DECISION This is an appeal against the order of the Labour Court condoning the delay which was said to be of one day in filing the application under sec--tion 25-A; Industrial Relations Ordinance.
2. The respondent was in the employment of the appellant. He was charge-sheeted for remaining absent without permission. After inquiry he was found guilty and dismissed from service. Aggrieved by this, he served a grievance notice and approached the Labour Court.
3. A preliminary objection was taken that the application made by the respondent was time- barred and liable to be dismissed. An application was made for condonation of the delay. In this application it was pleaded that the respondent had gone to his native place on account of flood and could not return in time to file the application and there was delay of only one day in filing the application. The Labour Court found the ground to be reasonable and condoned the delay.
Aggrieved by this, the present appeal had been filed.
4. On perusal of the record and proceedings and hearing the arguments it is admittedly clear that the delay was not of one day but it was of four months. The termination letter was issued on 27th April, 1976. The grievance notice was served by the respondent on 6th May, 1976 ; reply to that was sent on 13th May, 1976 whereas the application under section 25-A, industrial Relations Ordinance was made on 23rd September, 1976. The period of limitation for making the-application under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance was two months after the receipt of the reply from the Manage--ment. But in the present case it is clear that more than four months passed when the application was made. The learned Representative for the respondent unsuccessfully claimed that the letter dated 6th May, 1976 sent by the res--pondent was not a grievance notice but it was the second letter sent in July which should be treated as a grievance notice for the purpose of section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance. I am unable to accept this conten--tion. The perusal of the first letter leaves no room for doubt that it was a grievance notice. The subsequent letter would not save the time or affect the first notice. The learned Presiding Officer clearly disregarded the facts and, therefore, erred in holding that there was delay of only one day. The delay of more than four months which has been caused in the present case stands unexplained. Consequently, the application made under sec--tion 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance was time-barred.
5. In result I allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Labour Court and dismiss the application made under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance.