Fazal-ur-Rahman, J.--This jail appeal is directed against the judgment of learned Special Judge for Suppression of Terrorisemt Activities/Sessions Judge (Ad hoc), Quetta dated 31.10.2000 whereby, the appellant was convicted under Section 302 PPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life.
He was also given the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.0 Abdul Karim son of Nabi Dad has filed Criminal Petition No, 139 of 200 under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. and has 'prayed for the enhancement c sentence from life imprisonment to death awarded to the convict/appellant Since both the criminal appeal and criminal petition are arising out of on and the same judgment therefore, they are taken together and will be disposed of by one and the same judgment.
2. The occurrence is stated to have taken place on 21.12.1998 at about 11-15 a.m. at Quarry Road near Javed Autos, Quetta. The report of incident is stated to have been made by the deceased while he was in injured condition vide Fard-e-Bayan Ex. P/8-A wherein, appellant Amanullah was nominated in the said report to have made an attempt on the life of deceased by making firing upon him with T.T. pistol. It is stated that the deceased had received two bullet injuries. A case under Section 324 Qisas & Diyat Ordinance was registered against the appellant. It is stated that on 22.12.1998 at 12.45 p.m. Nabi Dad succumbed to injuries and the offence was substituted by inserting Section 302 Qisas & Diyat Ordinance. The offence is stated to have been committed with T.T. pistol. After usual investigation, the appellant was sent up to face his trial and on 26.3.99, the cognizance of the case was taken over by learned Special Judge Court of Suppression of Terrorist Activities, Quetta.
3. On 19.5.1999 charge under Section 302 PPC was framed by the learned Special Judge/Additional Sessions Judge-II, Quetta against the appellant, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
4. In support of its case, the prosecution examined PW-1 Abdul Rahim, PW-2 Muhammad Ashraf, PW-3 Shaukat Ali, PW-4 Muhammad Rafique, PW-5 Syed Azmat Hussain, PW-6 Dr. Muhammad Noor, PW-7 Jehangir Khan, PW-8 Raja Ishtiaq Hussain, PW-9 Abdul Rauf, PW-10 Amanullah and PW- 11 Sher Afgan.
5. In this statement recorded under Section 342 Cr.P.C. the, appellant has disputed the case of the prosecution and pleaded his innocence. The appellant while replying Question No, 24 put to him by the learned Special Judge has stated as under:-- Q. No,
24. What else do you want to say?
Ans: I have no enmity with the complainant nor .I have ever been quarreled with him. They have filed this case against me only on account of suspicious. PW-2 and PW-5 are the relative and neighbouring therefore, have recorded the statement. I was arrested from my house and I am innocent.
Neither, he made his statement on oath nor led any evidence in his defence.
6. The learned Special Judge formulated the following point for determination:--
1. Whether the accused committed Qatl-i-Amd intentionally causing the death of Nabi Dad son of Abdul Karim?
7. On the assessm ent of evidence, the learned Special Judge under Suppression of Terrorist Activities/Sessions Judge (Ad hoc), Quetta found the appellant guilty for the offence under Section 302 PPC and convicted him in the manner hereinabove mentioned.
8. We have heard Rana Ehsan Rafiq, Advocate learned counsel for pauper appellant. Assistant Advocate General and Raja Amir Abbas, learned counsel for state while Mr. Muhammad Mohsin Javed, Advocate has appeared for petitioner.
9. After having given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the relevant record with their assistance, we are of the view that there is no need. to dispose of the case on merit as we feel inclined to set aside conviction and sentence of the appellant and order retrial for inter-alia various reasons. Case involving use of T.T. pistol would be triable by Court of Session and not by Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act (XV of 1975), therefore, taking of cognizance by the learned Special Judge was without application of the judicial mind and being a non-scheduled offence, it was triable by Court of Session. Question of jurisdiction being a question of law could always be raised by any party at any stage including the appeal. Court itself is required before proceeding with the case, to examine whether it has jurisdiction in law to proceed or not. Merely, because a party to the proceedings has not taken any objection to the jurisdiction out of ignorance or for want of proper advise shall neither debar a party from taking such objection at the appellate stage nor the silence of a party or even waiver shall confer jurisdiction of a Court not vested in it in law.
Question of jurisdiction goes to the very root of the law and renders the entire proceedings coram non judice thereby vitiating the entire proceedings and making the judgment illegal and void. A matter ordinarily has to be dealt with in general jurisdiction and unless a case false squarely within special jurisdiction.
10. Reference can be made to the authorities reported in NLR 1999 Criminal 122 and PLD 2003 Quetta 11.
11. The perusal of statement of the appellant indicates that the examination of the appellant has not been made in accordance with the provisions of Section 342 Cr.P.C. The learned Special Judge has failed to give requisite certificate in his/her hand to the effect, that the statement of appellant was recorded in his/her presence and hearing and contain full and true account of the statement made by him. No doubt, the statement of the appellant is available on record but the certificate appended thereto is not in the hand writing of Presiding Officer. It is well settled that where law provides a procedure for doing a thing in a particular manner then that thing should be done in prescribed manner and in no other manner or should not be done at all.
12.The judgment is also not legal as the same is not in conformity with the mandatory provisions of Section' 367 Cr.P.C. According to Section 367 Cr.P.C., the judgment shall contain points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. The judgment must not be vague, it must conform all requirements of Section 367 Cr.P.C. It may be observed that the learned trial Court had charged the appellant for the offence u/S. 302 PPC and the Court has not specified the sub-section of Section 302 PPC. It is neither mandatory nor necessary at the stage of charge and may be ignored but it concerns much if sub-section is not specified in the judgment, where conviction is awarded in the case in hand. The trial Court has stated that the prosecution. has proved the case against the appellant but convicted him under Section 302 PPC for life without giving reasons for the same and specifying the sub-section of Section 302 PPC. We would have dealt with some other aspects of the case but we are, refrained to do so because that may prejudice the case of either of the parties. We are; of the view that the judgment under appeal is not sustainable in the eye of law for the reasons and authorities referred hereinabove. As far criminal petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. for enhancement of the sentence against the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Special Judge under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities is concerned, the same is not maintainable in view of observations made by this Court in the authority reported into 2001 P.Cr.L.J. 754. The relevant portion of which is reproduced below for the sake of facility:-- "From bare perusal of the above reproduced section, we are, of the opinion that the High Court has got inherent power to modify the sentence awarded to accused in exercise of powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. but not to enhance the sentence. (1999 MLD 2450). The inherent powers are not supposed to be exercised to override express provisions of law. (1999 MLD 946 and 535). It is held under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked and added where there are express provisions dealing with a particular subject or can be used to defeat the express intention of Legislature. In the case in hand provisional powers under Section 439 Cr.P.C. in view of Section 7(1) Act of 1975 was specifically excluded no Court shall have authority to revise such sentence or order to acquittal as the case may be" 1992 SCMR 2192."
13.Having regard to the above mentioned position, the impugned judgment is set aside and the case is sent to learned Sessions Judge (Ad hoc) or adjudication as a Sessions Case strictly in accordance with law. The record since received be sent to the learned Sessions judge immediately.
14.With the above observations, the appeal and revision stand disposed.
Amanullah Khan Yasinzai, J.--I have had an opportunity of going through the draft Judgment of my learned colleague Mr. Justice Fazal-ur-Rehman, and with all humbleness I am not in agreement with the findings viewed by my learned brother and for such disagreement, I have my own reasons; for, in my estimation, remand would not be warranted, in the peculiar circumstances of instant case.
Before, touching the merits of case, my learned colleague Mr. Justice Fazal-ur-Rehman, remanded the case on the following two grounds:--
1. T.T. Pistol was used in the commission of Crime, therefore, STA Court had no jurisdiction to try the case and it was to be tried by the ordinary Court of Sessions; and
2. Questions asked in statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. were not in accordance with law.
It may be observed that, before the trial Court, no such objection, regarding jurisdiction was raised and even in appeal before this Court, such objection was never raised and learned Counsel for appellant argued the matter on merits. Thus principle of estoppal would operate, on account of his acquiescence. It may be noted that, incident took place away back in December, 1998 and since then, appellant is behind the bar. Thus, remand of case on such point, would in no way advance the ends of justice, for the reasons that, STA Court is also presided over by the Sessions Judge, secondly Section 302 is included in the schedule attached to the STA Act, 1975 and procedure of trail is also the same, and besides no prejudice has been caused to the appellant, on account of his trial by the STA Court. Therefore, remand of case for de-novo trial would not promote the ends of justice, rather it would amount to re-putting of appellant in ordeal of trial, especially when no useful purpose would be served, and it would only amount to a substitution of a stamp and nothing more. For sake of arguments, even if the case is remanded to trial Court, neither accused nor prosecution, can bring a better case, then what has been brought on record, and above all, no prejudice has been caused to appellant, even if the case was, tried by the learned STA Court, and in view of the peculiar circumstances of instant case, for such a technicality, it would be an exercise in futility . In this regard I am fortified with the observations made in the case of (2002 SCMR 203), wherein following observations have been made: This objection could also be taken at the time of hearing of appeal but admittedly it was not raised at that stage also. It is salutary principle of law that an objection about jurisdiction/competency of a forum should be raised at initial stage in order to avoid complication/inconvenience which may arise ultimately in the reversal of the entire process. Therefore, even if it had been found that the High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, even than the appellant could not be permitted to raise such an objection at this stage on account of the principle of estoppel which would operate against him because of his acquiescence/silence and particularly when otherwise in this case the trial Court/Sessions Judge and the High Court as such did not lack jurisdiction in the matter."
In the draft judgment, my learned brother has also observed that since incriminating pieces of evidence were not put to accused in his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. therefore, on this score as well the case is to be tried afresh. It may be observed that, where an incriminating piece of evidence has not been put to accused, the same cannot be considered as an evidence against him and besides, no such objection has been raised by the appellant nothing has been brought on record, to show, as to what prejudice has been caused to appellant. Thus proceedings on such ground cannot be nullified, as it has not prejudiced the appellant. Rather it has benefited him. In this regard I am fortified with the observations made in the case of Munir' Ahmed v. The State (2001 SCMR 56), wherein reads as under: "In laws, if an incriminating piece of evidence is not put to an accused and it has resulted in causing prejudice to the accused the same shall not be considered as evidence against him.
When we asked learned counsel for the appellant whether this ground was agitated by the appellant's counsel before the Court below, he frankly replied in negative with an assertion that it was not necessary to do so. But we may observe that absence of any challenge to such circumstance may in appropriate cases amount to admission that no prejudice thereby was caused to the accused/appellant."
Thus, in view of the above discussion in my considered opinion, no ground for remand of case for de-novo trial exists. Thus the case to be decided on its own merits.
Since dissenting view has been taken, therefore, this case may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice, for appointing of a Referee Judge, within the meaning of Section 378 Cr.P.C. The appeal is not being disposed of on merits, which is likely to be sent to the Referee Judge, any findings on merits, may cause prejudice to otherside. Sd/- Judge Akhtar Zaman Malghani, J.--This criminal appeal alongwith Criminal Revision Petition No, 139 of 2000 was heard by the Hon'ble Members of the Division Bench of this Court comprising of Mr. Justice Amanullah Khan Yasinzai and Mr. Justice Fazal-ur-Rehman. The draft of proposed judgment written by Mr. Justice Fazal-ur-Rehman was gone through by the Hon'ble Senior Member of the Bench and he found himself unable to agree with the conclusions as contained in the draft judgment proposing for remand of the case to Sessions Judge (Adhoc) for adjudications strictly in accordance with law. Consequently, I having seized with the matter as Referee Judge, issued notices to the learned counsel for the parties for hearing.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and complainant as well as learned Additional Advocate General. The learned counsel for the appellant supported the dissent judgment written by the Hon'ble Senior Member of the Bench Mr. Justice Amanullah Khan Yasinzai and so the learned counsel for the complainant. Both the learned counsel in support of their contentions relied upon the judgments referred in the judgment authored by the Hon'ble Senior Member of the Bench. The learned counsel for the appellant in addition to mentioned judgments also referred to the judgments reported in 2001 PCr.L.J. 453, PLJ 1998 (Criminal Cases) 1507 and 2002 PCr.L.J.
3. On the other hand the learned Additional Advocate General supported the judgment written by his Lordship Mr. Fazal-ur-Rehman, J and contended that the Special Court constituted under Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 had no jurisdiction to try the case and record conviction as the weapon of offence with which the appellant has allegedly committed the murder of deceased, did not fall in the Schedule-II of the Act-XV of 1975 at the time of commission of offence. He further contended that the consent of the parties could not confer jurisdiction on the Court or Tribunal, if it originally lack the jurisdiction nor by the acquiescence of the parties any order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, could be maintained. The learned Additional Advocate General maintained that the case was triable under the regular law, where the complainant has also remedy by way of appeal and revision, in case the accused is acquitted or awarded lesser sentence, whereas no such remedy is available to the complaint in the situation where the case is tried under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975.
According to learned State Counsel even the State cannot seek enhancement for sentence awarded by the special judge as provisions of Section 439 Cr.P.C. have been specifically excluded under the provisions of Act-XV of 1975, as such; prejudice would be the natural result of the proceedings conducted by the Special Court constituted under the Act-XV of 1975, having no jurisdiction in the matter.
4. I have carefully considered the. contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the parties in the light of relevant provisions of law and the record. I have also carefully gone through the proposed judgment written by his Lordship Mr. Justice Fazal-ur-Rehman and dissenting judgment of the Honourable Senior Member of the Division Bench (Mr. Justice Amanullah Khan Yasinzai).
5. The perusal of judgment reveals that Mr. Justice Fazal-ur-Rehman has proposed to remand the case to Sessions Judge (adhoc) on the following grounds:--
(i) Case involving use of T.T. Pistol would be triable by Court of Sessions and not by Special Court constituted under Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, as such; the proceedings and trial before the Special Court in the instant case were Without jurisdiction.
(ii) The learned Special Judge has failed to give requisite certificate in his/her hand as provided under Section 342 R/W Section 364 Cr.P.C.
(iii)The judgment is not legal as the same is not in conformity with the mandatory provisions of Section 367 Cr.P.C.
5. As the point of jurisdiction goes to the very root of the case, therefore, I intend to dispose of the same first. It may be noticed that the Special Courts setup under the Act XV of 1975 have been conferred with exclusive jurisdiction of the cases falling under the Schedule of the Act. According to Schedule if an offence punishable under Section 302 is committed in the course of the same transaction in which offence specified in sub-paragraph (i), (iii) and (iv) of Paragraph (a) or Paragraph (b) and (c) is committed or in addition to or in combination with such offence, then the Special Court setup under the Act XV of 1975 would have exclusive , jurisdiction. It may be noticed that in the instant case, according to prosecution case, the appellant has allegedly committed an offence with T.T. Pistol, and it appears that the Special Court has taken cognizance of the offence thinking the same falling under Paragraph (a) r/w Paragraph (c) of the Schedule. Paragraph (c) of the Schedule at the time of commission of offence was as under:-- "Any offence punishable under the. Arms Act, 1878 (XI of 1878), or any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 (West Pakistan Ordinance No, XX of 1965), namely Sections 8, 9 and 10, if committed in respect of a cannon, grenade, bomb, rocket; or a light or heavy automatic or semi-automatic weapon such as Kalashnikov, a G-III rifle".
6. It may further be observed that on 15.12.1996 through Ordinance CXVII the words "including semi- automatic or automatic pistols and those commonly known as T.T. Pistols" were inserted in the Schedule but said Ordinance was not revived and had expired; as such; on the date when the offence was allegedly committed by the appellant the above amendment brought through Ordinance CXVII of 1996 was not in existence and the murder committed allegedly through T.T.
Pistol was not triable by the Special Courts constituted under the Act XV of. 1975. Now the question arises as to whether the conviction of the appellant recorded by the Special Judge can be set aside being Coram-non-judice, when no objection regarding jurisdiction was taken by the appellant or for that matter by the prosecution during trial. It is settled law that the consent or acquiescence of the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court or Tribunal which totally lack jurisdiction and that the objection to the jurisdiction can be taken at any stage including appeal.
Similarly it is also obligatory for the Court or the Tribunal conferred with Special jurisdiction to itself see as to whether the matter falls squarely within its jurisdiction .before taking cognizance of the same. In this regard I am fortified by the judgment reported in 2000 P.C.R.L.J. 1317, relevant observations are reproduced herein below:-- "On the other hand, Mr. Raja Qureshi, learned Advocate-General Sindh, and Mr. Ryas Khan, learned Special Public Prosecutor, submitted that the appellant could submit an application before the A.T.C. under Section 23 of the A.T.A. for transfer of the case to the Court having jurisdiction but it was not done, and therefore, the appellant cannot be allowed to take this plea at the appellate stage.
We are not persuaded to agree with the submission because the question of jurisdiction is a question of law and can always be raised by any party at any stage including the appeal. However, if the objection to the jurisdiction is taken at appellate stage is should not involve recording of further evidence and should be on the basis of material already available on record. We are, further of the opinion that so far, the question of jurisdiction of a Court is concerned, a Court itself is required before proceeding with the case to examine whether it has jurisdiction in law to proceed with the case or not. Merely because a party to the proceedings lids not taken any objection to the jurisdiction, out of ignorance or for want of proper advice, shall neither debar a party from taking such objection at the appellate stage nor the silence of a party or even waiver shall confer jurisdiction on a Court not vested in it in law. The question of jurisdiction goes to the very root of the case and renders the entire proceedings as corum non judice, thereby vitiating the entire proceedings and rendering the judgment illegal and void, therefore, it is the duty of every Court to examine itself if it has jurisdiction to proceed with the case or not and the objection in this behalf can be raised at any stage. Objection to the jurisdiction of a Court is in the nature of "objection to the proceedings" and not an "objection in the proceedings" and thus primarily it is an issue between a party on whom the jurisdiction is exercised and the Court". In another ' judgment reported in PLD 2000 SC 816 in similar circumstances while dealing with the point of jurisdiction the Honourable Apex Court observed as under:-- "The case was tried under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 and being a Special Court it could only proceed with the scheduled offence as mentioned in the Schedule of said Act, including the offences under Sections 8, 9 and 10 of Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 if committed in respect of a cannon grenade, bomb or rocket, or a light or heavy automatic or semiautomatic weapon such as Kalashnikov, a G-III rifle or any other type of assault rifle. It is noted that Special Courts constituted under above Act, are Courts of limited jurisdiction and are only competent to proceed with the matters, which are mentioned in the Schedule of the Act. In this particular case the pistol in question, without any valid explanation, was not sent to the ballistic expert to find out if it was automatic or semi-automatic or ordinary. Learned A.G. before the High Court had contended that since the charge-sheet was submitted before Special Judge, as such it was to be presumed that it was semi-automatic. This argument found favour of the High Court and the pistol was treated as semi-automatic.
We are not inclined to accept above finding. In order to determine the exact caliber/status of the weapon it should have been referred to the expert as it was necessary to determine the issue of jurisdiction of the Court, learned High Court dealing with this point observed that irrespective of the fact that whether it was semiautomatic of otherwise the appellant was to be tried by a Court and either he would have been convicted or acquitted and so was done by Special Judge. Again, we do not agree with above finding and hold that Special Judge could not proceed with the matter unless it was established the offence was covered by Schedule of the Act".
Similar view was also taken by the Honourable Apex Court in the judgment reported in 1995 SCMR 59 wherein the criminal appeal file with leave of the Court by the State against the judgment of Lahore High Court, whereby appeals filed by the respondents against their conviction under Section 13-E Arms Ordinance, 1965 recorded by the. Special Court constituted under Act XV of 1975 were allowed "holding the trial before the Special Court to be Coram-non-judice", was dismissed.
7. So for, the case law relied by the learned counsel for the appellants and complainant and referred in dissenting judgment of the Honourable Senior Member of Bench (Mr. Justice Amanullah Khan Yasinzai) is concerned, with all humbleness and due deference, I may observe the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case, firstly; because in that case no objection regarding jurisdiction was taken before the trial Court as well as before the appellate Court, while in the instant case the same come into consideration during the hearing of appeal and the learned Additional Advocate General for State has taken objection to this effect; secondly in that case the accused was tried by the Sessions Judge Under Section 302(b) PPC and acquitted the accused but on appeal High Court after setting aside the judgment of trial Court convicted the accused under Section 302(b) PPC and an objection was taken before the Honourable Apex Court regarding jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the acquittal appeal on the ground that the challan was submitted by the Investigating Agency under Section 302(b) PPC r/W 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 and the contents of charge also reveal commission of the offence under Section 17(3) of the Ordinance 1979, though specifically said Section was not mentioned in the charge, as such; learned counsel was of the view that the appeal was competent before the Federal Shariat Court and not before the High Court. The Honourable Apex Court repelled the contentions of the learned counsel by observing that no such objection was taken at the time of framing of charge nor before the appellate Court at the time of hearing appeal, therefore, same could not be allowed to be taken for the first time before the Apex Court.
Whereas in the instant case objection regarding jurisdiction is being dealt with at the appeal stage.
Additionally; in the reported case the question regarding jurisdiction of trial Court was not involved as in the present case.
8. As I propose to remand the case to the learned Sessions Judge (ad hoc) Quetta after coming to conclusion that the Special Court constituted under Suppressions of Terrorist Activities (Special Court) Act, 1975 has no jurisdiction to try the case in view of above discussion, therefore, I feel it not necessary to dilate upon the other grounds i,e, failure to append certificate in his/her own hand by the Presiding Officer and comply with mandatory provisions of Section 367 Cr.P.C.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the judgment dated 31.10.2000 passed by Special Judge STA/Sessions Judge (ad hoc) is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the Sessions Judge (ad hoc) for adjudication in accordance with law.