1. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-In this case leave to appeal was granted by this Court on the 5th of November, 1973, to examine the correctness of several propositions of law laid down by a Division Bench of the Baluchistan High Court by its judgment dated the 2nd of October, 1978, in a Constitution Petition filed by respondent Muhammad Niaz to challenge his proposed trial by a Summary Military Court for offences falling under sections 409, 420, 408, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947.
(a) the offences involved in this case were scheduled offences as contemplated by the Criminal Law Amendment Act XL of 1958 triable exclusively by a Court of special jurisdiction, namely, the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption and not by any other Court;
(b) the exclusive jurisdiction meant exclusive of even the Summary Military Court;
(c) the Chief Martial Law Administrator's Order Nos. 4 and 37 did not impliedly or otherwise repeal the Criminal Law Amendment Act XL of 1958;
(d) the Criminal Law Amendment Act was a special legislation whereas the Chief Martial Law Administrator's Orders Nos. 4 and 37 were general laws, and must remain subordinate to the aforesaid special law;
(e) the Chief Martial Law Orders Nos. 4 and 37 could only apply to Martial Law offences and not other offences under the ordinary law of the land; and that, in any case, they were not applicable to offences committed before the promulgation of Martial Law; and
(f) the trial of citizens for offences other than the offences created by Martial Law Regulations or Martial Law Orders could not take place before Military Court unless such offences were committed while resisting the Martial Law itself.
2. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the contentions that these proposi--tions were not a correct enunciation of the law, and if given effect, they will destroy the officacy of Martial Law and will bring its operation in the relevant sphere to a stand-still; that the Martial Law imposed in the country was justified by State necessity and considerations of welfare of the people; that the two Martial Law Orders in question, namely, Nos. 4 and 37 were laws which were justified on grounds both of necessity and welfare of the people; that these laws were of special character promulgated during a special period for a special purpose, and therefore, the High Court was in error in treating them as general laws by ignoring their peculiar context and that the Prevention of Corruption Act as well the Criminal Laws Amendment Act were existing laws within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1 of 1977, and it was, therefore, obvious that jurisdiction of the Special Judge Anti-Corruption was subject to the provisions of the relevant Martial Law Orders in question. While granting leave to appeal this Court observed that these were substantial questions of law of public importance which were likely to affect a large number of cases and people.
3. On the 17th of December, 1978, a Miscellaneous Application filed by the petitioners came up before the Court, expressing an apprehension that the declaration made by their Lordships while deciding this case, that the trial of any citizen by a Military Court was illegal unless the offence amounted to resistance to Martial Law, has brought the administration in Baluchistan to a standstill, and the aforesaid declaration has further encouraged the commis--sion of offences and the deterrent effect of the Martial Law Regulations had been reduced to a nullity, and all the Military Courts validly constituted ceased to function. On this application this Court observed on the 17th of December, 1978: "after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners we find that this apprehension is misconceived as this case has nothing to do with any other case that might be pending with the Military Courts concerning the scheduled offences triable under the Criminal Law Amendment Act."
4. When this appeal came up for hearing before us yesterday, Mr. Irshad Hasan Khan, learned Deputy Attorney-General for Pakistan, made a state--ment that it has been decided to try the respondent Muhammad Niaz under the ordinary law applicable in this case, namely, the Criminal Law Amend- -ment Act of. 1958, and, accordingly, the present appeal had become infructuous, provided it is clearly understood that the judgment of' the High Court of Baluchistan was confined only to this particular case and did not amount to law laid down for other cases coming up before the Military Courts in the Province. The learned Advocate-General, Baluchistan, stated that although he was aware of these instructions to the learned Deputy Attorney-General for Pakistan, but he had not been given any such instruc--tions by the Provincial authorities, he, therefore, requested for time to contact them. The cage, was, accordingly, adjourned to today.
5. At the commencement of today's hearing Mr. Irshad Hasan Khan stated that his instructions remained the same provided that it is made clear by the Court, as was done in the interim order dated the 17th of December, 1978, that this judgment of the Baluchistan High Court would apply only to the individual case of respondent Niaz and was not to govern all cases coming up before the Military Court in Baluchistan. He stated that if the Court thought otherwise, then he is prepared to argue the matter on merits.
6. Mr. Basharat Ullah, learned Advocate-General for Baluchistan Province, states that he has not been given any specific instructions as to the trial of the case of respondent Muhammad Niaz, but he has instructions to argue the appeal on merits.
7. Mr. S. M. Zafar, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent, submits that in view of the solemn statement made yesterday by the Deputy Attorney---General for Pakistan that as far as the individual case of the respondent Muhammad Niaz is concerned it had been decided to try him under the ordinary law applicable to him and not by a Military Court, this appeal had become infructuous in so far as the respondent was concerned, but be would be at the disposal of the Court to assist on any questions of law that may come up for discussion.
8. After giving consideration to the statements made before us by the learned Deputy Attorney- General for Pakistan, the Advocate-General, Baluchistan and Mr. S. M. Zafar, we have formed the opinion that in view of the decision taken by the authorities to try respondent Muhammad Niaz under the ordinary law applicable to his case, namely, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, the present appeal has, indeed, become infructuous. In the A circumstances, no useful purpose would be served by embarking upon an academic exercise to consider the propositions of law formulated in the leave granting order, except to observe that the propositions and observations made by the High Court of Baluchistan in the judgment under appeal, appear to be much too wide and prima facie open to exception, and would require careful examination in a proper case. As already observed by this Court in its interim order dated the 17th of December, 1978, the impugned judgment should be read as confined to this individual case alone.
9. With the foregoing observations this appeal is disposed of as having been become infructuous.