' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the order of the High Court dated 22-4-1999, whereby accepting the revision, petition filed by Muhammad Sharif, vendee-respondent, the pre-emption suit filed by the appellant, herein, was dismissed for non- depositing of 1/5th of probable value of the suit-land.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that a pre-emption suit was instituted by the appellant, herein, .Against the defendants-respondents in the Court of District Judge, Muzaffarabad, on 27-11-1994 which was made over for hearing and disposal to the learned Additional District Judge, Muzaffarabad, on the same day. On 7-2-1998, the plaintiff-appellant was directed to deposit 1/5th of the probable value of the suit-land or to furnish security bond for the said amount uptil 14-3-1998. On 14-3-1998, the trial Court issued process against some of the defendants and also extended time for depositing of 1/5th of the probable value of the suit-land or furnishing security bond by 15-4-1998. On 15-4-1998, it was recorded in the interim order that 1/5th of the consideration amount or the security bond had not yet been deposited and, thus, it was directed that needful should be done till next date, i.e. 30-4-1998. Earlier, an application was submitted by the respondents-defendants on 19-3-1998 praying that the suit should be dismissed for the non-compliance of the order of the Court with regard to the deposit of 1/5th or furnishing of security bond. The trial Court, after hearing the arguments, dismissed the said application filed by the defendants-respondents. On revision to the High Court, the learned Judge in the High Court has accepted the same holding that the trial Court extended the period without any sufficient cause and dismissed the suit for non-compliance of the order of the trial Court.
3. Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, Advocate, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, has argued that the interim orders dated 7-2-1998 and 14-3-1998 were written by the Clerk of the Court and not by the Additional District Judge himself. Thus, he has contended that the part of the said orders which pertains to the deposit of 1/5th of the probable value of the suit-land or furnishing the security bond was subsequently inserted in the orders by the Clerk of the Court and the plaintiff- appellant or his counsel was not in the knowledge of the said part of the orders. He has submitted that when the matter was brought into the notice of the Additional District Judge on 15-4-1998, he extended the time to do the needful till 30-4-1998 and the plaintiff-appellant in compliance of the order of the Court filed the security bond. The learned counsel for the appellant has further argued that even if it is assumed that the plaintiff or his counsel was in the knowledge of the fact that he had to comply with the order of the trial Court, the relevant order of the trial Court should not have been disturbed because it was within the discretion of the trial Court to extend the time. The learned counsel has further submitted that the contention of the defendants-respondents that the earlier objections, the copy of which is on the paper book, marked as 'DA'. Were filed by the plaintiff-appellant or his counsel, is not correct. He has submitted that the said objections have not been signed by the plaintiff or his counsel and those are of no legal consequence. The learned counsel has also contended that in fact he filed the objections to the application dated 19-3-1998 for the dismissal of the suit on 29-4-1998, which are initialed by the Presiding Officer. Thus, he has argued that it is not correct to suggest that the plaintiff-appellant had filed any objections earlier in which he had admitted the knowledge of the aforesaid orders whereby the plaintiff was directed to deposit I/5th of probable value of the suit-land or to furnish the security bond of the said amount.
4. In reply, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents, has argued that in fact the plaintiff-appellant, had earlier filed the objections, the copy of which was given to the defendants-respondents and is marked as 'DA' in which the knowledge to deposit 1/5th of the probable value of the suit-land was admitted by the counsel for the appellant; those objections were taken back by the counsel for the appellant leaving a photostat copy on the record. He has further submitted that the said fact is further confirmed by the order of the Additional District Judge dated 29-5-1998 wherein he has observed that the counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has taken the stand in view of his pleadings that the Court had the powers to extend the time; he has not mentioned therein that any charge was levelled against the Clerk of the Court that he had subsequently inserted the part of the order regarding the deposit of 1/5th or furnishing the security bond in the interim orders date 7-2-1998 and 14-3-1998. The learned counsel for the defendants-respondents has further argued that subsequent objections dated 29-4-1998, wherein, the factum of the absence of knowledge was pleaded were filed after the announcement of the order dated 29-5-1995 by the Additional District Judge; it is for this reason that the aforesaid order did not find any reference to the said subsequent objections wherein the absence of knowledge has been pleaded. The learned counsel has further argued that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the objections dated 29-4-1998 were filed before the announcement of the said order, the same would not help the case of the plaintiff-appellant because the Additional District Judge did not record any reason in the interim orders dated 7-2-1998 and 14-3-1998 as to why he was extending the time for doing the needful. The learned counsel has argued that it is well settled principle of law that while exercising the discretion with regard to the deposit of 1/5th of probable value of the suit-land or furnishing of security bond, the Court cannot extend the time without sufficient cause. The learned counsel has also referred to an authority which has been also relied upon by the High Court in the impugned judgment.
5. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised at the Bar. Irrespective of the question as to whether earlier any objections were filed by the plaintiff-appellant, wherein 'knowledge' regarding 1/5th was admitted by the plaintiff-appellant, the fact remains that the perusal of the interim orders dated 7-2-1998 and 14-3-1998 reveals that it cannot be said that the part of the orders which pertains to deposit of 1/5th of the probable value of the suit-land or furnishing security bond was subsequently inserted in the interim order or the same was written in a different ink; it is also clear from the aforesaid orders that the said part of the orders was mentioned at the time when the orders dated 7-2-1998 and 14-3-1998 were first written. It may also be pointed out that in objections dated 29-4-1998, it has not been specifically mentioned that the orders dated 7- 2-1998 and 14-3-1998 were not written under the supervision of the Presiding Officer and as such were of no legal value. It is mentioned in paragraph 3 of the said objections that it transpired from the file that in the order dated 7-2-1998, the Clerk of Court has afterwards inserted the part of diction which pertains to the deposit of security. It has been already observed that the perusal of the said orders leaves no doubt that the said parts were not subsequently inserted as is the case of the plaintiff-appellant. The learned Additional District Judge did not deal with the question in his order dated 29-5-1998 as to whether the plaintiff-appellant was not in the knowledge of the said orders so far as the same pertain to the deposit of 1/5th of the probable value of the suit-land or to furnish the security bond. Thus, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff- appellant that needful could not be done due to absence of the knowledge of the plaintiff- appellant or his counsel.
6. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court had the discretion to extend the time is concerned, it may be observed that the judicial discretion is to be exercised according to norms of justice. It is well settled principle of law that the order regarding 1/5th cannot be extended by the trial Court without sufficient reasons in that regard but in the present case no reason has been recorded by the Additional District Judge. Thus, we are of the view that the High Court did not commit any error while passing the impugned order.
' In the light of what has been stated above, finding no force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed with costs.