By this constitutional petition the petitioner Mills have called in question the legality of the decision given by the Labour Appellate Tribunal upholding the award of the IInd Sind Labour Court, Karachi, given on 5-2-1974. By this award, the Labour Court has allowed the application for the re-- instatement of 5 workmen and that held the termination of their services was not legal.
2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this petition, briefly stated, are that in consequence of an allegedly illegal lockout in the petitioner Mills from 23-8-1972, resulting in the unemployment and deprivation of services of 9 workers, respondent No. 1, which is the registered Trade Union of workmen employed in the petitioner., Mills, submitted an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance to the Labour Court, praying-
(a) that the lockout effected in the petitioner Mills be declared as illegal;
(b) that the workers affected be declared to be entitled to restration in service with full back benefits; and
(c) that an order be issued to the petitioner Mills directing them to lift the lookout.
3. During the pendency of the proceedings taken upon the application of the respondent union, Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed Siddiqui, who was the General Secretary of the Union when the application was filed and who had in fact signed the application, compromised with the petitioner Mills and accordingly an application was submitted to the Labour Court that the application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance be disposed of in terms of the compromise. The compromise application, however, was rejected on the ground that Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed had since ceased to be the General Secretary of the respondent Union. The Labour Court, on the other hand, allowed another application by which Mr. Abdul Razzak, who had succeeded Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed as the General Secretary of the respondent Union, was made a party to the proceedings.
4. The learned Labour Court, by its order, dated 5-2-1974, held that out of the 9 workmen affected, 4 were not entitled to any relief, on the ground that one of them, whose name however does not transpire in the award, had left receiving due payment from the petitioner Mills and compromising with it, and that 3 others, namely, Abdullah, Muhammad Ahmed and Zahoor Ahmed, had also admitted in specific and candid terms that they had received their dues in full and final settlement, and accordingly it appeared that they had voluntarily left the services of the petitioner Mills.
However, in regard to the remaining 5 workmen, in respect of whom the respondent Union had filed the application under section 34 of I. R. O., the learned Labour Court held that their termination of service was illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance.
5. The petitioner Mills filed an appeal against the order of the Labour Court to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, but the appeal proved unfruitful, as the Labour Appellate Tribunal, on the basis of the decision of this Court in Muhammad Aqil v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLD 1978 Kar. 649) held that no appeal lay against a decision of the Labour Court under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, as it was not an award. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner Mills have sought to challenge the legality of the decision of the Labour Court by way of a constitutional petition.
6. Mr. Talmiz Burney, the learned counsel for the petitioner Mills, assailed the impugned orders of the Labour Court on two grounds. His first ground of attack was that an application to a Labour Court under the I. R. O. Against illegal or improper removal or termination of services of workmen can only be made under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and not under section 34, as has been done in the instant case. He accordingly submitted that since the Labour Court had wrongly entertained an application which at the relevant time was not entertainable by it but by a Junior Labour Court therefore, the Labour Court has acted without jurisdiction and its orders are liable to be quashed on this ground. The learned counsel, however, conceded that an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordi--nance would lie against dismissal or termination of workmen where the dismissal A or termination of service was in consequence of or arising from an industrial dispute. This point was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of International Laboratories Employees' Union v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal (1976 PLC 38). In that case the argument was repelled that re-instatement having been separately provided by sub-section (6) of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance demand for re- instatement of workmen who have been dismissed cannot constitute an industrial dispute and, therefore, falls outside the purview of section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance It was held that two remedies are provided by the Statute for re-employment, one is by way of individual grievance under subsection (6) of section 25-A and the other by way of industrial dispute under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance.
7. The contention of the respondent Union before the Labour Courts was that the services of the workmen had been terminated in consequence of the illegal lockout resorted to by the petitioner Mills. Mr. Burney, on the other hand, contended that there was no evidence or material to indicate the existence or the raising of an industrial dispute, much less a causal link between such dispute and the termination of services of any employee of the petitioner Mills. However on the attention of the learned counsel being drawn to the affidavit filed by the proprietor of the petitioner Mills, admitting that the respondent Union had raised an industrial dispute and taken the plea that there was a lockout in the petitioner Mills, he conceded that it appeared that the non-employment and the termination of services of the workmen was related to the plea of industrial dispute and the lockout in the petitioner Mills.
8. It was next contended by Mr. Burney that the learned Labour Courts have erroneously held that the services of the workers of the petitioner Mills had been terminated or that they were deprived of employment in the Mills and that the correct position, on the other hand, was that the workmen had voluntarily resigned. This no doubt was the position taken by the petitioner Mills before the Labour Court, which has carefully considered the evidence in support of the alleged plea of voluntary resignation by the workers, and come to the conclusion that it has no substance. This was a finding o a question of fact and this Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction cannot disturb such a finding unless it is based on no evidence or no misreading of evidence. The scope of interference by the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction has been discussed at some length) in the decisions of the Supreme Court in PLD 1963 SC 704 and PLD 1974 SC 139.
9. It was lastly contended by Mr. Burney that the order of the Labour Court suffers from another serious infirmity in that it does not even mention the names of the workmen whom the petitioner Mills are required to rein--state in service, and as there is no indication whatsoever in that order as to who precisely those workmen are, it is not possible for the petitioner Mills to comply with the orders for reinstatement of workmen. This objection appears to be well founded. All that the Labour Court has directed is that 5 of the workmen, whose names unfortunately have not been stated, should be reinstated in service by the petitioner Mills. In that order, they are referred to as the applicants. However, the application under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance was not by the workmen, but by the respondent Trade Union. Mr. Burney placed before the Court a copy of the application under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance filed by the respondent Union, but even this application does not give the names of the workmen who are to be reinstated in service. In the circumstances, there could be a reasonable confusions to the workmen who are to be reinstated in service. Since non-compliance of the orders of the Labour Court involves penal action, the apprehensions of the peti--tioner Mills would appear to be genuine that if a wrong person is reinstated in service by them, they would be liable to prosecution under the Industrial Rela--tion Ordinance. I asked Mr. Shahanshah Hussain, the learned counsel for the respondent Union, whether he could indicate from the record the names of the workmen, who were required to be reinstated in service by the petitioner Mills, but he frankly conceded his inability to do so. In the circumstances, the only course which appears to me, is to remand the case to the learned Labour Court for specifically stating the names of the workmen who are required to be rein--stated in service by the petitioner Mills. It will of course be open to the Labour Court to take evidence as to the person who are to be reinstated in service, and for this purpose, reasonable opportunity would be given to both sides to lead evidence. In the circumstances of this case. There will be no order as to costs.