1991 Law Notes (Karachi) 113). In seeking non-maintainability of the appeal, learned counsel of the respondents sought in fact strength from the "Doctrine of forum non-convenience" which means power of Court to decline jurisdiction when convenience of parties and ends of justice would be better served if actions were brought and tried in another forum as defined in Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition as noted by my learned brother Tassaduq Hussain. Jilani, J in T. Zuhair Limited and 2 others vs. Judge, Banking Court No, III, Lahore and another (2000 .CLC 1405). The restriction prescribed under 'Sections 16, 17 and 20 are not applicable qua the Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court in view of Section 120 C.P.C. which does not mean by exclusion of those provisions of law the power of this Court is restricted. In fact by exclusion of these provisions has widened the power of this Court as the law laid down in M/s. Popular Pharmacy vs. M/s. Nova Bio Medical etc. (PLJ 1997 Karachi 313). Although provisions of Sections 16, 17 and 20 C.P.C. do not apply to the High Court in exercise of original civil jurisdiction, the Court will have jurisdiction to entertain a suit if the cause of action has arisen within its local limits of the jurisdiction as the law laid down by the Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation vs. M/s. Sheikh Muhammad Amin & Co. (1992 CLC 2047). The aforesaid provisions of law again interpreted by the Karachi High Court in Sindh Employees Social Security vs. Habib Sugar Mills Limited Nawabshah (PLD 1993 Karachi 61) and observed as under: The accumulative effect of the above cited provisions shows that for the purposes of institution of proceedings the analogy of Section 15,. C.P.C. is to be followed."
The aforesaid provisions of law also interpreted by the Karachi High Court and reaffirmed the said principle in Master Mehboob Ali Sarwar's case (1998 CLC 1722).
7. The net shell result of the aforesaid discussion on the basis of the principle laid down by the superior Courts by interpreting aforesaid provisions of law are as follows:--
(i) By exclusion of Sections 16, 17 and 20 does not mean to curtail the jurisdiction of this Court and in fact by omission the jurisdiction of this Court is extended and provided vast discretion to entertain the suits it can easily be comparable with Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan viz-a-viz Article 199 of the Constitution. Under Article 199 of Constitution, there are certain parameters prescribed by Legislature in its wisdom qua entertaining Constitutional petitions whereas under Article 184(3) of the Constitution such restrictions are not imposed by the Legislature in its wisdom as is highlighted by the Honourable Supreme Court in the following judgments:-- Benazir Bhutto's case (PLD 1988 S.C. 416); I.A. Sherwani' s case (1991 SCMR 1041); Mian Nawaz Sharif's case (PLD 1973 S.C: 473);
(ii) Exclusion does not mean that general principles of C.P.C. are not applicable qua entertaining the appeal under original civil jurisdiction. In the present case as mentioned above, misconduct was allegedly committed by the appellant at Lahore. Trainee has informed Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 by filing the complaint from Lahore to Karachi. Ministerial proceedings were held at Lahore and Islamabad. Show cause notice, final decision and intimation were sent by Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 to the appellant at Lahore. Respondents Nos, 1 1 and 2 have also its sub-office at Lahore.
Department also interpreted the provision of law that this Court has jurisdiction by the conduct of Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 in view of Reference I-C of 1992 filed by the respondents before this Court as law laid down in Nazir Ahmad vs. Pakistan and 11 others (PLD 1970 S.C. 453). Complainants are also residing at Lahore. Members, who had investigated the matter also reside at Lahore as is evident from the memorandum of parties name, therefore, at any cannon of justice friction of cause of action has accrued to the appellant at Lahore. Friction of cause of action will be part of cause of action and confers jurisdiction on a- Court within the territorial jurisdiction of the little occurs. In arriving to this conclusion, I am also fortified by the law laid down in the following judgments:- D. Munirangappa vs. Amidaya la Venkatappa and other (AIR 1965 Masoor 316); Tribni Prasad Singh and other vs. Ramasray Prasad Chaudhri (AIR 1931 Patna 241); Swaminatha Mudali vs. M. Saravana Mudali & others (AIR 1918 Madras 383); Munna Lal vs. Chhabil Das and others (AIR 1918 Lahore 329); Nittala Achayya and others vs. Nittala Yellama and others (AIR 1923 Madras 109); Faqir Muhammad vs. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Kashmir Affairs Division, Islamabad (2000 SCMR 1312); It is also settled principle of law that suit can be filed where wrong committed or part of cause of action accrued. In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by the law laid down in Akmide vs. Akbar Ali Malik (2000 MLD 1693) and Faqir Muhammad vs. Pakistan Through Secretary Ministry of Interior & Kashmir Affair Division, Islamabad (PLJ 2001 SC 377). Section 20(C) (Explanation-II) is attracted in the present case on the basis of general principle as highlighted in the preceding paragraphs. In arriving to this conclusion, I am fortified the law laid down in the following judgments:-- Parvathy Amma vs. Lakshmikutty Amma (AIR 1960 Kairala 313); Messrs Rahmana Trading Company vs. Messrs Eagle Star Insurance Company (PLD) 1960 S.C. 202); Messrs Brady & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. vs. Messrs Sayed Saigol Industries Ltd. (1981 SCMR 494); WAPDA and 2 others vs. Mian Ghulam Bari (PLD 1991 SC 780); It is also settled principle of law that each and every case is to be decided on its own peculiar circumstances and facts and every judgment must be read as applicable to the peculiar facts proved or assumed to be proved, as per law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in "Trustee Board of Karachi's case" (1994 SCMR 2213). The judgments cited by the learned counsel of the respondents are distinguished on facts and law in view of the aforesaid discussion.
8. In view of what has been discussed above, the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel of Respondents Nos, 1 and 2 that appeal is not maintainable on account of territorial jurisdiction has no force and the same is repelled.