' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.--This petition for leave to appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 16th December, 2003 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore whereby criminal appeal filed by the respondent has been allowed and the case was remanded to the learned trial Court for re-writing of the judgment.
2. Precisely stating the facts of the case are that petitioners were sent up to answer the charge under sections 302/148/149, P.P.C. Vide F.I.R. (Exh.P.A.) registered on 15th August, 1989 at 5-00 p.m.
Within the area of Manga Mandi, Lahore in respect of stated allegation of murder of Maqbool alias Mukhi. Learned trial. Court vide judgment dated 27th July, 1994 acquitted all the accused persons of the charge, however, learned High Court in revision petition, by means of impugned judgment dated 16th December, 2003, remanded the case to the trial Court for re-writing of the judgment for the following reasons:-- "We have considered the arguments propounded by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully. At the outset, we will deal with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents regarding the conversion of the revision into appeal. It is well-settled by now that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction cannot convert the findings of acquittal into that of conviction. The amendment came into force on 14-11-1994, which cannot be given effect retrospectively. We are, therefore, of the firm opinion that the conversion of revision into appeal was not in accordance with law.
' The perusal of the record shows that the case was registered promptly soon after the occurrence.
P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 who are eye-witnesses of the occurrence have fully implicated the accused/respondents. Their evidence fully proves the case against the respondents. It was a broad daylight occurrence and within their view the accused/respondents committed the murder of the deceased. Their presence at the spot is natural and cannot be doubted. They appear to be truthful witnesses.
' Even otherwise the ocular account narrated by them is corroborated by the medical evidence as the doctor who conducted autopsy has categorically stated in his report that all the injuries were caused by fire-arm. The injury No,1(a) caused the death of the deceased as it damaged the major blood vessels and right lung leading to profuse haemorrhage and shock which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The time between injury and death was stated to be immediate. P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 deposed in their statements that Maqbool alias Mukhi (deceased) succumbed to injuries while they were on their way to hospital. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has not appreciated the evidence rather ignored the same. He acted on surmises and conjectures. We do not agree with the reason advanced by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore for acquittal of the accused/ respondents. The judgment is perverse and is not borne out from the record."
3. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners contended that the trial Court after having taken into consideration the material available on record acquitted the accused in accordance with law, therefore, interference in the acquittal order is unwarranted.
4. We are not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the reason that learned High .Court vide impugned judgment has referred to certain pieces of the evidence which were disbelieved without any justification and the trial Court proceeded to dispose of the case on the basis of surmises and conjunctures. It may be noted that impugned judgment is strictly in accordance with the principles of law discussed by this. Court in the case of Ghulam Sikandar and another v.
Mamaraz Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 11 wherein it has been held that interference in the acquittal order shall be permissible if the Court seized with the matter come to the conclusion that the judgment is perverse or the Court while recording the acquittal had not taken into consideration important incriminating evidence. After having gone through the judgment of the trial Court independently as well as material available on record, we are of the opinion that the material incriminating evidence was disregarded by the learned trial Court without any justification, therefore, for such reason, interference by the High Court was warranted in the acquittal order.
' Thus for the foregoing reasons, we see no force in this petition as such same is dismissed and leave declined.