' TANVIR BASHIR ANSARI, J.--- Akhtar Hussain petitioner who is employed as Research Officer in WAPDA lodged F.I.R. No.463 on 11-6-2004 with the allegation that Muhammad Iqbal Ansari accused Assistant Director injured Abdul Rehman, Director C.A.D, WAPDA with his fire-arm weapon and also caused the intentional murder of Abdul Jalil Ibrar another employee of WAPDA by repeatedly firing at the deceased from his pistol. Initially the F.I.R. Was registered under sections 302/324, P.P.C. In consideration of the nature of occurrence the offence, under section 7, A.T.A. Was added through Zimni No.7, dated 28-7-2004. On 3-9-2004 formal charge was framed against respondent No.2 by the learned Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism under sections 302/324, P.P.C. Along with section 7, ATA, 1997. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
2. On 8-9-2004 the respondent No.2 filed an application under section 23, A.T.A., 1997 for transfer of the case from the Court of Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism, Lahore to the Court of ordinary jurisdiction at Lahore. The said application was resisted. Vide order, dated 1-10-2004 passed by the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No.III, Lahore was held that the offence did not attract section 7, A.T.A., 1997 and it was directed that the case be sent to the learned Sessions Judge, Lahore for trial in accordance with law.
3. The petitioner complainant is aggrieved of the aforesaid order passed by the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No.III, Lahore and has assailed the said order through the instant writ petition.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the accused/ respondent No.2 who himself is a public servant being employee of WAPDA is responsible for causing fire-arm injury to Abdul Rehman, Director, C.A.D. As well as causing the intention death of Abdul Jalil Ibrar, Director WAPDA and that the cases squarely falls within the ambit of section 6(A)(B)(M) and (N) of A.T.A.
1997. It is submitted that motive as made out in the F.I.R. Is that Muhammad Iqbal Ansari respondent No. 2/accused bore a grudge that injured and the deceased officials of WAPDA were instrumental in his transfer. It is further submitted that occurrence has not been denied by the accused. In fact the accused was apprehended at the spot along with weapon of offence. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued with vehemence that all the ingredients attracting the application of sections 6 and 7, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were squarely attracted to the circumstances of the case and that the learned lower Court had passed the impugned order without any justification or cogent reason to support the same. It is submitted that the lower Court did not advert to the peculiar circumstances of the case in order to determine as to whether the offence under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was made out or not and instead engaged itself in unnecessary hypothetical question.
' It is further submitted that the lower Court did not rely upon any circumstances which could suggest that criminal act committed by the accused was the result of any specific personalized enmity as is now being suggested by the opposite party, appeal the plea that the wife of the accused was allegedly having illicit relations with the deceased.
5. Conversely the learned counsel for the accused contends that in fact the occurrence was the assault of an in-built enmity which the accused entertained against the injured and the deceased of the occurrence as the accused seriously believed that victims were carrying on illicit relations with his wife. According to the learned counsel the offence did not have any nexus with the object and purpose of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and as such the case was rightly sent to the Court of Sessions Judge for trial under ordinary law. The learned counsel for the respondent was at pains to submit that said intention that as the mens rea has to be considered and the mere fact that fear or terror is consequeptly generated because of the occurrence would not be relevant to bring the offence with the ambit of provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. He contended that the motivation design and purpose behind the occurrence was a personal grudge of the accused and that this fact is even acknowledged by the prosecution in the F.I.R. Itself when the motive of the occurrence is described. He submits that motive itself was merely a reaction to the transfer of the accused which was allegedly engineered by the injured and the deceased of the occurrence and that it could not be said that this motive alone could be responsible to create or spread fear or insecurity in the society.
6. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon Basharat Ali v. Special Judge, ATA (PLD 2004 Lah. 199).
7. In order to appreciate respective contentions of the parties, it is necessary to revert to the object and purpose of promulgation of ATA, 1997. This indeed is an Act to provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. Public servant is defined in section 2(R) ibid and is reproduced as under:-- "Public servant" shall have the same meaning as in section 21 of P.P.C., 1860 or in any other law for the time being in force.
' Terrorism is defined in all its manifestations. Relevant provisions of the said provision of law are reproduced as under:--
(6) Terrorism.--(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where (a) the action falls within the meaning of subsection (2) and (b) the use of threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or the public or a section of public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society: or
(2) (a) An "action" shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1) if (a) involves the doing of anything that causes death. (m) Involves serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force him to discharge or to refrain from discharging his lawful duties, or (n) involves serious violence against a member of police force,armed forces, civil armed forces or a public servant.
Section 7(ibid) provides for punishment for acts of terrorism. A close scrutiny of the F.I.R. Would show that the accused, injured namely Abdul Rehman, Director and the deceased Abdul Jalil/Ibrar, Director were all employees of WAPDA as is the complainant/ petitioner. Even if the accused entertained the suspicion that injured and the deceased officials of WAPDA were responsible for his transfer, his act certainly fell within the mischief of section 6(a)(b)(m) and (n) of ATA, 1997 as it amounted to coercion and intimidation of a public servant in order to force him to refrain from discharging his lawful duties. The resultant fear or sense of insecurity coupled and conjointly with a motive which inherits in itself the eleminate the determine as defined under law would certainly bring the offence within the pale of A.T.A., 1997.
' Resultantly, we do not consider the impugned order to be sustainable either on law or on facts of the case. The writ petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside with the direction to the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism III, Lahore to proceed with the trial of the case with dispatch and alacrity.