1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.-The dispute in this case relates to some 137 kanals of agricultural lands which were confirmed in the name of the respondent No. 3 in village Jamgil, Tehsil Ferozewala, District Sheikhupura, in March-1956.
2. It appears that she claimed on the basis, that she was the sole heir of one Mohar Singh, a right- hlder, who died in the Walton Camp in the year 1948 after migration to Pakistan, leaving lands in Bharatpur State (India). Her claim was duly verified and mutation of inheritance was sanctioned in her favour in April 1955.
3. On the 3rd of March 1960, however, one Moti s/o Budha made a complaint through one Zahoor Khan that the said respondent was not the daughter of Mohar Singh and had fraudulently obtained the allotment.
4. This complaint was not addressed to any specified autho--rity nor is it known as to before which particular officer it was presented, but an enquiry, it appears, was conducted by the Tehsildar (Inspection), who was posted with the then Settlement Commissioner (hands) Mr: Muhammad Yar Khand. The Tehsildar ' recommended that the mutation should be reviewed. On the basis of this, report an E. A. C. (R) in August 1960, recommended the cancellation of the said res--pondent's allotment. The order of cancellation' was actually passed by Mr. Muhammad Yar Khand, the .Settlement Com--missioner (Lands), who also directed that the Said respondent should be prosecuted under Martial Law Regulation No 49.
5. A revision against this order was dismissed on the ground that since the impugned order had been passed by a dele--gate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner no revision was competent.
6. After her, release the said respondent applied for a review of the order of cancellation, alleging that the cancellation had been secured by one Mehdi Khan, who was closely related to the then Settlement Commissioner (Lands) Mr. Muhammad Yar Khand. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, 'however, summarily dismissed the petition for review.
7. Against this order she moved the High Court in its writ jurisdiction, but subsequently applied to have the writ peti--tion converted into a, revision petition under section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. This was allow--ed subject to just exceptions. But after the matter was heard on merits the High-.Court again re-converted the peti--tion into the form in which it was originally filed, namely, as writ petition, and held that the order cancelling her allot--ment was null and void. The case was, however, remanded back to the Chief Settlement Commissioner with a direction that it should be examined afresh and decided in accordance with law after issuing notices and giving proper hearing to the persons who had since been allotted these lands.
8. The petitioners now seek special leave: to appeal and contend that after the High Court had converted the writ petition into a revision petition under section 21 of the Dis--placed Persons (Land. Settlement) Act: it should have dismissed the same as it was barred by time, and it had no jurisdic--tion to condone the delay, as section 5 of the Limitation Act did, not apply to proceedings under the Land Settlement Act of 1958.
9. It is further contended that in this view of the matter the High Court should not have converted a time-barred revision petition into a writ again, since the consequence of the revision petition being barred by time was that there was no petition before the High Court which could be converted into a writ petition.
10. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention, for the petition was originally field in the High Court in the form of a writ, petition and the High Court had not dismissed the same, but; merely allowed its conversion as a revision petition under the. Land Settlement Act subject to just exceptions. Upon these exceptions being taken the High Court could have withdrawn its permission and treated the petition in its original form namely, as a writ petition. This is exactly what it had done. No just exception can, therefore be taken to the procedure adopted by the High Court.
11. So far as the question of lathes is concerned we are in agreement with the High Court that there was no serious delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, for, within two months of her release the respondent applied for the review and within three months thereafter she filed the writ petition in the High Court. There was no inordi--nate delay, therefore, on her part. It has to be remembered that she was arrested, in pursuance of the direction of the Settlement Commissioner (Lands) for her prosecution under the Martial Law Regulation and during the pendency of the prosecution she could not have moved against the impugned order of cancellation.