1. ' This petition is directed against an order in revision passed by the respondent No.1 dated 14-3-1991 upholding the original appellate orders of the Adjudicating Officers and Appellate Authority dated 18-3-1986 and 12-11-1987 respectively. Without going into the factual details it might suffice to record that the petitioner was found to be in possession of contraband betel nuts on 20th July, 1985 by officers of Pakistan Coast Guard. An F.I.R. was recorded and a Mashirnama of arrest having been prepared, the petitioner was taken into custody. Thereafter, proceedings under section 156 of Customs Act were initiated against the petitioner.
2. ' The Adjudicating Officer after having served a show-cause notice and hearing the petitioner passed an order dated 18-3-1986. Being aggrieved the petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 18-3-1986 thereafter the petitioner invoked the revisional remedy before the respondent No.1 who also by order dated 14-3-1991 upheld the findings of the Tribunal.
3. ' Mr. S.M. Aamir Naqvi, learned counsel for the petitioner, attempted to argue that the findings of the Tribunal below were contrary to facts and the law. He stated that sufficient evidence was not available to establish that the petitioner was guilty of an offence under the Customs Act or that the goods in question were liable to be confiscated. We are afraid we are not impressed by this contention inasmuch as it is well-settled that this Court rarely interferes with concurrent findings of facts recorded by statutory Tribunals unless it can be shown that some finding was recorded without there being any evidence to support it or a material part of the evidence adduced was completely ignored by the Tribunal below. In view of three concurrent findings of facts we do not think there is any room for interference in Constitutional jurisdiction.
4. ' Mr. S.M. Aamir Naqvi alternately argued that the findings recorded were in the nature of a criminal charge and the factum of petitioner's possession of contraband goods was not established beyond a reasonabli. Doubt. Indeed, learned counsel may be right to the extent that when the findings recorded entail an element of moral turpitude and very serious repercussions are involved, the allegations need to be established beyond a reasonable time as held in Muhammad Saeed and 4 others v. Election Petitions Tribunal, West Pakistan and others PLD 1957 SC (Pak )
91. Mr Nadeem Azhar Siddiqui, learned Deputy Attorney-General, however, referred section 3 of the Customs Act which explicitly provided that when contraband goods are recovered from the custody of a particular person the burden to prove innocent possession lies on that person. In the circumstances considering the specific provisions of a specific law we are unable to accept Mr. Naqvi's contention on this ground as well.
5. ' Finally, learned counsel argued that the Adjudicating Officer could not be described as an officer of Customs in terms of section 6 of the Customs Act and, therefore, the order passed by him was void ab initio and liable to be struck down. He argued that once the original order was found to be void the entire superstructure constructed thereon has to fall in view of the pronouncement of Honourable Supreme Court in Yousuf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam A PLD 1958 SC 104.
6. ' We regret we are unable to accept this contention either. It is well-settled by now that in such situation the superior Courts having variably applied the doctrine of de facto and it has been consistently held that illegality in the appointment of public officer will not per se vitiate any order passed by him and that no such illegality can be allowed to be questioned in collateral proceedings. Pronouncement of Supreme Court in Lt. Col. Farzand Ali and others v. Province of West Pakistan through The Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Government of West Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1970 SC 98 and Pir Shah v Shad Muhahunad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.W.F.P. And another PLD 1995 SC 66 amply state this proposition.
7. ' For the above reasons we find no merit in this petition and are constrained to dismiss it.