' SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, J.--- Rahm Badshah seeks leave to appeal against the judgment, dated 22-11-2002 of Peshawar High Court whereby his writ petition was dismissed.
2. Plaint filed by Rahm Badshah in a pre-emption suit stands rejected under Order VII, rule 11 of the C.P.C. On the ground that the sale Mutation No,536 having been attested on 24-11-1998, his suit filed on 1-6-1999 was barred under section 31 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987. The position is correct factually as well as legally.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the stance that the mutation having been attested at Latambar, 10/11 miles away from his village Mundawa and the provisions of section 32 of the Act having not been complied with, the pre-emptor could not have knowledge of the transaction and thus, he could not have been non-suited under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C.
4. What we have gathered froth the stance taken by the learned counsel is that the provisions of section 31 of the Act are dependent upon the provisions of section 32 (ibid). This we are afraid is not the correct interpretation of law because if the Legislature had intended to make the provisions of section 31 dependent upon the piovisions of section 32 of the Act, it could have conveniently inserted the relevant and important ingredients of section 32 into the provisions of section 31 of the Act. Having not done so, we believe that the two sections cannot be interpreted to be interdependent.
5. Secondly, section 32 of the Act provides for certain acts which might constitute the knowledge of transaction by the prospective preemptor but the factum of knowledge by the pre-emptor has already been covered under clause (d) of section 31 of the Act which provides that if the sale is not through registered deed or mutation or by transfer of physical possession, the pre-emptor may sue within 120 days from the date of knowledge of transaction. Such mode of knowledge provided in section 31 of the Act is rather wider in ambit than the mode of knowledge B attained through the provisions of section 32. The latter section does not deal with the question of limitation but might be relevant with regard to the performance of "Talbs".
6. This Court, in case of Nur-ul-Haq 2000 SCM R 1305 where plaint was rejected under similar circumstances has already held in decisive terms that provisions with regard to issuance of public notice by the Registrar or Revenue Officer contained in section 32 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act has no nexus with the period of limitation prescribed by section 31 of 'the Act.
7. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the case of Mian Asif Islam PLD 2001 SC 499 is not helpful, in that, though the two Honorable Judges had difference of opinion over sections 31 and 32 of the Act yet the same was never finally resolved because the appeal was decided, with unanimous view, on grounds other than those involving the implication of sections 31 and 32 of the Act. In Muhammad Shah's case 2004 SCM R 535, this Court had left undecided the question of interdependence of sections 31 and 32 of the Act and had observed that it be left to be decided by the trial Court after framing issues and recording evidence. Meaning thereby, that the real question was left undecided despite the fact that this Court in Nur-ul-Haq's case (supra) had already given a verdict thereon. Had some different view of the matter been taken by the larger Bench in Muhammad Shah's case (supra), it might have changed the interpretation but as no decision on the crucial point was finally taken, that adopted in Nur-ul-Haq's case would hold the field. For reasons given in the earlier part of the judgment, we also find ourselves in agreement with the view taken in Nur-ul-Haq's case (supra) and hold that the provisions of section 31 of the Act, having no nexus with the provisions of section 32 of the Act, the instant suit is barred by time.
8. Consequently, the instant petition having no merit is hereby dismissed and leave to appeal refused.