DECISION This is an appeal against the order of the Labour Court allowing the application made by the respondent under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance.
2. The respondent was in the employment of the appellant. On the 3rd February, 1975 he received a charge-sheet dated 31st of January, 1975 with regard to certain allegations of misconduct. He sent the reply dated 4th February, 1975. Inquiry was held and the evidence tendered by both the parties was recorded. On the conclusion of the Inquiry the respondent was found guilty of the charge. A show-cause notice dated 13-2-1975 was served. An application by the respondent as well as other workers jointly was sent on 17th February, 1975, to the appellant for holding fresh Inquiry but the request was rejected and the respondent was dismissed from service by letter dated 18th February, 1975. He served a grievance notice dated 8th March, 1975 through the Union and thereafter filed the application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance on 15th March, 1975.
3. The application was resisted and various pleas were taken. On the assessment of the evidence the Labour Court allowed the application. Aggrieved by this, the present appeal had been filed.
4. It was urged before me on behalf of the appellant that the grievance notice was not served. This plea was also taken before the Labour Court and was rejected by giving elaborate reasons. I see no reason to dis--agree with him.
5. It was next urged on behalf of the appellant that the application made under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance to the Labour Court was premature as it was made before it had to be made. The grievance notice was served on 8th March, 1975 while the application was made on 15th March, 1975 i.e. Before the expiry of seven days. According to the appellant it had to be made at the earliest on 16th March, 1975. So it was urged that the application was premature and liable to be dismissed.
6. To this it was stated by the learned counsel for the respondent that this plea was taken for the first time in this Court and, therefore, it could not be considered. To support the argument reliance was placed upon the case of Trustees of the Port of Chittagong and another v. Rover Steam Navigation Co Ltd., Chittagong (PLD1965SC352), in which the similar objection was taken and it was held that since the objection was not taken at the earlier stage, it would be deemed to have been waived. Thus this authority is a complete answer to the plea taken on behalf of the respondent.
7. Another objection that was taken on behalf of the respondent was that the statement of the witnesses were not recorded on oath and, therefore, could not be considered. This was also effectively answered by the learned counsel for the appellant by referring to section 13 of the Oath Act which clearly lays down that proceedings and evidence are not invalidated by omission of oath or irregularity. This as also supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Latif Niazi v. Government of `rest Pakistan (PLD1967SC62).
8. Now I will take up the pleas raised on behalf of the respondent. It was urged that the complainant was not examined. I find no force in --this contention as it is not necessary that the complainant should be examine if there is other material sufficient on record to enable the Inquiry Officer or the Labour Court to come to a conclusion.
9. It was next urged that the statement of the respondent was recorded before the evidence was tendered on behalf of the appellant. This objection cannot be taken into consideration as it was not made either in the grievance notice or in the application made under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance.
10. The third objection that was taken was that the witnesses tendered on behalf of the appellant in the inquiry were not independent and, therefore, no reliance could be placed on their evidence.
This plea also found favour with the Labour Court. I am unable to uphold the objection as it is for the party to examine any witness as is desired and the appreciation of the evidence rests with the Inquiry Officer. No appreciation of the evidence could be made by the Labour Court.
11. The last ground that was taken on behalf of the respondent was that the appellant had examined two defence witnesses Khan Muhammad and Muhammad Yousuf and their evidence was not considered by the Inquiry Officer while reaching the conclusion. This plea was also raised in the Labour Court and was accepted. I see no reason to disagree with the Labour Court. The Inquiry Officer could not ignore the evidence tendered by the appellant. He did not at all deal with their evidence. It was not a mere question of appreciation of the evidence by the Labour Court but it is a question relating to the evidence which had been tendered had been completely ignored.
Consequently, an illegality had been committed.
12. In view of the last objection raised on behalf of the respondent I allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order as well as the dismissal of the respondent and order that the Inquiry Officer should consider the evidence of the defence witnesses and then pass order that may be deemed fit.