This Constitutional petition challenges the order of Punjab Civil Services Appellant Tribunal, Lahore dated 19-11-1973, declaring respondent No. 4 as senior to petitioner. The petitioner has been working as Superintendent in Central Police Office. The respondent No. 4 was working as Junior Superintendent under the Provincial Government Transport Authority. On 31-10-1964, the Provincial Transport Authority was dissolved and the respondent No. 6 was appointed as a Junior Superintendent in the Central Police Office. In course of time, on 2-8-1969 the respondent No. 4 was promoted to officiate as a Senior Superintendent. The petitioner claiming seniority against the respondent No. 4 filed an appeal Case No. 267/184 of 1971, before the above-mentioned Tribunal but withdrew the same on 13-4-1972. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn vide order of the Tribunal dated 13-4-1972. The respondent No. 4, then, made a representa--tion to the departmental authorities which was accepted and he was declared as senior to the respondent No. 4 vide order dated 22-2-1973. This order was challenged by the respondent No. 4 through an appeal, Case No. 157/97 of 1973, before the Tribunal which was allowed by the Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 19-11-1973. The petitioner was promoted as Senior Superintendent some time in 1974. The petitioner filed the Constitutional Petition/Writ Petition No.2242/S-74 challenging the order of the Tribunal dated 19-11-1973 on 20-11-1974. While petition was pending, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service on 23-7-1975.
The petitioner challenged the last mentioned order by means of another Writ Petition No.1909/S-75.
He also challenged the compulsory retirement by means of an appeal before the Tribunal constituted under Punjab Act IX of 1974. The two writ petitions of the petitioner came up for hearing on 11-12-1975. The second petition, Writ Petition No 1909/S-75, was dismissed as having abated under Act IX of 1974. The first Writ Petition No. 2242/S-74 was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner having already been retired from service and there being no way of saying as to when his appeal against compulsory .Retirement would be decided by the Tribunal, there was no use keeping the petition pending. If the petitioner were to succeed in his appeal before the Tribunal against the order of compulsory retirement, he could apply for revival of the writ petition. The petitioner's appeal against compulsory retirement was finally accepted by the Tribunal on 21-9- 1977. The petitioner applied for the revival of Writ Petition No. 2242/S-74.
2. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 has raised a preliminary objection that question of revival does not arise as the writ petition itself is incompetent because against the order of the Civil Service Appellate Tribunal, an appeal can be filed before the newly-constituted Tribunal under Punjab Act IX of 1974. He further submitted on merits that the petitioner had filed an appeal against the declaration that the contesting respondent No. 4 was senior to the petitioner and the petitioner withdrew that appeal on 13-4-1972. Thereafter, he had .No right to go to the departmental authorities and get a declaration that he was senior to the respondent No. 4. This declaration was rightly set aside under the impugned order. He also submitted that the impugned order was passed on 19-11-1973 and the petition was filed on 20-1 i-1974. It is barred by lashes. He has also submitted that the impugned order of the Tribunal even if erroneous is nor interferable by this Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. He has relied on Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (PLD1974SC139).
3. In reply to the preliminary objection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that against the order of the Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, appeal was not competent before the newly-constituted Tribunal under Act IX of 1974, as appeal lay only against final order of a departmental authority and the Civil Services Appellate Tribunal was not a departmental authority.
On merits, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the first appeal was withdrawn from the Civil Services Appellate Tribunal so as to file a representation before the concerned authority which was done and the concerned authority, in fact accepted the representation.
Therefore, the earlier withdrawal of the appeal is not fatal. He has also contended that the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the respondent No. 4 was senior to the petitioner because the petitioner has been a Gazetted Officer drawing higher pay scale than the respondent No. 4, since before the respondent No. 4 came to join the concerned office.
4. The preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 is without merit.
Under Punjab Act IX of 1974, an appeal is provided against a final order of departmental authority.
But no stretch of imagination, a Tribunal can be said to be a departments authority. Departmental authorities are functionaries of administrative or executive arm of the State. Their job is to administer and carry out what is directed. Tribunals and Courts deal with adjudicatory function.
These decide disputes. The basis of two bodies is distinct and separate. Slight overlapping is not to lead to the confusion in thought about the fundamentals. The position, requirement and attitude of the two bodies are distinct and have to be so for successful functioning. The Tribunal constituted under Punjab Ordinance IV of 1970 with special qualification for adjudicatory function can hardly be construed to be a department authority for each of the numerous Departments of the Provincial Government carrying out administrative functions. Therefore, the preliminary objection has no force. Consequently, the writ petition earlier disposed of on the ground that the petitioner stood compulsorily retired and his appeal against compulsory retirement was not by then decided and that if he were to succeed in appeal he could ask for revival of the writ petition, has to be taken up when he had succeeded in the said appeal. Now, coming to the merits of the petition it is to be noticed that the petitioner has been declared junior to the respondent No. 4 on the ground that the latter was appointed as Senior Superintendent on 2-8-1969 and admittedly the petitioner was not appointed to this post until some 5 years later in the year 1974. There is nothing on the record to show that the order promotion of the respondent No. 4 to the post of Senior Superintendent dated 2-8-1969 had been challenged in appropriate proceedings ever by the petitioner and certainly not successfully. That being so, the respondent No. Being in the grade of Senior Superintendent and petitioner not reaching to this grade until 5 years later, can hardly claim seniority. The other consideration was that that the petitioner having earlier filed an appeal claiming seniority over respondent No. 4 and having withdrawn the same and the appeal having been dismissed as withdrawn, the petitioner would C have no right to get that order of the Tribunal nullified from the departments authorities by means of a representation. This fact was brought to the notice of the departmental authorities that the petitioner had filed an appeal claiming seniority over respondent No. 4 before the Tribunal and that appeal having been dismissed as withdrawn, the authority should no intermeddle in the matter. The authority upset the arrangement and the order of the authority was successfully challenged by the respondent No. 4 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was quite right in saying that the earlier appeal filed by the petitioner having been withdrawn and dismissed as such the petitioner had no right to re-agitate the matter. The petitioner having gone to the Civil Services Appellate Tribunal and come back, had to keep peace. It is not possible for this Court to grant relief to the petitioner which he had claimed and withdrawn 7 years earlier by his voluntary act It is exiomatic that orders passed by a competent authority within jurisdiction are not susceptible to interference in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction either even if the orders be erroneous.
5. For the foregoing reasons, there is no force in this petition. It is, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances the parties shall bear their own costs.