MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---Appellant bank, through the filing of the instant first appeal, under section 21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, has called in question order dated 17-2-1999, whereby the Honourable Banking Judge of this Court disposed of appellant's suit for recovery of Rs.14,69,48,288 having become infructuous.
2. Appeal in hand is admittedly barred by time, as such the appellant bank has filed the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act (C.M. No.1 of 1999), seeking condonation of delay. The only ground urged in the said application is that the copying agency did not sent any notice to the appellant regarding the preparation of the certified copy of the impugned order.
3. Firstly, the aforenoted application for the condonation of delay is adverted to. The learned counsel for the appellant, in support of the said application, has submitted that the appellant has made out a "sufficient cause" for the condonation of delay, therefore, the application be accepted and the main appeal be entertained. When the learned counsel for the appellant was asked to show as to how section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable in the present case, the learned counsel replied that as the appellant was not negligent, therefore, the delay may be condoned.
4. In the above perspective, to our mind, the prime question, which has arisen for determination by this Court is as to whether section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable in the present case. Section 29 of the Limitation Act provides that where in a special or local law different periods of limitation have been prescribed, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. It may be noted here that under the ordinary law, a period of 90 days has been prescribed for filing the first appeal, under Article 156 of the Limitation Act, before this Court, while the present case is governed by the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, which is a special law and section 21(1) of the Act, 1997 prescribes a period of 30 lays for filing the first appeal, before this Court, against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Banking Court.
5. From the above, it is thus clear that the special law has provided different period of limitation, for filing the first appeal in this Court, than the ordinary law, therefore, provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are neither applicable nor attracted in the present set of circumstances, as per law laid down in the cases of Allah Ditta v. Farooq Ahmad and 3 others PLD 1979 Lahore 917 and Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105 and by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the reported cases of All Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCM R 1239 and Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCM R 286.
Being guided by the aforesaid law declared, the application in hand, which has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act, is, misconceived, incompetent and not maintainable. Needless to add that the contentions raised by the learned counsel in this regard are devoid of merits in view of the aforenoted law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, which, as per Article 189 of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is binding upon all the Courts.
In the above back ground appellant's application ID under section 5 of the Limitation Act is incompetent and not maintainable, thus stands dismissed
6. With the dismissal of the aforenoted application, the appeal is barred by time, thus we are constrained to hold that the appeal cannot proceed further having been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the relevant law, thus the same also stands dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.