' This S. A.
0. Has been filed by the unsuccessful tenant, who was ordered to be ejected by the learned Rent Controller from Property No, 75-D/1, Gulberg III, Lahore, by his order dated 12-5-1976, which was upheld by the Appellate Authority.
2. The facts of this case, in brief, are that the bungalow aforesaid was obtained on lease by appellant No, 1, through its Director appellant No, 2, from the respondent's mother, namely, Mst.
Sughran Bibi, for the period from 15-4-1973 to 14-4-1974 at the monthly rent of Rs, 1,000 vide an agreement of lease dated 15-4-1973 Exh. R. I. Later on, as a result of the arbitration award Exh. R. 2/1, which was made rule of the Court by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Lahore, as per decree dated 4- 4-1974, Exh. R. 2/3, the respondent became owner of the bungalow. He was then posted as Director, Excise and Taxation, at Multan, but his wife and son were residing at Lahore in a house belonging to a friend of the respondent. The reason for not shifting his family to Multan was that the respondent's son was studying in the Halley College of Commerce, Lahore, and could not be given education in commerce at Multan. The respondent verbal requested the appellants to vacate the bungalow for his bona fide person use. This request was followed by a notice dated 16-8-1974, Exh.
P-1, which went on unheeded. Consequently, the respondent filed a petition against the appellants for their ejectment on the grounds of default, user of the property for the purposes other than that for which it was let out, impairing the value and utility thereof, and bona fide personal use. The appellants contested the petition and controverted all the grounds taken up by the respondent.
They also asserted that no notice under section 13-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance was served on them.
3. The learned Rent Controller on the basis of the evidence led before him held that notice under section 13-A was duly served on the appellants that the property was used by them for a purpose other than that for which it was let out ; that unauthorised alterations were made by them in the property, which impaired the value and utility thereof and that the property was required by the respondent in good faith for personal use. As a result of these findings the appellants were ordered to be ejected. The appellants' appeal was also dismissed on 19-10-1976 by the learned Additional District Judge and the findings of the learned Rent Controller upheld.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that an agreement was reached between the parties in pursuance whereof the respondent could not get the property vacated before 31-9-1976. Admittedly, there was no written agreement between the parties, but an implied agreement was sought to be inferred by the learned counsel from the appellants' letter dated 1-8- 1974, Exh. R/3. This letter was addressed by them to the Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Nilla Gumbad, Lahore, and copy thereof addressed to the respondent, whereby they informed their Bank that the bungalow had been taken on lease by them at the monthly rent of Rs, 1,500, and that quarterly rent at the rate of Rs, 1,500 per month be remitted to the respondent. In this respect my attention was also invited by the learned counsel to the statement of the respondent in which he conceded that no reply to the letter Exh. R/3 was sent by him. It was argued that the respondent's failure to reply this letter amounted to acceptance of the contents thereof. It is to be noticed that the respondent expressly denied that any agreement, as alleged by the appellants, was reached between the parties. In the ejectment petition it was specifically averred that the letter Exh. R/3 was a unilateral act of the appellants. Furthermore, the is nothing in this letter to indicate that an agreement of tenancy was arrived at between the parties leasing out the bungalow in dispute to the appellants up to 30-9-1976. No inference of the existence of any such agreement can be drawn from the letter Exh. R/3. In any case, the respondent's failure to reply this letter does not amount to acceptance of the contents thereof by him as alleged by the learned counsel. In this view of the matter, the learned counsel's submission that there was an implied agreement between the parties is without any substance.
5. It was next argued that no damage impairing the value and utility of the property was caused by the appellants and that at the most vide clause (4) of the lease agreement Exh. R/1 the appellants could only be burdened with costs of the repairs to the satisfaction of the landlord, but impairment of the property in dispute could not be taken up as ground for the appellants' ejectment. It is difficult to agree with the learned counsel. Moinuddin Ahmad (A. W. 1) specifically stated that he visited the bungalow and found that the appellants had installed an antenna about 50/60 feet high in the building. They also made alterations in the bath room in the inter-floor inasmuch as the wash-basin was removed and a part thereof was converted into telephone exchange ; that an opening in the wall was also made and a window installed in a room in the inter-floor. According to this witness, who is a Consultant Engineer and had supervised the construction of the bungalow in dispute, the constructional changes brought about by the appellants resulted in impairing the value and utility of the property. The respondent appeared as his own witness and corroborated with the statement of A. W.
1. The defence taken by the appellants was that these changes were made by them with the permission of previous landlady, but they could not bring on the record any such permission and were disbelieved by the learned two Courts below. Whether or not the building was damaged by the appellants resulting in impairing its value and utility, primarily is a question of fact on which a concurrent finding has been returned against them by the Courts below. It is not possible to interfere with such a finding in the second appeal. The appellants' reliance on lease agreement Exh.
R/1 is also misconceived. This deed was entered into between the previous landlady and the appellants. It is in evidence that after acquisition of the property by the respondent the appellants attorney to him. They now cannot fall back on Exh. R. I. Furthermore, the agreement expired by efflux of time much before the respondent became owner of the property through the award.
6. By placing reliance on para. 10 of the lease agreement Exh. R/1 it was next argued that the appellants were entitled to one month's notice, before they could be called upon to vacate the demised premises without such notice. As observed above, the respondent is not a party to this agreement and it also expired by efflux of time. The reliance on this document by the appellants, is thus misplaced.
7. It was next argued that the appellants were also entitled to the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This submission is also not well founded. By virtue of the provisions of the Rent Restriction c Ordinance, the tenancies in the urban area are governed by this Statute, and if a case falls within the mischief of section 13 of the Ordinance, an ejectment petition is competent without any notice. This argument is also without any merit.
8. The learned counsel then raised another objection that the decree Exh. R. 2/3 created right and interest in the immovable property, therefore, under section 17 of the Registration Act, it requires registration compulsorily, and as it was not registered it could not be acted upon. It was also argued that award Exh. R. 2/1 was not properly stamped and thus could not have been admitted in evidence. In support of these submissions the learned counsel relied on Gopi Mal v. Vidya Wanti etc. Abdur Razzak Howaldar v. Sh. Muhammad Shaft and Inayat and others v. Nawab Khan. In Gopi Mars case it was laid down that a partition decree not drawn up on a properly stamped paper cannot be acted upon, unless proper stamp is paid. The proposition laid down in Abdur Razzak Howladar's case is that a document creating charge on the future rent, though does not create right in immovable property yet it does create a right to an immovable property and, therefore, such an instrument needs registration under section 17 of the Registration Act. According to the ruling laid down in the third precedent referred to above by the learned counsel, when the original document is not duly stamped its secondary evidence through a copy if admitted in evidence, is liable to be ignored. It will be seen from the succeeding paragraph that these precedents have no bearing on the facts of this case.
The Rent Controller is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction and cannot investigate the question of title.
The existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is sufficient to attract his jurisdiction. The appellants in the written-statement, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, did not deny the relationship of landlord and tenant. On the other hand, in para. No, 2 of the written-statement, they stated that a sum of Rs, 750 was paid by them as rent to the respondent through Cheque dated 5-8-1974. Similarly paras. 4 and 10 (d) of the metnorandum of appeal demonstrate that the appellants remitted rent to the respondent and claimed to have paid him the rent up to 31-7-1974. These facts are more than enough to maintain that they accepted tenancy under the respondent. It is, therefore, not open to them to challenge the respondent's title and question the maintainability of the ejectment petition on this score. Furthermore, the appellants were tenants under the respondent's mother, the property having been alienated in favour of the respondent, they became tenants under him. He was only required to serve a notice on the appellants under section 13-A of the Ordinance, informing them of the change of ownership.
Both the Courts below have held that notice under section 13-A was duly served on the appellants.
After the receipt of this notice, the appellants attorned to the respondent. Looked from any angle the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between the parties, the learned Rent Controller therefore, rightly assumed jurisdiction. This objection is also untenable.
10. It was then argued that the lower Courts were not justified in holding that the property was utilized by the appellants for a purpose other than that for which it was leased out. In this respect it1 2 3 was submitted that the bungalow was hired by a limited Company and from the very nature of the tenancy it could not have been assumed that the premises were required for residential purposes. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel. The respondent while appearing as his own witness stated that the bungalow was let out for residential purposes. This version was accepted by both the learned Courts below. This is a finding of fact, and I have not been persuaded to differ therewith. Consequently, this submission also fails.
11. It was lastly argued that the respondent failed to establish that the bungalow was needed by him in good faith for personal use. This argument is also ill founded. There is over whelming evidence on the record that the respondent does not own any other residential house in Lahore. He has now been transferred to Lahore. While he was at Multan his family has been living in the house of one of his friends. There is sufficient material on the record to sustain the finding that the house is required by the respondent in good faith for personal use. Moreover it is also a finding of fact.
There is no ground in the second appeal to interfere with such a finding.
12. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellants shall hand over the vacant possession of the property in dispute to the respondent within two months. A R 1942 Lah. 260 PLD 1962 SC 134 PLD 1971 Lah. 938