' The petitioner Malik Nisar Hussain and respondents Nos, 15 and 16, namely Bashir Ahmad and Abbas All respectively, instituted three separate suits against respondents Nos, 1 to 14 the vendees for pre-empting the sale of land, measuring 322 kanals 2 marlas, situate in village Rana Wahan, District Multan. This sale was made vide Mutation No, 382 sanctioned on 22-2-1973. All these three suits were consolidated and proceedings were taken in the suit filed by Abbas Ali respondent No,
16. The case proceeded when, on 20-4-1976, evidence of the petitioner who was termed as (URDU TEXT) was closed under Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. This revision petition has been filed against the afore mentioned order dated 20-4-1976 passed by the learned Civil Judge First Class, Multan.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended - ' firstly, that on 26-1-1976, which was the date previous to the date on which evidence of the petitioner was closed, the adjournment was not granted on the asking of the petitioner and as such Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. Could not be invoked to close the evidence of the petitioner ; and ' secondly, that the case was not decided forthwith i. e. On the same date and was adjourned for further proceedings which was not permissible under the aforementioned provision. In support of his this contention the learned counsel placed reliance on Industrial Sales and Service Karachi v.
Archifar Opal Laboratories Ltd., Karachi PLD 1969 Kar.
418.
3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No, 15 submitted that the present revision was not competent as any order passed under rule 3 of Order XVII, C. P. C. Amounts to a decree and as such appealable. He also submitted that not only once but on a number of occasions adjournments were granted to the petitioner but he failed to produce evidence and that the trial Court was left with no alternative except to have resorted to the penal provision of Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C.
4. In reply to the contention "secondly" raised on behalf of the petitioner, the learned counsel submitted that the word "forthwith" has been authoritatively enunciated by the Supreme Court in Maulvi Abdul Aziz Khan v. Mst. Shahjehan Begum and others wherein it was held that "forthwith" does not mean 'on the same day'.
Taking the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner into consideration, it may be pointed out that the same proceeds on an erroneous assumption as to the factual position. A perusal of the order sheet clearly shows that the adjournment on 26-1-1976 was granted on the request of the petitioner as his evidence was not present on the said date. Apart altogether from the above position that the adjournment on 26-1-1976 was granted to the petitioner for production of evidence on 20-4-1976, it may also be pointed out that earlier also, on 3-7-1975, the case was adjourned to 11-10-1975 as the evidence of the petitioner was not present and request was made for adjournment which was granted subject to payment of costs. It is therefore factually incorrect that the adjournment on 26-1-1976 i. e. On the date prior to the date on which the evidence was closed was not granted on the request of the petitioner. This being so, the first contention fails.
6. Adverting now to the second contention, it may be pointed out that it has been enunciated authoritatively in PLD 1971 SC 434 that the word "forthwith" does not mean `on the same day' but within a reasonable time. At page 438 of the report, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under :- "Thus it is quite clear that the word `forthwith' does not mean on the same day. The reasonable meaning of this word in the context of Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. Is that the Court should proceed to decide the suit within a reasonable time under the circumstances of the case. In our opinion the view expressed in the above decision that the suit should be decided on the same day is not in accordance with law.
' In view of the above conclusion, we are satisfied that the trial Court was perfectly justified in adjourning the case for arguments so as to enable him to proceed with the suit forthwith."
7. In the case in hand, a re-perusal of the order-sheet shows that after closing the evidence of the petitioner under Order XVII, rule 3, C. P. C. The learned trial Court recorded the statements of all the three learned counsel for the three plaintiffs 1. e. Petitioner and respondents 15 and 16 who admitted the sale price of the land in dispute as Rs, 15,000 and conceded issue No, 12 on, the same day.
Thereafter the case was adjourned by the learned trial Court to 22-4-1976 for arguments. Of the parties. The order thus passed was perfectly legal in view of the Supreme Court pronouncement afforested. It is a different thing that on 22-4-19.76 the petitioner and respondents-vendees made certain applications and the Court had to adjourn the case further for reply to and arguments on the said applications. Again when the learned trial Court was in a position to decide the suit after disposal of the aforementioned applications, it was informed on 8-5-1976 that proceedings had been stayed in the suit under the orders of this Court. Thereafter the case had to be kept pending awaiting decision in this revision.
8. In the circumstances aforementioned, no fault can be found with the order of the trial Court as the adjournment made after the closing of evidence was solely for the purpose of enabling itself to pronounce the judgment which, as already pointed out above, was permissible. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner therefore also fails.
9. Since the revision petition is not being accepted on merits, I do not feel called upon to deal with the contention raised on behalf of the contesting respondent as to the competence of the revision petition.1
10. In view of the foregoing discussion, this revision petition has no merit and is dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. PLD 1971 SC 434