1. DORAB PATEL, J.--The petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act, and, according to learned counsel, it was dissolved on 25-7-1977 by an order of the Provincial Education Secretary. This order has not been filed, because, according to learned counsel, it is not relevant to the petition for leave. Be that as it may, after it had been dissolved, the premises of the petitioner were sealed by the third respondent on the orders of the Provincial Education Secretary, therefore, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the Sind High Court in order to set aside the orders passed against it. Together with the writ petition it had sought interim relief and although interim relief was sought, for the purpose of this petition, is sufficient to state that the petitioner had sought the unsealing of its remises, pending the hearing of its writ petition. This application came up for "hearing before a Division Bench of the Sind High Court on 3-10-1977, and as to the prayer for unsealing of the petitioner's premises, the order passed reads: "Therefore is that the record should be preserved, and the request also is not necessary to make, because it is understood that the record of an organisation is never meant to be destroyed and Mr. A. H. Lakho says that it will not be disturbed. Orders accordingly."
2. Mr. A. H. Lakho was then the Additional Advocate-General and the assurance, that the record of the petitioner would be preserved, was obviously an assurance which was binding on all the respondents. And the question in this petition is of the effect of the undertaking thus given by the learned Additional Advocate-General According to Mr. Muzaffar Aly Khan, the undertaking thus given meant that the petitioner's premises would be unsealed. But, not only were they not unsealed but the petitioner learnt on 16-12-1977 that the fourth respondent had two days earlier broken the lock of the petitioner's premises and handed over the premises including the records of the petitioner to the respondent No. 5. And, further, according to learned counsel, the action thus taken by the fourth respondent was on the orders of the second respondent. Therefore, on 18-12-1977, the petitioner filed an application for contempt against all the respondents and the Court ordered notice to the respondents on 9-1-1978. Although this order is crucial to the petitioner's case, it has not been filed. Be that as it may, respondents 2 to 5 filed counter-affidavits in which they showed cause, but at the same time, they submitted unconditional apologies.
3. It would appear that an affidavit in rejoinder was filed on behalf of the petitioner and meanwhile the writ petition of the petitioner came -up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court and was allowed on 21-5-1978, but the hearing of the contempt application was adjourned to a date in office.
4. The contempt application then came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court on 7- 8-1978. The petitioner and its counsel were absent on that day, whilst the learned counsel for the respondents were present, therefore, the application was dismissed "in default and for non--- prosecution on 7-8-1978". The petitioner, therefore, filed a restoration application, but as once again neither the petitioner nor its learned counsel were absent, the restoration application was dismissed for default. Hence this petition for leave, which has been filed against the said orders of 7-8-1978 and of 21-8-1978.
5. When we pointed out to learned counsel that his argument was self --destructive, he submitted that once a contempt application was admitted by the Court, the Court could not dismiss it for default, but had to decide it according to law.
6. The submission is interesting, but as we would riot like to make observations wider than are necessary for the decision of this case, we would only observe that the petitioner does not appear to have made out a prima facie case for contempt in the first instance. Its complaint was a willful defiance of the Court's order of 3-10-1977, but the only order passed by the Court on that day was "that the record should be preserved". Now, even at this stage, learned counsel is not able to state that the record has not been preserved. He merely relied on the fact that the premises in dispute had been handed over to respondent No. 5 together with the records of the petitioner. As the conduct of the respondents in so doing was not in contravention of the High Court's order of 3-10- 1977, the High Court was justified in dismissing the application for contempt for default, and no case has been made out for the grant of special leave. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.