' SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.--- This appeal is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court, sitting on the original side, dismissing the appellant's application under Order 7, rule 11, C.P.C. Without going into the details, it might suffice to say that the respondent filed a suit for declaration of title with respect to certain pieces of land and permanent injunction, seeking to restrain the appellant from interfering with the respondent's possession. The appellant raised objections to the maintainability of the suit contending that the National Logistic Cell (N.L.C.) was part of the Pakistan Army and therefore, asuit against the appellant was barred by law. This application was dismissed by a learned Single Judge through an elaborate and well reasoned order, impugned in this appeal.
2. Mr. Abdul Rauf Khan, learned counsel for the appellant argued, in the first instance, that the findings of the learned Single Judge as to the legal status of the National Logistic Cell (N.L.C.) to the effect that it was a body corporate, was not sustainable in law. He proceeded to argue that N.L.C.
Was only a branch of Pakistan Army and therefore, the suit was barred by law.
3. Learned counsel referred to various orders and Notifications establishing the National Logistic Board and the N.L.C. And also referred to certain cases decided by our superior Courts in attempting to show that N.L.C. Was a part of the Pakistan Army. It may be observed that by a Notification dated 12-8-1978 from the Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, the National Logistic Board was constituted "for the management of transportation/projects/work entrusted to the Board from time to time". The Board was to be headed by the Secretary, Finance Division and comprising of the Secretary, Planning and Development Division and Quarter Master-General, General Headquarters to act as member and Member/Secretary respectively. Under para.3, the terms of reference of the Board were specified which inter alia stipulated transportation of stores or commodities from one place to another, procurement of trucks and spares, maintenance and repair of such vehicles as well as building of truck bodies and chassis etc. Para.4 provided that functioning of the Board will be effected through N.L.C. Headed by the Quarter Master-General.
Subsequently a Special Pakistan Army Order, dated 5-3-1979 to implement the above mentioned Notification was issued whereby the contents of the earlier Notification were reiterated and it was emphasized that the day-to-day work of the Board would be carried through the N.L.C. Headed by the Quarter Master-General which would "ensure expeditious dispatch of all essential commodities throughout the country".
4. Mr. Abdul Rauf Khan learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the Quarter Master- General who was the operational head of the N.L.C. Was a serving Army Officer subject to the Army Act and so were a number of officers and other subordinates working under him, the N.L.C. Ought to be treated as a Department of the Army. With profound respects, we are not impressed by this contention as the mere fact of some Army Officers being required to work in an Organization could never by itself make such Organization part of the Army. Learned counsel then relied upon the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in Aon Muhammad Khan v. Saeed Qadir PLD 1987 SC 490, where the meaning of the expression "logistic" in terms of the Chamber's 20th Century Dictionary as "art of movement and supply of troops" was cited with approval. With profound respects, _however, we are unable to agree with learned counsel for more than one reason. In the first place as observed by the learned Single Judge the Dictionary does not show the quoted words as the only meaning of the word "logistics". Moreover when the functions of the National Logistic Board has been clearly laid down in the Notification dated 12-8-1978 and have to be implemented by the N.L.C. Such functions cannot be narrowed down by mere reference to the Dictionary meaning of the expression "logistics". It is also interesting to note that in the same case, the Honourable Supreme Court found the respondent to be a technocrat by virtue of his experience performance as Chairman, N.L.C. In relation tore-organization of port-clearance, transportation of wheat and improvement of roads.
5. Mr. Abdul Rauf Khan, however, placed great reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Muhammad Aslam v. Incharge, N.L.C. Centre, Khairpur PLD 2001 Kar. 135, where a petition questioning detention of the petitioner's truck by the respondent was dismissed on the ground that the N.L.C. Was a branch of the Pakistan Army and a petition was barred under Article 199(3) of the Constitution. To be fair to learned counsel, though the above precedent is distinguishable in the sense that the question of bar of jurisdiction under Article 199(3) of the Constitution is not before us, it does not help him to the extent that the functionaries of the N.L.C. Have been treated to be at par with members of the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, upon a careful consideration of the relevant material and with profoundest respects to the Honourable Members of the Bench, we entertained certain reservations as to the correctness of the view taken and are of the tentative opinion that the contrary view held by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order had more to commend itself. Apparently the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court in Liaqat Hussain's case PLD 1999 SC 504, with respect to the limited functions that the Constitution assigned to the Armed Forces under Article 245 were not brought to the attention of the learned Judges hearing Muhammad Aslam's case. In other words the multifarious functions required to be performed by the National Logistic Board under para.4 of the Notification dated 12-8-1978 could not be treated as merely incidental to the specified duties of the Armed Forces under Article 245 of the Constitution i,e, to defend Pakistan against external aggression and to act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so. Nevertheless, since this appeal could be decided on other grounds we did not consider it necessary to seek constitution of a larger Bench and preferred to leave the controversy open for a decision in an appropriate case.
6. Assuming (without holding), that N.L.C. Was a part of the Pakistan Army, we invited Mr. Abdul Rauf Khan to satisfy us how the present suit was barred by any law? Learned counsel could only rely upon section 59 of the Army Act which stipulates that even when a person subject to the aforesaid Act commits a civil offence and even (except in specified cases) the victim is a civilian, the offender is required to be dealt with under the Army Act. Learned counsel argued that the jurisdiction.Of Courts Martial in such situations was exclusive and all-embracing and relied upon a number of precedents including the pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in Shahida Zahir Abbasi v. President of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 632. Indeed there could be no cavil with the proposition that the jurisdiction of Courts Martial to try offences under the Army Act is exclusive, but with all respects, we find the arguments to be entirely misconceived for another reason. Obviously in the instant case there is no allegations of commission of any offence by the officers of the N.L.C.
But the respondent has approached this Court only for the vindication of his civil rights. The distinction between civil liability and criminal liability is too well known to be highlighted and if authority is needed, one may refer to the pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in Abdul Razak v. Karachi Building Control Authority PLD 1994 SC 512.
7. When confronted with this situation and the fact that the Pakistan Army Act mainly deals with commission of offences and does not provide for adjudication of civil disputes to which members of the Armed Forces may be party, Mr. Abdul Rauf Khan argued that the Army Act provided both civil and criminal liabilities and referred to the following observations of Ajmal Mian, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Force Commander, A.S.F. v. Muhammad Rashid 1996 SCM R 1614:-- "That the Act and the Army Act provide civil and criminal liabilities of the persons subject to the same, namely through departmental proceedings a person subject to the Act or the Army Act may be dismissed or removed from service or a lesser punishment may be imposed or he may be proceeded with through criminal proceedings and be imprisoned and in consequence thereof may be dismissed from service."
8. We are afraid that the above inference is misplaced and a careful reading of the judgment clearly shows that the word "Act" used for the first time in the above quotation is preferable to the Airport Security Force Act, 1975 and his Lordship was only drawing a clear distinction between civil liability of dismissal by way of disciplinary action under the Airport Security Force Act through the Government Servants (E&D) Rules and the criminal liability of being dismissed on account of conviction under the Army Act.
9. In view of the above, we found no merits in this appeal and dismissed it vide our short order announced in Court on 24-1-2002.