' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.--Appellant/judgment debtor, through the filing of the instant first appeal, on 9-1-2003, under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, assails the judgment and decree dated 4-5-2002, whereby the learned Banking Court passed a decree for the recovery of Rs.6,11,778 together with costs of funds, except liquidated damages, against the appellant. The appeal in hand is, admittedly, barred by time, as such the appellant has instituted an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act (C.M. No,1-C of 2003) seeking condonation of delay. The ground of condonation of delay, as mentioned in the aforenoted application, is "that the petitioner has been roaming about the Court below but being illiterate person could not trace out his case and the officials of the Court has been telling the petitioner that his case is still pending."
2. Admittedly, the impugned judgment was passed, on 4-5-2002, and the appeal, in hand, was filed, on 9-1-2003, while the period of limitation for filing an appeal under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinances, 2001, is thirty days from the date of judgment and decree. If the period for obtaining the certified copies is excluded from the period of limitation, even then the appeal has been preferred after the expiry of period of limitation.
3. =Section 29 of the Limitation Act provides that where in a special law or local law different periods of limitation have been prescribed the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable. Needless to mention that under the ordinary law for filing regular first appeal before this Court, a period of 90 days has been prescribed, while the present case is covered by the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which is a special law, and as noted above, prescribes a period of 30 days for filing first appeal before this Court against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Banking Court. From the above narrative it is, thus, clear that special law has provided a different period of limitation than the ordinary law, therefore, section 5 of the Limitation Act is neither applicable nor attracted in the present set of circumstances.
4. In the above perspective without adverting to the merits of the application, the same on the legal plain is not maintainable. Provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable in the present case in view of the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, as per law laid down by this Court in Bashir Ahmad and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105 and by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in a case reported as Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCM R 286. Being guided by the aforesaid law declared, this application (C.M.No,1-C of 2003), which has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act, is misconceived, incompetent and not maintainable, hence, dismissed.
5. For the foregoing reasons and with the dismissal of the aforenoted application, the appeal is, admittedly, barred by time, thus, we are constrained to hold that the appeal cannot proceed having been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the relevant law, thus, the same is dismissed.
' There shall be no order as to costs.