SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN): The appellant Mirza M. Anwar Beyg, was originally appointed as B Grade Clerk in the Central Government in the Department of Public Relations Directorate (Kashmir) on 16-8-1948. In the same department he was promoted on 1-11-1969 as Assistant. The Public Relations Department (Kashmir) was merged with the Press Infor--mation Department on 16-10-1959 and the appellant also carried his post to that Department. Early in 1967, some posts of Information Assistants in the Press Information Department were to be filled is and the appellant on the basis of a test held in this behalf was selected and appointed as such with effect from 29.8- 1967. Certain other posts of Information Assistants were also filled in which according to the appellant was done against the recruitment Rules then in force. The appellant was promoted as Assistant Information Officer with effect from 4-1-1968 and the period of probation was completed by him on 4-1-1969.
2. It is alleged by the appellant that his appointment as an Assistant Information Officer was regular against the departmental quota but the Government against the rights of the plaintiff adjusted those persons also who were appointed in an irregular manner and whose appointment has been regularised in illegal way. In 1970 on the recommendations of the Federal Public Service Commission some appointments in the cadre of Assistant Information Officers were to be made.
The appellant contends that he was advised to go on leave to protect the reversion of one affected person. Consequently he went on leave with effect from 30-1-1970 but while on leave he was reverted as Information Assistant retrospectively with effect from 31-1-1970. This reversion according to him was illegal as the appellant was not junior most person who could have been reverted while many persons junior to him were allowed to continue. Against this order of reversion the appellant appealed to the higher authority but did not get any favourable reply. According to him the Establishment Division and the Law Division on a reference from Information Ministry advised the acceptance of the appellant's claim but that advice was not given effect to by the Press Information Department and the Information and Broadcasting Division.
3. The appellant further alleged that certain other irregularities were committed by the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 by appointing M. Shamsuddin respondent as Assistant Information Officer with effect from 12-8-1972. He states that the previous reversion of the appellant which was without any legal basis resulted in a recurring loss of Rs. 250 per month in his salary and that in the seniority list he has been shown junior to those persons who were not regularly appointed. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of this appeal the appointment of persons against whose appointment the appellant had taken exception was regularised by order of the President dated 2-6-1977 made in exercise of the powers under section 23 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The appellant in his amended appeal has challenged the validity of this order also which was made on the request of the Infor--mation Division with the intention of preventing the appellant from succeeding in his claim in the present appeal. He contends that this order is illegal and void and the appellant's reversion referred to above and his emplacement in the seniority list is not correct and that he is senior to respondents Nos. 4 to 9 who have been illegally appointed against the spirit of the relevant rules.
4. The learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 Syed M. Shahudul Haque and the learned counsel for respondent M. Shamsuddin. Mr. Muhammad Hanif Bhatti have raised a preliminary objection with regard to limitation and have argued that the two claims of the appellant being barred by time this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. There are two orders which have been challenged by the appellant. The one is dated 10-2-1970 whereby the appellant was reverted from the post of Assistant Information Officer to the post of Information Assistant. The other is the publication of the seniority list on 6-4-1972. It has been contended by these counsel for the respondents that the appellant having not received any redress from the departmental authority from the order dated 10-2-1970 should have come up in appeal to this Tribunal within 6 months of its establishment, i.e. On 22-8-1974 and on the same date he should have approached the Tribunal against the fixation of his seniority.
5. Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act provides that any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, made by the departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service may within thirty days of the communication of such order to him or within six months of the establishment of appropriate Tribunal which ever is later prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Since in the present case the impugned orders had been passed long before the establishment of this Tribunal the period for filing the appeal is six months from the date of the establishment of the Tribunal and this date falls on 22-8-1974. The appeal, therefore, against both the orders is barred by time as it was filed on 16-11-1974 after the expiry of the period of limitation.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that proviso (a) to section 4(t) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 bars the filing of the appeal for a period of ninety days after he had made an appeal or representation to the departmental authority and that the appellant can come to this Tribunal at any time after expiry of ninety days if no final order is made. He contends that period of thirty days mentioned in section 4(1) comes into operation only when the departmental authority passes the final order and not otherwise. According to him the departmental authority to whom the appeal was made had not passed any order on the appellant's appeals and representations and therefore, he can come at any time before the Tribunal. 1n this contention we do not find any force. The period of limitation for filing of appeal against the final order of the authority is thirty days in the normal circumstances and if the departmental appeal had been preferred then for a period of ninety days, the aggrieved person cannot come in appeal to the Tribunal. He gets a right of appeal to the Service Tribunal after) the expiry of the said period and the right, on the plain reading of section 4(1), A must be exercised within thirty days. In other words the appeal should be filed within four months after the making a departmental appeal and any) appeal filed thereafter would be treated as barred by time, unless in the meantime an order is passed by the appellate authority which gives the aggrieved person a fresh cause of action. In the present case, however, the appellant could not avail of the opportunity of waiting period of ninety days and the limitation period of one month because till that time the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, or its predecessor law namely the Service Tribunals Ordinance, 1973 had not come into force. The period for limitation in his case was, therefore, six months from the date of the establishment of the Tribunal but he approached us after the expiry of that period. No application for condonation of delay was made in writing nor the learned counsel for the appellant made any prayer for condonation at the time of hearing of the appeal. It is established law, that where a period of limitation is provided, then each day of delay has to be explained.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 had been corresponding with him and had been informing him from time to time that the matter was under consideration and in these circumstances the appellant had to wait for a final order from the depart mental authority. In this contention here is no force because the provision with regard to limitation is very clearly enacted in section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and that does not provide for any enlargement of time in case the Department sits over the aggrieved person's representation and tells him that the matter was under consideration.
8. For the aforegoing reasons, this appeal is held to be barred by time and is dismissed as such.
9. Needless to mention that the dismissal of this appeal shall not bar respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to consider the appellant's case if there is any substance in it for they have obtained the order of the President in respect of certain persons to avoid hardship to them and if the appellant can accommodated in a similar manner, this order should not come in the way of respondents Nos. 1 to
3. According to the appellant he is suffering a loss of Rs. 250 per month which claim if correct can be redressed by the Department if found, genuine 'notwithstanding the dismissal of his appeal on the question of limitation.
10. Parties to be informed.