1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, J.-By the majotity opinion of this Court dated 18th of March, 1977, in Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 1977, the judgment of the Lahore High Court was set aside and that of the trial Court dated 30th of April, 1974, restored. The trial Court .Had by that judgment, convicted the petitioners under section 302 read with section 34, P: P. C. For the murder of Muhammad Aslam and sentenced the first petitioner to death and-the second petitioner to imprisonment for-life.
2. The petitioners seek review of the majority opinion on the grounds: firstly, -V that in reversing the acquittal, the defence evidence was not considered ; secondly, that in accepting the tainted evidence, , there was an error in the appraisal of evidence as those witnesses could not have corroborated each other on the factum of the main incident and the motive ; thirdly, that at least one of the Judges of this Court had agreed with the opinion of the Division Bench of the High Court which acquitted the petitioner, therefore, the acquittal could not be said to be based on an unreasonable view of the evidence ; and fourthly, that on being acquitted by the High Court the first petitioner was entitled to the lesser punishment of imprisonment for life on the doctrine of expectation of life which principle should have been given effect to while reversing his acquittal.
3. While allowing the appeal, I had considered the defence evidence and rejected it. When the learned counsel was confronted with that portion of the opinion he readily gave up this point. There is, therefore, no fort in the first submission. The second ground relates to the appreciation of the evidence which cannot be gone into at this stage as it would tantamount to re-hearing the appeal on merits which is beyond the scope of review. The third submission is also without substance, for, the majority opinion has expressed that the acquittal was based on unreasonable view of the evidence which now holds the field. As such it cannot be a legitimate ground for the review of the order. The fourth contention has also no substance. It has been held by this Court that the doctrine of expectation of life has no application to an erroneous order causing grave miscarriage of justice but if inordinate delay occurs in the disposal of the appeal against the order of acquittal then the appellate Court may refrain from exacting the extreme penalty of death. But this would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Here, there is only a delay of two years which cannot be described an inordinate so as to entitle the firs petitioner to the benefit of the lesser penalty.
4. Moreover, in awarding the capital sentence, the trial Court has held that there was no extenuating circum, stance to mitigate the sentence. The learned counsel was not able to show that this conclusion was amenable to challenge for any substantial reason. In any case, this objection was not taken in the appeal and, therefore, it cannot be urged now.
5. Accordingly, there is no substance in the review petition which is dismissed.