' This judgment shall also decide Civil Revision No.307 of 2003 as both these cases arise out of a common consolidated judgment dated 12-7-2000 of the Trial Court and judgment dated 18-2- 2003 in appeal.
2. Briefly the facts are that Sultan Khan son of Pehlwan Khan, respondent filed a suit for declaration etc. That he was an owner in possession of land measuring 13 Kanals situated in Khasra No.683 Min village Cheengi and that the defendant be restrained from interfering in his possession. He also sued for payment of damages. On the other hand Sultan Khan and others (sons of Noor Khan) filed a suit against the respondents to the effect that they are owners in possession of land measuring 4 Kanals situated on the eastern side of Khasra No.683 and that the entries in the Revenue record showing the respondents to be owner of 13 Kanals was illegal and inoperative upon the rights of the petitioners.
3. Both the suits were consolidated. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence of the parties decreed the suit of the respondents and dismissed the suit filed by the petitioners vide his judgment and decree dated 12-7-2000.
' The petitioners preferred two civil appeals being Civil Appeals Nos.302 of 2000 and 304 of 2000 against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The learned Appellate Court after reappraising the legal and factual grounds involved in the case, dismissed both the appeals vide judgment and decree dated 18-2-2003.
4. Present civil revision as well as the connected Civil Revision No.307 of 2003 were filed on 10-6- 2003 against the impugned judgment and decree of the Appellate Court dated 18-2-2003. The civil revision appears to be barred by time as it has been filed beyond the time as prescribed in section 115, C.P.C.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners urton the question of limitation contends that the petitioners filed an application for obtaining certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree on 19-2-2003. The certified copy was prepared on 23-3-2003 and was delivered to the petitioners on the same day. According to the learned counsel, the timespent in obtaining certified copies from 19-2-2003 to 24-3-2003 shall be the time requisite for obtaining copies and shall be excluded for the purpose of computing period of limitation for the present revision as envisaged under section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the civil revision filed on 10-6-2003 was thus within limitation.
' In support of this contention, reference is made to section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, wherein the said benefit is also extended to applications which would include civil revisions. Reliance is also placed on the case of Shujahat Hussain v. Muhammad Habib and another (2003 SCM R 176) where the Honourable Supreme Court has held that a revision petition filed within a period of 90 days after excluding the timespent for obtaining certified copies of the judgment and decrees and other documents was within the period of limitation and could not be dismissed as barred by time. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent appeared at limine stage and vehemently contended that according to the amended section 115 of the C.P.C. The civil revision shall be made within 90 days of tht decision of the subordinate Court which shall provide a copy of such decision within 3 days thereof. According to him the petitioners can not seek any benefit of the time that was spent in obtaining certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree as section 115, 2nd proviso to subsection (1), C.P.C. Provides a special period of limitation and under section 29(2) of the Limitation Act section 12 of the Limitation Act would only apply to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local provision of law, It is further submitted that the petitioner had erred in applying to the Copying Agency for obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment as neither a certified copy was a requirement of section 115, C.P.C. For the purpose of filing a revision nor was it competent in view of second proviso to section 115(1), C.P.C.
Which obliged the subordinate Court to provide a copy of the impugned decision within 3 days.
According to his submission, the petitioners ought to have applied to the Subordinate Court itself for obtaining the copy of the impugned judgment within the prescribed period of 3 days.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the relevant legal provisions.
7. For resolving the controversy, reference is made to the first proviso to section 115(1) C.P.C. Which reads as under:- "Provided that where a person makes an application under this subsection, he shall, in support of such application, furnish copies of the pleadings, documents and order of the subordinate Court.
And the High Court shall, except for reasons to be recorded, dispose of such application without calling for the record of the subordinate Court."
8. This provision of law makes it obligatory for the petitioners to furnish copies of the pleadings, documents and the order of the subordinate Court alongwith the revision petition. The word "certified" is conspicuous by its absence in this provision of law. The inference from the omission in statute law is clearly to absolve the revision petitions from filing the certified copies of the impugned judgment etc. Along with the revision petition. Approaching the Copying Agency for obtaining certified copy of the impugned judgment was neither apt nor necessary and would not in any manner extend the benefit of section 12 of the Limitation Act to the petitioners.
9. This Court is also fortified in its view upon. The strength of second proviso to section 115(1) C.P.C.
Which makes it obligatory for the subordinate Court to provide a copy of the impugned decision within three days thereof. Here again there is no requirement of law that such a copy shall be a "Certified" copy and it thus becomes manifest that it was the duty of the petitioners to have approached the learned Lower Court which passed the impugned judgment and decree to obtain a copy of the same. Once an application was made to the subordinate Court and there was a failure of the Lower Court to provide the copy within the prescribed period of 3 days, the revision petitioners could have sought condonation of delay on the ground that it was beyond his control to obtain a copy, from the lower forum.
10. In the present case, however, it is not disputed that no such application was made by the petitioners to the learned subordinate Court and thus it would be idle to submit that the benefit of section 12 of the Limitation Act should be extended to the petitioner for the time spent in obtaining the certified copy from the Copying Agency.
11. It appears that the Legislature while amending section 115 C.P.C. Was alive to the requirement of law and procedure that civil revisions should be filed promptly and decided expeditiously.
Otherwise there was no occasion to have burdened the subordinate Court with the duty of providing a copy of its decision to an intending petitioner within three days.
12. The provision of limitation as incorporated in the second proviso to section 115(1) C.P.C. Leaves no manner of doubt that a special and specific period of limitation, different from the period prescribed there for by the first schedule has been provided. This being the case section 4. Sections 9 to 18 and section 22 Limitation Act are applied only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local provision of law. The second proviso is reproduced as finder:- "Provided that such application shall be made within ninety days of the decision of the subordinate Court which shall provide a copy of such decision within three days thereof, and the High Court shall dispose of such application within three months."
13. It is clearly manifest from this provision that a special mechanism as been provided for the supply of the copy of the impugned decision besides fixing a period of ninety days for filing the revision petition. It would thus be imperative for a petitioner who intends to invoke section 115, C.P.C.
To apply and obtain a copy of the impugned judgment from the concerned subordinate Court, and applying for a certified copy to the Copy Branch shall be violative of the proviso quoted IE supra.
14. The case of Shujahat Hussain (2003 SCM R 176) supra proceeds on its own facts. The provisions of section 115 C.P.C. Were interpreted in conjunction with rule 56 of Sindh Chief Court, Rules. The said rule is reproduced as under:- "56. Time for application for exercise of civil jurisdiction.---Application for the exercise of the Court 4urisdiction under section 115 of the Code, section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, or section 32 of the Karachi Small Cause Courts Act, 1929, shall be made within 90 days from the date of decision complained against, exclusive of the time required for obtaining copy."
' It has been specifically mentioned in the leave granting order in the case - of Shujahat Hus.Sain supra that in this view of the matter, time requisite to obtain certified copies shall at least apply to the Province of Sindh. The said judgment, does not appear to have universal application.
15. It needs no gainsaying that in revisional jurisdiction, this Court can take suo motou notice of any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by the lower Court despite the fact that a revision is barred by time. In the present case, however no such illegality or infirmity is pointed out in the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts.
16. The upshot of the above discussion is that the civil revision is patently barred by limitation. The petitioner have not even filed any application for condonation of delay even if such remedy was available to the petitioners. Resultantly the petition is dismissed as barred by time.