' FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR,. J.---This appeal, by leave of the Court, is directed against judgment and decree dated 24-5-1999, passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in R.S.A.No,276 of 1979.
2. The appellant purchased from one Painda Khan suit-land measuring 8 Kanals and 16 Marlas vide Mutation No,2892 attested by Assistant Collector, Kharian, District Gujrat, on 18-9-1970 for ostensible price of Rs,2200. Late Ahmed Khan son of Muhammad Khan, (predecessor-in-interest of the respondents), instituted, before the Civil Judge, Kharian, District Gujrat, on 14-9-1971, a suit for possession through pre-emption on the ground of being a co-sharer therein. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Civil Court, the plaintiff-Ahmed Khan son of Muhammad Khan passed away. Therefore, the respondents were impleaded as plaintiffs. The trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 24-2-1977 dismissed the suit primarily on the ground that the appellant was a tenant of the suit-land at the time of its purchase. Therefore, he had superior right of pre-emption vis-a-vis the respondents. The District Judge, Gujrat, by judgment and decree dated 19-3-1979, accepted the appeal of the respondents and decreed their suit. The R.S.A. No,276 of 1979 preferred by the appellant thereagainst was also dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, by the impugned judgment and decree dated 24-5-1999. Hence this appeal, by leave of the Court.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant vehementally submitted that during the pendency of the civil suit, the status of the appellant/vendee stood improved by virtue of sub-para. (3) of paragraph 25 of the Land Reform Regulation, 1972 (M.L.R. 115) (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation) whereby it was provided that as from Kharif, 1972, a tenant would have the first right of pre-emption in respect of the land comprised in tenancy. Therefore, the claim of the respondents of being co-sharer in the suit-land was inferior to that of the appellant. The learned counsel placed reliance on the case of Piara Khan versus Bashir Ahmed (1991 SCM R 2107).
4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that the appellant had no superior right of pre-emption over the respondents at the time of sale of the property, institution or decree of the suit. It was next contended that the provisions of Paragraph 25(3) of the Regulation were not given retrospective effect. The appellant, even if a tenant, had no right of pre-emption at the time of purchase of the suit property whereafter he became a vendee/owner of the same.
Therefore, the first right of pre-emption to the tenants was made available only to those persons who were tenants as from Kharif 1972 onward.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also gone through the available record. We find that the sale of the suit property had taken place and the suit had been instituted much earlier than the promulgation of the Regulation. At the time of purchase of suit property or institution of the civil suit, the appellant was not possessed with any right of pre- emption under any law. The first right of pre-emption was conferred on the tenants from Kharif 1972 onward. After the purchase of the suit property in 1970, the appellant had ceased to be a tenant and his status became that of a vendee or owner. Therefore, he could not claim any superior right of pre-emption vis-a-vis co-sharer in order to defend the civil suit of the respondents who were co-sharers of the suit property. In the case of Piara Khan (supra) it was held that if a vendee/defendant improved his status after the date of sale, but before the institution of the suit, he could rely on his improved status under section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 to defeat the suit of the pre-emptor. In the present case, late Ahmed Khan had instituted the civil suit on 14-9-1971 when the appellant had no other status except the vendee/owner of the suit property.
In the case of Fazal Khan and another v. Ghulam Rabbani (PLD 1983 SC 265), it was held that the right of pre-emption created under paragraph 25(3) of the Regulation was not available to a tenant who had purchased the suit property before coming into force of the said Regulation, and the question of his improved status did not arise. The position would have been different if the appellant had purchased the suit property on a date falling in Kharif 1971 or at any time thereafter while holding the status of a tenant thereof. The High Court has rightly taken the view that the appellant could not defeat the right of the respondents merely on the ground that he was a tenant at the time of sale of the suit property in 1970 as no right of pre-emption was available to a tenant at that time. In our opinion, the impugned judgment of the High Court is plainly correct to which no exception can be taken.
6. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
No order as to costs.