' This regular second appeal filed by Zahid Mehmood (appellant/defendant) impugns the concurrent judgments and decrees dated 9-12-1992 passed by the learned trial Court and 12-12- 1994 passed by the learned lower Appellate Court. The facts, necessary for the disposal of the present appeal, are relatively straightforward. Mst. Sabrina Iqbal (respondent/ plaintiff) filed a suit against the appellant/defendant for recovery of a sum of Rs.1,50,000 on the footing of a promissory note dated 3-12-1988. In addition to the aforesaid pro note, which is Exh.P.2, the respondent/plaintiff also relied on a receipt dated 3-12-1988 which was filed by her alongwith her plaint. The said receipt has been executed on the letter head of Muhammad Younus & Company (Registered) and has been signed for Muhammad Younus & Company by the Accounts Officer and by the appellant/defendant.
2. The case of the respondent/plaintiff, as set up in her plaint, is that the respondent/plaintiffs' father was employed as Office Manager in Muhammad Younus & Company while the appellant/defendant was also employed with the said firm as Export Manager. It is further averred in the plaint that the appellant/defendant held himself out as a partner of the firm and had approached the plaintiffs' father for a loan of Rs.1,50,000. It was on this basis that the respondent/plaintiff, on the advice, of her father, advanced a sum of Rs.1,50,000 which is subject- matter of the present litigation and of the pro note Exh.P.2.
3. The appellant/defendant, at the very outset, took up the plea that he was not personally liable under the pro note because the same had been executed by Muhammad Younus & Company and, as such, created a liability of the said firm alone. It is this defence to which arguments before me have been confined.
4. Both Courts below have held the appellant/defendant to be personally liable on the basis of the pro note Exh.P.2. At this point, it is to be noted that the appellant's signatures on the pro note as also on the receipt referred to above, are admitted by the appellant/defendant. The issue in contention between the parties, therefore, is as to whether the pro note and receipt were executed by the appellant in his personal capacity or the same were executed for and on behalf of Muhammad Younus & Company.
5. From the record it is clear that the pro note bears the rubber stamp of Muhammad Younus & Company and the same has been signed by the appellant. The receipt dated 3-12-1988 does not bear an exhibit number but is an admitted document having been filed by the plaintiff in support of her plaint. This receipt, as noted above, is on the letter head of Muhammad Younus & Company and is clearly signed by the Accounts Officer and by the appellant in his capacity as Manager of Muhammad Younus & Company. On the basis of this documentary evidence I am not left in the slightest doubt that the executant of the promissory note and the receipt was Muhammad Younus & Company and not the appellant in his personal capacity.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff argued that the appellant was personally liable because he had signed the pro note and the receipt although he had no express authority to act on behalf of the above named firm. In support of his argument, he referred to section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. For the purpose of better appreciating the argument of learned counsel for the respondent, section 28 is reproduced as under:- "28. Liability of agent signing: (1) Where a person signs a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque without adding to his signature words indicating that he signs it as an agent for and on behalf a principal or in a representative character, he is personally liable thereon but the mere addition to his signature of words describing him as an agent or as filing a representative character does not exempt him from personal liability.
' Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), any person signing a promissory note; bill of exchange or cheque for and on behalf of the principal is not liable to a person who induces him to sign upon the belief that the principal alone would be held liable."
7. The provisions of section 28 above, to the extent applicable to the facts of the present case, are clear and unambiguous. If there are words indicating that the person signing a promissory note did so far and on behalf of a principal or in a representative capacity, the person does not assume any personal liability by signing the promissory note. In the present case the rubber stamp on the promissory note clearly indicates the executant to be Muhammad Younus & Company. The appellant has merely signed on the rubber stamp. If at all there is any question as to whether or not the appellant signed the pro note on behalf of Muhammad Younus & Company, the same is set at rest by the receipt dated 3-12-1988 which has been relied upon by the respondent/ plaintiff and which leaves no room for doubt that the appellant had acted on behalf of Muhammad Younus & Company and not on his own account.
8. It is correct that under section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act the executant of a promissory note cannot absolve himself from personal liability merely on the ground that there are words added to a signature which indicate that he was acting as an agent or in a representative character. In the circumstances of the present case this, at most, can mean that the appellant may have been personally liable under the pro note if there was evidence on record to show that he had assumed personal liability under the pro note even though the pro note itself showed that it had been executed by Muhammad Younus & Company through the appellant. There is no evidence on the record to this effect. In fact, the receipt dated 3-12-1988, referred to above, establishes the contrary by clearly showing the appellant as acting for Muhammad Younus & Company.
9. The contents of the plaint have briefly been referred to above. Admittedly, the respondent/plaintiffs' father was Office Manager with Muhammad Younus & Company and it was on his advice that the respondent/plaintiff allegedly advanced the suit amount to the appellant. As Office Manager of the aforesaid firm, the respondents' father surely had knowledge of the constitution of the firm. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to impute notice to the respondent/plaintiff of the fact that the appellant was not a partner in Muhammad Younus & Company and was only the Export Manager as alleged by the respondent herself in paragraph 1 of the plaint. This fact coupled with the rubber stamp of Muhammad Younus & Company on the pro note and the receipt dated 3-12-1988, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, are sufficient to establish that the appellant/defendant had not assumed any personal liability by signing the promissory note.
10. Both Courts below have failed to consider the above circumstances while decreeing the suit of the respondent/ plaintiff against the appellant/defendant. For the reasons discussed above, the impugned judgments and decrees are set aside. As a result, the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is dismissed.