FAKHRUDDIN G. EBRAHIM, J.---On 15-2-:978, an order was made by the Government of Sind under section 5(1)(6) and (d) of the Sind Maintenance of Public Order (Ordinance XXXI of 1960), confining the movements of the petitioner to Karachi Division only, with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in a meanner prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order in the Province of Sind for a period of 30 days.
2. On 17th of March, 1978, the respondent District Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner (South) made an order under section 5, subsection (1), clauses (b) and (d) of the Sind Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance whereby Syed Nair Hussain Zaidi, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Karachi was directed to ensure that the petitioner shall reside and remain within the premises of her house situate at 70, Clifton, Karachi for a period of 30 days on the ground that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order and the detaining authority was satisfied that she was likely to continue to engage herself in prejudicial activities and it was, therefore, necessary to prevent her from doing so.
3. On 23rd March 1978 the respondent communicated the grounds on which the aforesaid order of detention had been made, which grounds read as follows:- "Police has reported that Miss Benazeer Bhutto daughter of Mr. Z. A. Bhutto resident of 70, Clifton, Karachi and her close associates have been actively indulging in political activities to mobilise support and win favour for her father. Her speeches, press statements which have appeared in the press from time to time, meetings with the other P. P. P. Workers Leaders of P. P. P. And visits to the various places in the City are a part of her plan to launch a campaign to get sympathies of the public in favour of Mr. Z. A. Bhutto.
As a part of her plan she has visited Lyari area on 17-12-1977 to meet P. P. P. Workers and held meetings with other leaders of P. P. P. Who frequently visited her house at 70, Clifton, Karachi. She also met Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto and Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada in Sind High Court on 13-3-1978 and 14-3- 1978 respectively. On her directions the female workers of P. P. P. Had planned to take out a procession wearing dupattas having colours of P. P. P. Flag.
It is apprehended by the police that the said Miss Benazeer Bhutto daughter of Z. A. Bhutto would try to create a situation prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order."
It was further stated in the aforesaid communication that the petitioner was at liberty to make representation, if any, against her detention to the Home Department, Government of Sind, Karachi.
4. On 29th of March, 1978 the petitioner filed the present petition challenging the aforessaid order dated 17th March, 1978. During the Pendency of this petition the petitioner's period of detention was twice extended for 30 days each by order dated 15th April, 1978 and 15th May, 1978 (wrongly did on 15-4-78). The petitioner amended her petition so as to enable her to challenge the two extensions of the order of detention dated 17th March, 1978.
5. Mr. Mujeeb Pirzada, the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this petition raised three contentions. Firstly, that delay in furnishing the grounds of detention; secondly, that the grounds were vague, indefinite and completely lacking in particulars and lastly, there was na nexus between the material and the grounds of detention and the satisfaction of the detaining authority was not induced by existence of reasonable grounds.
6. In support of the first contention the learned counsel invited our attention to subsection (5) of section 5 of the said Ordinance which obliges the detaining authority to communicate "as soon as may be the grounds on which the order has been made", and urged that the words "as soon as may be", have been interpreted by the superior Courts in Pakistan to mean simultaneously with the detention order but not later than 24 hours, which is the dead line within which the grounds must be served. However, the only decision which fixes this dead line is the case of Moulvi Ghulamullah v.
District Magistrate, Campbellpur (PLD 1967 Pesh. 195), in which the learned Judges observed that the grounds on which the District Magistrate made the order must have been known to him at least on the day when the order was made and can ordinarily be served on the petitioner along with the order almost in all cases though cases may be visualized which will be very exceptional and rare in which the detaining authority may not be able to serve the grounds along with the order and in order to meet such a contingency the detaining authority was permitted to serve the grounds after the order of detention but the grounds must be served without the least possible delay and 24 hours be considered to be the dead line within which the grounds may be served, According to the learned counsel this decision was approved by the Lahore High Court in the case of Mohammad Aslant v. Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1968 Lah. 1324). In this case Anwarul Haq, J.
(as he then was) after observing that ordinarily the detaining authority must be in possession of the grounds before it makes order and accordingly there could be in such cases no justification for delaying the communication of grounds to the person affected, went on to state as follows :- "We consider, therefore, that the use of the phrase ---as soon as may be', appearing in subsection
(5) of section 5 of the Ordinance must be taken as indicating the intention of the law-maker that the grounds must be served without any avoidable delay, keeping in view the circumstances of the case. We are further of the view that the question whether this has been done is clearly a matter open to judicial review. It is true that Fundamental Right No. 2 stands suspended under the Proclamation of Emergency made by the President of Pakistan on the 5th of September, 1965, but precisely the same provision is present in subsection (5) of section 5 of the Ordinance under which the impugned order has been made. It is erroneous to think that the deletion of the time limit of 15 days from section 5(5) of the Ordinance has the effect of relieving the detaining authority of its duty to act promptly in the matter of furnishing the grounds of detention to the person affected. Far from enlarging the period in this behalf, the amendment has, on the contrary, abridged the period to ---as soon as may be', which must in the vast majority of cases mean simultaneously with, or soon after the order is made. If there is any delay it must be justified to the satisfaction of the Court.
And if sufficient cause is not shown for not communicating the grounds as soon as possible, then the detention order in question must be declared to be without lawful authority on account of its failure to comply with an essential requirement of the law under which it is issued."
In the aforesaid judgment the learned Judge extensively quoted from a Supreme Court judgment reported in the case of the Province of East Pakistan v. Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali and others (PLD 1966 SC 286), in which a delay of 5/6 days was regarded as fatal to the validity of the action taken under section 41 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance.
7. The learned Advocate-General in reply contended that a delay of six days in furnishing the grounds cannot be regarded as inordinate. As aforesaid, in the Supreme Court case relied upon by Anwarul Haq, J. (as he then was) 5 or 6 days delay was considered to be fatal. Moreover, in the present case the detention was for a period of 30 days only and if as much as a week is taken in furnishing the grounds, by the time the detenu makes a representation and it is considered by our easy going beaurcracy, the detenu will have substantially suffered in the deprivation of her liberty.
The alternate argument of the learned Advocate-General was that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the time within which the grounds of detention should be served on the detenu and that this question has to be determined with reference to the circumstances of each particular case which comes before the Court and went on to point out the circumstances existing in the country immediately after 17th March, 1978 when the order of deten--tion was made in the present case, namely, the pronouncement of the judgment by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court on 18-3-73 convicting Mr. Z. A. Bhutto for the murder of Nawab Amir Ahmed Khan which created a law and order situation, which of necessity demanded top priority from the law enforcing authorities in the Province. When we pointed out to the learned Advocate-General that there was nothing in the counter-- affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent that any such situation existed the reply was that we must take judicial notice of these events. I am, however, of the view that even if we could take judicial notice of this situation, the existence of which would in all probability make the delay in furnishing the grounds not unreasonable, it was necessary to assert in the counter-affidavit that the delay in furnishing the grounds arose on account of the preoccupa--tion of the detaining authority in matters requiring priority. In the counter--affidavit filed there is not only absence of such an assertion, but on the other hand, it is stated that "the grounds were supplied within one week of making of the order whereas the law allows a margin of two weeks for the purpose." In other words it was not a pre-occupation with the urgent affairs of the Province that the grounds were not supplied forthwith but because of an erroneous impression at the law granted two weeks time for this purpose. As held by the Division Bench of Lahore High Court in the aforesaid case of Mohammad Aslam, if sufficient cause is not shown for no communicating the grounds as soon as possible then the detention order must be declared to be without lawful authority on account of its failure to comply with an essential requirement of the law under which it is issued. My conclusion, therefore, is that the unexplained delay of six days is furnish--ing the grounds in the present case makes the order of detention without lawful authority.
8. Coming to the second contention as to the vagueness of the grounds, Mr. Mujeeb Pirzada, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the allegation against the petitioner stated is that she was along with her close associates indulging in political activities to mobilise support and win favour for her father, but neither the nature of activities have been particularised nor the names of the associates disclosed nor the specific ends towards which these activities are directed. This ground does not even disclose the place or the time of such activities. It is next alleged that she made speeches, made press statements, held meetings at various places in Karachi but again without specifying when the speeches and statements were made or meetings held and what were- its contents or at least the gist of what transpired at the alleged meetings with the other P. P.
P. Workers in the city. The only specific assertions in the grounds are that she visited Lyari area on 17th Decem--ber, 1977 and she met Mr. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto and Abdul Hafiz Pirzada in the Sind High Court on 13-3-1978 and 14-3-1978 but as to what according to the detaining authority transpired thereat, the petitioner is left guessing. Lastly, the allegation was that on the direction of the petitioner the female workers of the P. P. P. Had planned to take out a procession wearing dopattas having colour of P. P. P. Flag, but again neither the female workers were identified nor the place and the time of the conspiracy.
9. The learned Advocate-General, however, pointed out that the grounds and its alleged vagueness must be examined in the context of Martial Law Regulation 24 dated 1-10-1977 which allowed only limited political activities, specifically confined to holding of close door meetings of the Central and the Provincial executives of political parties and press conferences, press state-- ments or interviews by individual politicians and even this limited political activity ceased on, promulgation of Martial Law Regulation 33 on 28-2-1978. In the context of these two Martial Law Regulations, the learned Advocate. General contended that it was sufficient if it was alleged against the petitioner that she was indulging in political activities not permissible under the aforesaid two Martial Law Regulations and, therefore the lack of particulars, if any, was wholly immaterial or inconsequential. The question however, before us is not that the petitioner contravened M. L. R. 24 or 33 but whether in the grounds the activities of the petitioner which gave rise to the apprehension in the mind of the detaining authority that she was acting or likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public order or safety have been sufficiently particularised to enable her to make an effective representation. The true test for examining whether the grounds furnished are in order or not is to find whether a person could on those grounds make an effective representation apart from a bare denial of the accusation conveyed to them. In the instant case, the maximum that the detenu could, on the grounds fur--nished to her, do was to make a bare denial and therefore, not such as to enable her to exercise her right to make an effective representation.
10. This brings me to the last contention on behalf of the petitioner that there was no nexus between the grounds and the material before the detaining authority. The argument was that the material before the detaining authority was unrelated to the grounds furnished to the petitioner.
The learned counsel referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court (PLD 1973 Kar. 421) in which it was observed that the duty of the Court is to examine the material with a view to ascertain bow far the conclusions arrived at by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention are justified by the material, in other words the nexus between the material and the grounds of detention and to determine how far the satisfaction of the detaining authority was induced by the existence of the reasonable grounds. Now, in so far as the grounds are concerned it is clear to me that read as a whole they refer to the alleged activities of the petitioner in the city of Karachi. This view is further fortified by the circumstance that for a period of one month prior to the impugned order dated 17- 3-1978 the petitioner was restrained from moving out of the Karachi district. Now, in so far as the material is concerned we have an undated letter addressed to the Deputy Commissioner South, Karachi by the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Frere Sub-Division, Karachi. This letter merely recites what is contained in the ground of detention furnished to the petitioner. This report by itself can hardly be considered as sufficient material on the basis of which any reasonable person could Pass an order of detention. In a case reported in Fida Muhammad v. Province of N.-W. F. P. And others (PLD 1973 Pesh. 156) to which at our request attention was invite by the learned Advocate- General for which I am grateful to him, the Court refused to sustain an order of detention based only on information laid) before the detaining authority by the S. Superintendent of Police, Peshawar. The other material placed before us relates exclusively to the petitioner's activities outside Karachi Division. There is, therefore, no material relatable to the grounds which as aforseaid are limited to the alleged prejudicial acitivities of the petitioner in the City of Karachi. It follows, therefore, that in the absence of any material before the detaining authority of the alleged prejudicial activities of the petitioner in the city of Karachi which is the basis of the order of detention, the detention order cannot be sustained in law. The learned Advocate-General was of the view that the grounds of detention furnished to the petitioner do not exclusively relate to her activities in Karachi but also to her activities in Sind for which there was sufficient material before the detaining authority. Assuming the learned Advocate---General to be right, since it is impossible to say how far the alleged Sind activities, operated upon the mind of the detaining authority as distinct from comparatively more detailed Karachi activities in the grounds and whether or not the detaining authority would have at all made the impugned order in relation to alleged Karachi activities, the order must necessarily fail as a whole. In Full Bench case before the High Court of West Pakistan in the case of Rehmat Elahi v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1965 Lah. 112) Mr. Justice Muhammad Yaqoob Ali observed as follows :- "Similarly, if there is more than one ground on which the order of preven--tive detention is based, then each ground has contributed to the satis--faction of the detaining authority and none could be excluded from consideration. Conversely, if the detaining authority considered any material as insufficient to warrant preventive detention he will not set it out in the grounds of detention served on the person detained to make an effective representation against it."
These observations were again approved by our own Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Government of West Pakistan v. Haider Bux Jatoi and another (PLD 1969 SC 210), in the following words :- "Reliance was placed on the view expressed by a Full Bench of the High Court in Rehmat Elahi v.
Government of West Pakistan PLD 1965 Lah. 112 that wrongful inclusion of grounds renders order of arrest and detention under section 3 of the Ordinance illegal. It was said in that case if there are more than one ground on which the order of detention is based then each ground has contributed to the satisfaction of the detaining authority and no ground can be excluded from consideration in judging the legality of the order of detention . . . . "
11. For reasons aforesaid it is hereby declared that the orders dated 17th March, 1978, 15th April, 1978 and 15th May, 1978 are without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The petitioner will also be entitled to costs of this petition.
12. Before I part, I must place on record may appreciation of the manner in which Mr. Zahoorul Haq, the learned Advocate-General of the Province conducted this case which was not only fair and in full consciousness of his onerous task but dignified restraint which is a welcome departure from the politically partisan law officers of the State of the recent past.
AJMAL MIAN, J.----I agree.