' This order shall dispose of C.Rs. Nos.43 to 45 of 2005 as common questions are involved.
2. On 7-6-2004, the petitioner filed three suits for possession preemption of the respective suit lands purchased by the respondent through various mutations attested on 10-2-2004. The suits were put up before a learned trial Court on the same date and the petitioner was directed to deposit Zar-e-soim within 30 days. Admittedly, the petitioner did not make the said deposit within the said period of 30 days expiring on 6-7-2004. On the other hand, he filed application on 24-7- 2004 for extension of time on the ground that he was ill. The learned trial Court dismissed the application and consequently the suits on 10-9-2004. First appeals filed by the petitioner in all these three cases were dismissed in limine by a learned ADJ, Taunsa Sharif, on 9-10-2004.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that notwithstanding the terms of section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the learned trial Court had the jurisdiction to extend the time and as such the impugned orders do fall within the mischief of section 115, C.P.C.
4. I have already noted above the admitted factual position of the three cases above. Now there is no denial that 30 days time was given and the deposit was not made. Section 24 of the Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1991, lays down in mandatory terms that the Zar-e-soim will be ordered to be deposited and the period for the deposit shall not exceed beyond 30 days of the filing of the suit.
Subsection (2) of section 24 of the said Act provides that in case of failure of the deposit, the suit shall be dismissed.
5. To my mind the period having been prescribed by statute with a mandatory term that it shall not exceed 30 days beyond the date of filing of the suit, the learned trial Court would not be having jurisdiction to extend the time. This is how the said provisions was interpreted by this Court in the case of Mst. Wafa Jan v. Mahram Zad (1995 CLC 2002) and the reasoning contained in the judgment is supported by a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Awal Noor v. District Judge, Karak and 8 others (1992 SCM R 746).
6. It will further be seen that power to extend time has been granted to a Court by virtue of section 148, C.P.C. However, this power can be exercised only where the time has been fixed by Court itself and not where the statute prescribed the time for doing of an act. All the three civil revisions are accordingly dismissed in limine.