The petitioners are employees of respondent No. 1. After an inquiry they were dismissed from service on 4th February, 1976. They served notices of grievance on the respondent but the same were rejected. They, therefore filed separate applications under section 25-A of tic Industrial Relations Ordinance before the Labour Court which succeeded and the orders of dismissal were set aside respectively on 8th October, 1977 and 1st June, 1977. The back benefits were refused to them. Cross appeals were taken by the parties before the Tribunal but the same were rejected vide order dated 30th November, 1977. The two contesting parties have now filed separate writ petitions, i.e. W. Ps. 167/78 and 110/78, both of which shall be disposed of by this order.
2. The facts leading to this case are that on 6th January, 1976, petitioner No. 1 obtained permission from her supervisor to offer prayers. She instead went to the overall room of the establishment and remained there locked in with the other petitioner for some time. There were a number of witnesses to this incident.
3. The respondent served the petitioners with separate charge-sheets on 9th January, 1976, with the allegations referred to above and accused them of obtaining leave on false pretexts and committing acts which are immoral and subversive of the discipline, during working hours, at the establishment. Both the petitioners submitted their separate explanations denying their guilt. The prosecution witnesses brought written statements which were read out before the Inquiry Officer.
The petitioners cross---examined those witnesses and are stated to have signed each paper of the record. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 26th January, 1976, holding them both guilty of the charge of misconduct. A show-cause notice was thereafter served on them on 2nd February, 1976. Copies of the inquiry report were also supplied to them. They appeared before the Factory Manager on 4th February, 1976, and were given personal hearing. They were, however, dismissed from service on the same date.
4. It is contended by the learned counsel that as the statements of the prosecution witnesses had not been given on oath and as the same had; not been recorded by the Inquiry Officer the same could Dot be relied upon to punish the petitioners. It was further submitted that whatever inquiry was there it was held behind the petitioners back and, therefore, the same has no legal significance. Reliance was placed on Hap Mohammad v. State (PLJ 1974 Cr. C. 375 (?)) and University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmed (PLD 1965 SC 90).
5. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on sections 4 and 5 of the Oaths Act to say that there was neither an authority to administer oath nor a duty to make oath in domestic inquiries.
Reliance was placed by him on Ahdul Latif Niazi v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1967 S'C 52) and number of other cases which may not be referred, to say that evidence recorded in without oath in a Departmental inquiry was valid and was saved by section 13 of the Oaths Act. It is to be noted that though the Departmental Inquiry is conducted under rules, no such legal procedure is specified in the inquiries in respect of workmen. In any case, the above-noted judgment of the Supreme Court does apply and consequently the statements of the witnesses would be valid under section 13 of the Oaths Act.
6. The next submission was that the petitioners had not been allowed reasonable opportunity to defend themselves. This contention was, however, vehemently contested by the respondent- Company. It was stated that the statements of the witnesses were read before the petitioners and they were allowed to cross-examine them. Later, they were given copies of the inquiry reports and were also heard by the dismissing authority after show-cause notices. Reliance was placed on C. S. Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR1961Al1.45) in this regard that the opportunity provided to them was reasonable.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners did not controvert or contradict the above position. In fact the orders of the Labour Court and the Tribunal prove their correctness. It is accepted in both the orders that though the witnesses brought their written statements with them, they were cross- examined by the petitioners and their statements in cross-examination were duly recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The petitioners thus not only knew of the charge but they also knew as to what the wit--nesses stated. They were also allowed an opportunity to cross-examine them. The rule as laid down in University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmed relied upon by the petitioners themselves thus stands complied with and there is no justification to interfere with the parts of the orders maintained against them. Copies of the reports of the Inquiry Officer were also given to the petitioners and they were heard by the dismissing authority after show-cause notices. In the circumstances, I do not think either any prejudice had been caused to them or any requirement of the rule of natural justice has been violated.
8. In view of the above, this petition by Miss Zarrin Mirza and Rafiuddin (W. P. 167,/78) has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. The other petition of the employer (W. P. 110/78), however, succeeds.
The impugned order of the respondent Tribunal is declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The result is that the order of dismissal of the petitioners from service is maintained.
The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.