' AKBAR M. MEMON (MEMBER).---All these appellants, who were working in different capacities have challenged the orders of their termination dated 1-2-2000 and 2-2-2000. Since all the appeals are identical in nature, as such, we intend to dispose of the same by this single judgment. The order in question in reproduced hereunder:-- "Subject: TERMINATION OF SERVICE OF OFFICER ON NO LONGER REQUIRED BASIS ' It has been decided by the competent authority that your services are "No Longer Required" by Pakistan Steel Fabricating Company (Pvt.) Limited.
2. Therefore, in terms of clause 4.1(b)(iii) of Pakistan Steel Officers Services Rules duly adopted by ISFCI, your services are hereby terminated with immediate effect. However, in lieu of notice period as per requirement under above clause, you will be paid 180 days pay alongwith final settlement of your accounts.
3. You are, therefore, required to submit "No Demand/Clearance Certificate" from all the departments of Pakistan Steel/Pakistan Steel Fabricating Co. (Pvt.) Limited for final settlement of your legal dues.
4. This issued with the approval of competent authority.
(Sd)
(AHMED MASOOD)
Deputy General Manager/Incharge (PSFCL)"
2. Ch. Muhammad Ashraf appearing for the appellants in all the appeals excepting Appeals Nos.211 and 239(K)(CE) of 2000 has argued that the impugned order in all these appeals is identical. He has contended that respondents Nos.1 and 2 are sister concerns as respondent No,1 is the 100% subsidiary of respondent No,2 and all these appellants were terminated by respondent No,1 on 1-2- 2000 and 2-2-2000 on the ground of no longer required. He has contended that the present appellants were terminated even in the year 1992 which termination was challenged by the appellants before learned Labour Court and as a result of thereof they were reinstated with all back-benefits against which the respondents filed appeal before the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal where the matter ended in terms of compromise and the appellants again started working with the respondents. He has contended that the service of the appellant has been terminated abruptly without issuance of show-cause notice or holding of enquiry which shows that the respondents had adopted the policy of pick and choose. He has contended that the respondent No,2 had also terminated some of the employees who approached this Tribunal by filing Appeal No,198(K)(CE) of 2000 and others where this Tribunal had re-instated all the appellants which order was maintained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in civil petition contended that another set of Appeals bearing No,214-K of 2000 and others was also decided by this Tribunal on 9- 9-2002 but the same was not challenged by the respondents. He has contended that not a single appellant was even appointed on political influence as the appointments were made in the years 1979, 1982, 1983, 1984 when there was no political Government in power. He has contended that the appellants have been rendered jobless and since they have been able to make out their case for re-instatement with all back-benefits on the n le of consistency, as Appeal No,198(K)(CE)/2000 and others have been maintained upto the level of Hon'ble Supreme Court and so also. Appeal No,214(K)(CE) of 2000 and others which have not been challenged by the respondents, as such, considering the fact that these appeals are identical they deserve the same concession. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on 200k SCMR 1934. Lastly he has contended that appellants in Appeals Nos.370(K)(CE) of 2000 and 383(K)(CE) of 2000 have received their VRF benefits, as such, it is for the Tribunal to pass appropriate order.
3. Mr. Shafiq Qureshi learned counsel for appellants in Appeals Nos.211(K)(CE) of 2000 and 239(K)
(CE) of 2000 has adopted the same argument as that of Ch. Ashraf Khan with an addition that these two appellants were transferred from respondent No,1 to respondent No,2 and on the day when they joined respondent No,2, they were terminated. At the same time he has contended that the appellants after their first termination in the year 1992 were re-instated but subsequently they were pressurized by the respondents to opt for Voluntary Retirement Facility, but on their refusal, their termination orders have been issued. In such circumstances, he has contended that these appeals are liable to be allowed whereby the appellants be reinstated with all back-benefits.
4. Mr. Dilawar Hussain learned counsel for respondent No,1 has argued that there is no work in the respondents-Company and that on account of shortage of work the staff was sitting idle due to which termination orders were issued. He has contended that the termination orders have been issued as per Service Regulations of the respondents-Company which authorities the respondent to terminate the service of its employees on 3 months notice.
5. Mr. Asim Iqbal learned counsel for respondent No,1 in Appeal No,370(K)(CE) of 2000 and onwards has straightaway argued that the working condition of the respondent No,2 is to be seen. At the same time he has contended that the status of the appellants at the time of their appointment has to be seen. He has contended that very appointments were made on contract basis, as such, they will have to be dealt with according to the terms and conditions of the contract. He has contended that there is no work at all, as such respondent No,1 is not working properly. He has also contended that the terms and conditions of the appointment letter were accepted by the appellants and the termination is according to the terms and conditions as envisaged therein. Lastly he has contended that the appeals are misconceived and time-barred. Giving reference of Appeal No,372(K)(CE) of 2000 he has contended that the termination letter was issued on 2-2-2000 whereas service appeal was filed on 5-6-2000. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on 1999 SCMR 1997.
6. Mr. Zahid Hatnid learned counsel for respondent No,2 has argued that the termination order was issued by respondent No,1. He has also contended that the No,1, as such, they cannot claim to be the servants of respondent No,2. He has contended that how the appellants will be able to prove that they were not political appointees until and unless they file which affidavit and even for the purpose of alleging mala fides the appellants are required to file affidavits. He has also contended that the departmental appeals were not properly addressed and since the position of the appellants was that of master and servant they could have been removed from service by the respondent No,1. At the same time he has contended that delay in disposal of appeal is not on the part of the respondents, as such, the appellants are not entitled to the concession of back-benefits.
7. Ch. Ashraf Khan learned counsel appearing for the appellants in all appeals excepting Appeals Nos.211(K)(CE) of 2000 and 239(K)(CE) of 2000 has contended that respondent No,1 is a subsidiary of respondent No,2 and has produced Memorandum dated 25-1-2002 issued by Pakistan Steel which shows that the Corporate Secretary had emphasized the importance of Pakistan Steel Fabricating Company Limited for Pakistan Steel particularly for its future expansion program etc. At the same time he has contended that on account of insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act the employees working with the Pakistan Steel Fabricating Company Limited could have invoked the jurisdiction of this Tribunal for the redressal of their grievance as has been held in 2002 PLC (C.S.) 1660. At the same time he has contended that the principles of retrenchment is that the rule of last come first go is to be followed, but respondents have not done so. He has then referred to the appointment letter of appellant Queer Ahmed wherein there is a clear clause of such an incumbent's transfer to anywhere in Pakistan, as such, it would be wrong to say that the appellants were the servants of the respondent No,1 only. Replying the objection of Mr. Zahid Hamid about back-benefits he has contended that delay has always been occasioned on account of late filing of comments by the respondents which fact is evident from the diaries.
8. Mr. Shafiq Qureshi has produced letters dated 29-12-1999 and 27-1-2000 issued by the Ministry of Industries and Production and so also Pakistan Steel Centre Administration and has contended that the entire exercise was initiated at the instance of the respondent No,2 and if the respondents wanted to retrench the employees then such permission should have been sought from the Labour Court.
9. After hearing the arguments of learned counsel appearing for the parties, we have gone through the appeal files.
10. It is pertinent to bring it on record that appellants in Appeal Nos.370(K)(CE) of 2000 and 383(K)
(CE) of 2000 have already received their VRF, as such, without going into further details we dismiss their appeals as in our view it is a closed transaction and such decision has already been taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in CPLA No,217 to 219-K of 2000 which reads: "(7) We are persuaded to interfere with the case of "closed transaction" like the one in hand i,e, when the petitioners have already received all benefits and amounts due to them under VRF Scheme. The impugned judgment, in our considered view, is based on the law laid down by this Court, and we do not find any jurisdictional error or misconstruction of law.
(8) We are firmly of the opinion that the petitioners are without any merit and 'substance. Moreover, the question of general public importance is not involved in these matters.
(9) For the facts, circumstances and reasons stated hereinabove, all the petitions are dismissed and leave to appeal is refused".
11. As far as case of remaining appellants is concerned though they were pressurized by the respondents to receive VRF benefits but on their refusal the impugned termination orders dated 1- 2-2000 and 2-2-2000 were issued. Admittedly neither any notice was issued nor enquiry was conducted. Perusal of the record shows that these appeals are identical to Appeal No,198(K)(CE) of 2000 and others on all fours, which appeals were allowed by us and the reinstatement of all the appellants was ordered with all back-benefits vide judgment dated 3-3-2001. This judgment was challenged by the respondents before Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing Petition No,306(K)(CE) of 2001 where leave to appeal was refused. In such circumstances, we do not hesitate in reproducing paragraphs 25, 26 and 27 of the judgment rendered by this Tribunal:-- "(25)The other aspect of the case is that if at all, the respondents wanted to reduce their expenditure by removing certain employees then why these appellants were targeted. For this, there is no reply from the respondents. Thus action on the part of the respondents itself speaks of the discrimination as it is clearly an exercise of pick and choose and even some of them have been made target of this exercise are in fact the employees who were appointed even at the time when there was no political Government. As regard, the case of remaining employees is concerned, no doubt, they were appointed in the years 1989 and 1990, but nowhere it is the case of the respondents that they were not qualified or that they were inefficient or corrupt. If it was an act on the part of the respondents to reduce the strength of the employees for the sake of re-organization or for the sake of reducing their expenditure then also they have not come with clean hands before this Tribunal as many as 112 persons were appointed even after so called closure of respondent No,2. No doubt, some persons have been appointed on monthly basis and some of them are appointed on daily wages, which shows that the work is still going on and it is wrong to say that there was total closure. At the same time, the directive of the Cabinet Division has not been followed by the respondents in letter and spirit as neither any inquiry was held nor any official was put under suspension .But straightaway these appellants have been terminated which is also against Article 38 of the Constitution of Pakistan which provides guarantee of providing facilities of work and livelihood.
(26) As regard the arguments that some of the employees, who have been categorized by us as appellants of first category, were still performing their duties as workmen, we refrain from making any sort of observation, as according to them, they had filed petitions against redesigantion of the posts, which were already dismissed by the Labour Court. In any way, we keep them at par with the other appellants, as after redesignation their position was that of junior Officer or otherwise, as such, they have also been given the same treatment as the officers of the second category and were removed with identical termination letter without giving them any show-cause, without personal hearing and without holding any inquiry. Their case also comes within the same category and, as such, we disagree with the arguments of Messrs Ch. Muhammad Ashraf and Shafiq Qureshi, learned counsel for the appellants that their position was that of a workmen under Standing Order Ordinance they could not have been with appellants of second category and when, we are of the opinion that, all these appellants have been terminated without following the principles of natural justice, the orders in respect of these appellants are also not sustainable.
(27) Accordingly we allow all these appeals and direct the respondents to re-instate them in the same position in which they were terminated from the date of their termination with all back- benefits.
' At the same time the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.P.L.A. No,306-K of 2001 is reproduced hereunder.
"MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J.---Leave is sought against the judgment dated 3-3-2001 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Karachi through which appeal filed by respondent No,1 against the order of his termination from service, are accepted and he has been ordered to be re-instated in service with all back-benefits.
(2) The order of termination of service of respondent No,1 has been set aside by the Tribunal on the ground firstly that decision of the Cabinet Division was not followed in letter and spirit and further that if there was any need to decrease the strength of the employees on account of economy drive, the respondent has been discriminated against inasmuch as there was element of pick and choose, for after terminating of his service, as many as 112 persons were further employed.
(3) There is no force in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that order of termination of service of respondent No,1 was passed under the Service Rules framed by the Board of petitioner's Corporation and not on the charge of corruption, therefore, it was a case of termination implicit.
(4) The judgment of the Tribunal does not suffer from an infirmity, therefore, this petition meritless in hereby dismissed and leave refused".
12. Taking into consideration all the facts in both these appeals, we are of the view that these appellants who were terminated on the ground of no longer required were targeted by the respondents on pick and choose exercise, as such, they deserve re-instatement whereby the impugned order dated 1-2-2000 and 2-2-2000 is hereby ordered to be set aside. We, while, allowing all Appeals, excepting 370(K)(CE) of 2000 and 383(K)(CE) of 2000 direct the respondents to re-instate the appellants on the same positions from which they were terminated with all back-benefits.
13. There will be no orders as to costs. Parties be informed accordingly.