1. ' MAQBOOL BAQAR, J.---The above petition has been filed by Catholic Board of Education, Sindh and Balochistan, at Hyderabad, challenging the demand of Social Security Contribution under the (Provincial) Employees Social Security Ordinance 1965, (the Ordinance), in respect of two Schools managed by the said Board in Hyderabad.
2. ' The petitioner has claimed that the said two Schools are being run on non-profit and charitable basis.
3. ' It is contended that schools being educational institutions are not engaged in any commercial, industrial or agricultural activities and thus do not fall within the meaning of the term "establishment" as defined by clause (11) of section 2 of the Ordinance and similarly the term "employee" and "employer" as used in the Ordinance are also not applicable to schools, as such the same do not fall within the ambit of the Ordinance.
4. ' The controversy thus involved in the present case is as to whether or not the petitioner's schools are "Establishments" within the meaning of clause (11) of section 2 of the Ordinance, which reads as follows:
(11) "Establishment" means an organization, whether industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise; ' It is contended that the words "or otherwise" have to be construed ejusdem generis and should be read to give colour of those words that precede it, hence the words "or otherwise" would imply only such other organizations which are in the nature of industrial, commercial or agricultural organization. It is submitted that a common element in the various categories of organization as enumerated in the above definition is profit making, whereas the petitioner's schools being educational institutions are engaged in imparting education and that too on non-profit and charitable basis. In support of the above contention the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a unreported judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in ICA No,609/97, Don Basco High School versus The Director Social Security.
5. ' We have given our anxious thought to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and have carefully examined the terms "establishment" as defined by section 2 (11) of the Ordinance.
6. ' The. Ordinance has defined "establishment" as an organization and in order to re-assure that the definition would cover all kind of organizations, and to state it with certainty, the words "whether industrial, commercial agricultural or otherwise" have been incorporated in the definition, meaning thereby that the term establishment is not limited to industrial, commercial and agricultural organizations but embraces all other categories of organization and thus includes such other organization as are engaged on non-profitable basis rendering charitable, social educational or other welfare services, The word organization includes a corporation, Government and Governmental, sub-division, or agency, business trust, estate, partnership or even association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial entity which certainly covers a school. In literal sense "organization" cannotes, systematic arrangement for a definite purpose. In legal parlance it is described as a systematic arrangement, a body or a society furnished with organs for the formal exercise of its appropriate functions. The legislative intend to give wide meaning and scope to the term "Establishment" is thus obvious.
7. ' Indeed it is a well established rules in construction of statutes that general expression is to be read as comprehending only things of the same kind and class as that designated by the preceding particular expression, However the doctrine or maxim of "ejusdem generis" applies only under certain specific conditions. Three such pre-requisites being that the members of the enumeration constitute a class, the class is not exhausted by the enumeration, and the intent that the general terms be given a broader meaning then the doctrine requires is not clearly manifested. However all these essentials pre-requisite are missing in so far as the definition under discussion is concerned.
8. Neither the industrial, commercial or agricultural organizations belong to the same class nor is such enumeration exhaustive. In the case of Don Basco High School v. The Assistant Director, E.O.B.I and others (PLD 1989 S.C. 128) the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while discussing the doctrine of "ejusdem generis" has endorsed the above rule of interpretation in the following words: "However, the doctrine will apply when there is nothing in the provision or Act to show that a wider sense was not intended or the intention to give to the general term a broader meaning than the doctrine requires, was not manifested.
9. ' According to Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition,. Page 297, it is a well established rule in the construction of statutes that "general terms following particular ones apply only to such persons or things as are ejusdem generis with those comprehended in the language of the Legislature; R.V. Clewroth (1864) 4 B. & S. 927, per Cockburn C.J at 932. In other words, the general expression is to be read as comprehending only things of the same kind as that designated by the preceding particular expressions, unless there is something to show that a wider sense was intended (emphasis supplied)". Reference is made by the author to R.V. Edwardson (1859) 28 L.J.M.C. 213).
10. ' According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 82, page 658, the rule or doctrine of `ejusdem generis' will apply unless intention to the contrary is clearly shown. The relevant passage may be quoted here. It reads: "Whether general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words, under the rule or maxim of construction known as `ejusdem generis', will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated, unless an intention to the contrary is clearly shown." (underlining is ours).
11. ' J.G Sutherland, in his book "Statutes and Statutory Construction" (third Edition) in section 4910, at page 400 has stated that the doctrine applies when the following five conditions exist:
(1) the statute contains an enumerations by specific words;
(2) the members of the enumeration constitute a class;
(3) the class is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(4) a general term follows the enumeration; and
(5) there is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be Wen a broader meaning than the doctrine requires".
12. ' As, regards the legislative intent, it is quite obvious from the plain reading of the preamble of the Ordinance that it is a beneficial statute intended to provide benefits to certain employees, or their dependents in the event of sickness, maternity employment injury, or death, and therefore be construed liberally, the term "organization" as employed in the Ordinance has therefore, a very wide and literal import to deliver benefit to its employees irrespective of the nature of organization.
13. The intention thus seems to apply the Ordinance even to such organization which are engaged on non-profit basis and are rendering welfare services, it therefore follows that the mere fact that the petitioner's schools are being run on non-profit basis, do not justify their exclusion from the purview of the Ordinance.
14. ' In the case of Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Sind Employees' Social Security Institution (PLD 1977 SC 197), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while interpreting the term "establishment" as defined in clause
(11) of section 2 of the Ordinance held as follows: "There is no doubt that we are dealing with a beneficial or remedial legislation conceived as means of ameliorating the lot of the working class, and as such it would be in keeping with the accepted principle of interpretation, as observed in Divisional Superintendent, P.W.R., Karachi v. Bashir Ahmed
(1) that it should be so construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief, or else it would frustrate the legislative intent. It would appear, therefore, that, in keeping with the object of the legislation, as wide an interpretation should be placed on the terms "employee" and "establishment" as permissible within the language employed in the statute".
15. ' The Precise question as is being discussed now came before a Bench of this Court in an appeal filed by Adamjee Foundation and another versus First Sindh Labour Court, Karachi, and another (PLD 1979 Kar. 510). It was contended that application of the Ordinance to the appellant foundation, which was a charitable organization, was without legal authority. On the ground, firstly that under section 1(3) of the Ordinance, the provisions thereunder can be made applicable in restricted sense to such area, classes of person, industries or establishment, as Government may by notification specify in that behalf, whereas the foundation does not fit in with any one of these categories and secondly that the appellant foundation was not a ,employer within the meaning of section 2 (9) of the Ordinance, nor is it covered by the definitions of "establishment" and "industry" as provided under clauses (11) and (15) of section 2 of the Ordinance: It was further contended that in clause (11) of section 2 of the Ordinance the words "or otherwise" are used in conjunctive sense, whereby it should mean that the establishment should either be industrial, commercial, agricultural or any other organization of like nature and that the common feature of all these different categories of establishment mentioned above is profit making, hence "or otherwise" would imply any other organization which is based on profit making. It was held as follows: "In order to resolve the controversy whether Adamjee Foundation is an organization or not or as to what is the implication of words "or otherwise" used in the definition of "establishment" as provided in the said Ordinance, it is imperative to find out as to what is the legislative intent of the said Ordinance. This Ordinance, as stated in its preamble, is meant to introduce a scheme of Social Security for providing benefits to certain employees or their dependents in the event of sickness, maternity, employment injury or death and for matters ancillary thereto.
16. ' It has been held in PLD 1977 SC 197 that the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 is a beneficial or remedial legislation conceived as a means of ameliorating the lot of the working class, and as such, it would be in keeping with the accepted principle of interpretation, that it should be so construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief, or else it would frustrate the legislative intent. It is further held that in keeping with the object of the legislation as wide an interpretation should be placed on the terms "employee" and "establishment" permissible within the language employed in the statute. It therefore, follows that the term "organization" has a very wide and literal import to deliver benefits to its employees regardless of the facts as to of whatever kind the organization may be. In literal sense an organization connotes systematic arrangement for a definite purpose. In the legal sense it describes a system, a body or society furnished with organs for the formal exercise of its appropriate functions. These attributes are very much present and available even in a foundation which has charitable characteristics and is non- profit making. The employees working in such foundation are regular employees receiving their salaries or wages and are not distinguishable from employees as defined in section 2(8) of the said Ordinance. The trustees of this foundation step into shoes of employers as they control the administration and have powers of hiring and firing subject to their rules and regulations. It would not be out of place to mention here that in the light of broader and liberal import attached to the meaning of organization in consonance with the preamble and legislative intent of the said Ordinance, in the further classification of "whether industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise", the words "or otherwise" are used disjunctively in a generalized sense to include any other organization to attract operation of this Ordinance if such organization is so notified by the Government as required under section 1 (3) of the said Ordinance".
17. However in the case of the Don Basco High School ICA No, 609 of 1997, relied upon by the petitioner, where a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, whilst relying on two judgments from the English and Indian Jurisdiction has held that the "Establishment as defined in the West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965 does not cover the educational institution specially if it run on a charitable basis, neither of aforenoted, binding pronouncements of our apex Court have been discussed nor are the same mentioned.
18. ' In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the firm view that the petitioner's schools are "Establishments" within the meaning of the Ordinance and fall within the purview of the Ordinance.
19. Consequently the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.