The petitioner challenges the order dated 7th March, 1978, passed by respondent No. 1, dismissing his appeal and the one dated 24th September, 1977, passed by the Labour Court, re-instating the respondent No. 4 with back benefits.
2. The facts leading to this petition are that the petitioner, who had never employed more than 37 employees in its establishment, appointed respondent No. 4 as one of its workmen in 1972. His services were, however, terminated for misconduct on 29th October, 1976. Respondent No. 4 challenged that order in the Labour Court. The petitioner defended it for the reason that as it had never employed more than 49 workmen, the Standing Order 15 did not apply in view of the Second Proviso to Ordinance VI of 1968.
3. The Labour Court, did not accept that contention and re-instated respondent No. 4 vide its order dated 19th January, 1977, with permission to institute a fresh inquiry. A charge-sheet was consequently served on respondent No. 4 on 24th January, 1977, but he did not join the proceedings Consequently an ex pane inquiry was conducted which concluded on 25th January, 1977. The employer again dismissed respondent No. 4 vide his order dated 12th February, 1977. His order of dismissal was, however, set aside by the Labour Court in an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. An appeal by the petitioner having failed, it has now invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. It was held that the charge-sheet must have been served within one month of the alleged misconduct.
4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of Second Proviso to section 1 of Ordinance VI of 1968, Standing Order 15 does not apply strictly and that the substantial compliance of the same, in view of Standing Order 12(5) had been done by the petitioner by holding an inquiry. He further submitted that the inquiry had in fact been conducted on a remand order passed by the Court to which respondent No. 4 never objected.
5. The learned counsel for respondent No. 4 relied on Standing Order 12(5) to submit that Standing Order 15 had been made applicable and, therefore, its strict compliance was necessary. He also sought support from a decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4719 of 1978 which was dismissed in limine and application of Standing Order 12(5) being beneficial to a worker was upheld.
6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and also going through my previous judgment in Writ Petition No. 4719/78, I may restate the position that Standing Order 15 per se is not - applicable in view of its specific exclusion by Second Proviso to section 1 of Ordinance VI of 1968.
The same proviso excluded Standing Order 12(6)(8) and so retained to operate Standing Order 12(5). It lays down that services of a permanent or temporary workman shall not be terminated on the grounds of misconduc otherwise than in the manner prescribed in Standing Order 15. There thus appears to be a conflict on the face of it. To reconcile the two provisions, they can be safely interpreted to mean that only the manner provided in Standing Order 15 and not its literal or strict compliance is necessary, both in view of Standing Order 12(5) and the rules of natural justice. The inquiry could be conducted within a month or within a reasonable period.
7. The labour laws are primarily for the benefit of the workmen. A construction beneficial to them has, therefore, to be made if there can be two views about a provision. In view of this it cannot be said that an B employer who did not employ more than 49. Employees in his establishment is absolved of his responsibility to hold an inquiry against a workman whose services had to be terminated for misconduct. In such a case though strict and literal compliance will not be called for, substantial compliance of Standing Order 15 can be insisted.
8. In the case in hand an inquiry had been conducted. It was rather done with the permission of the Labour Court. Respondent No. 4 had never challenged that order further. Admittedly, he did not participate but the inquiry would not become illegal simply for that reason. On the other hand, the respondent took a risk in keeping away from the inquiry which had been conducted not by the employer but by an Advocate appointed by the Rawalpindi Bar Association. The substantial compliance of Standing Order 15 had, therefore, been made. The time . Limit of one month was, therefore, not mandatory so as to annul in default the inquiry and the action taken. The order of the employer terminating the services of respondent No. 4 was, therefore, not without lawful authority.
For the reasons given above, the impugned orders are declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The result is that the order of termination of the services of respondent No. 4 passed on 12th February, 1977, is maintained. There will be no order as to costs.