WAHID BUX BROHI, J.--The applicant/accused has sought quashment of the proceedings pending in Accountability Court No,V, Karachi as also the order dated 29-11-2002 passed by the said Court in the aforesaid proceedings which arise out of Reference No,02 of 2001 filed by the Chairman, NAB.
2. It is needless to dilate upon the detailed facts leading to the said reference and the subsequent proceedings, but suffice it to say that the main allegations against the applicant are that he was employed as a Store Clerk, Field Store, WAPDA, Larkana and had accumulated huge wealth and properties grossly disproportionate to his legal sources of income which are in the names of his spouse, dependants and Benamidars as such he committed acts of corruption and corrupt practice as defined in 'section 9 read with section 10 of the NAB Ordinance and the " Schedule thereto. In pursuance of the reference the NAB Court has, by now, examined as many as 22 witnesses, statement of the applicant has been recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. and 4 defence witnesses produced by the applicant have also been examined. For the remaining defence witnesses the applicant was allowed last and final chance by the trial Court, but he failed to avail the same whereupon the Accountability Court closed the side of applicant through the following order on 29-11-2002: --- "The accused was granted last and final chance on the last date of hearing to produce his defence witnesses. Prior to that so many reasonable adjournments had already been granted to the accused to produce his defence witnesses. According to the learned defence counsel remaining witnesses are not available in country. On the last date of hearing a longer date was given, to the, accused to his choice, to produce his all witnesses on the understanding that he will produce his all remaining witnesses today, but he failed. The further adjournment is not justified; it appears that prayer for further adjournments if for nothing but to protract the proceedings of this reference.
Hence the application is hereby dismissed. Side of evidence of accused is closed. Put off to 9-12- 2002 for final arguments."
3. The applicant had filed an application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. on which Accountability Court heard the arguments and passed an order to the effect that assessment of the evidence, at that stage under section 265-K, Cr.P.C., was not justified since the case was ripe for final arguments where the entire evidence of all the parties will be appreciated. However, the trial Court observed that the application would be considered alongwith the final arguments. This prompted the applicant not only to impugn the said order, but also to seek quashment of the entire proceedings.
4. We have heard Mr. Syed Nadeem Hussain, Shah, learned counsel for applicant and perused the relevant material.
5. At the outset it may be noted that earlier the applicant approached this Court invoking, in the same manner, the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. and after hearing the parties the following consent order was passed by a Division Bench of this Court on 19-6-2002:- - "After some arguments both learned counsel agreed that a consent order be passed to the effect that the trial Court will examine the Investigating Officer within two weeks from the date when this order is communicated to him and thereafter if it considers examinations of the alleged Benamidars are necessary it may do so pursuant to notices already issued and thereafter pronounced judgment after allowing an opportunity to defence to adduce evidence if necessary preferable within three months thereafter."
6. It would be relevant to point out that alleged Benamidars also approached this Court through Criminal Miscellaneous Nos.112 to 118 of 2002 which were also disposed of in the above terms on the same date. Subsequently, another application under section 561-A, Cr. P.C . (Criminal Miscellaneous Application No,244 of 2002) was filed by the applicant which too was heard and dismissed by another Bench of this Court by a short order on 30-7-2002, reasons whereof were recorded on 13-8-2002. The applicant challenged the said order in the Honourable Supreme Court where leave was refused with the following observations:-- "2. There is no need to highlight the facts of the case and recapitulate the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Suffice it to say that the prosecution evidence has admittedly been recorded, the reference is almost ripe for decision and disposal of this petition involves close scrutiny of evidence which we do not deem appropriate to undertake at this belated stage. It will be more appropriate if the matter is taken to its logical conclusion by the learned trial Court.
Consequently, the petition is dismissed and leave refused."
7. We are unable to understand what compelled the applicant to overlook the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court made through the aforesaid order that it would be more appropriate if the matter is taken to its logical conclusion by the trial Court. Admittedly, a large number of witnesses has been examined and the trial Court being the Court of first instance has to assess the evidence placed on record and form an opinion about the issues of fact and law involved in the case. Indeed, the trial Court has now only to hear the arguments, frame the points for determination and render findings thereon which would undoubtedly, be a decision on merits. If, at all, it is made out that the evidence on record is not enough to entail conviction of the applicant the logical conclusion would be acquittal of the applicant in terms of section 265-H, Cr.P.C. One fails to understand why should such finding be necessarily rendered under section 265-K, Cr.P.C.
8. The object of the provision of section 265-K, Cr.P.C. was to acquit an accused person if the Court considered that there was no probability of the accused to be convicted of an offence and such an order could be passed at any stage of the case which included the stage even before conclusion of the trial. Since in the instant case the trial has been concluded it would be absolutely absurd to advert to the provisions of section 265-K, Cr.P.C. only. Perhaps the main attraction for the aforesaid provision is that it speaks of acquittal only and not conviction, the applicant, therefore, avoids to have a decision otherwise than acquittal. Even for the purpose of an exercise under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. the Court cannot ignore the evidence recorded at the trial. In such an eventuality the entire material has to be examined, scanned and assessed and then the right course is to be adopted by the trial Court by passing a fair and just order in accordance with law. It would be unfair on the part of an accused to circumvent the final result of trial and compel the Court to consider the only aspect of his acquittal within the meaning of section 265-K, Cr.P.C. It is well settled that the law abhors fragmentary and piecemeal resolution of causes.
9. In a similar situation in Anwar Saifullah's case (PLD 2001 SC 7) the matter before Accountability Court was fixed for final arguments; the trial Court did entertain the request for acquittal of the accused under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. and dismissed the application which order was maintained by the High Court and the Honourable Supreme Court, also maintained the same placing reliance on their. earlier, decision in the case of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto v. The State (PLD 1999 SC 937). It was observed that when the case was fixed for final arguments before the Accountability Court interference at that stage would defeat the ends of justice requiring final determination after completion of the preliminaries and would also have the effect of curtailing the remedy of appeal to aggrieved party before the appellate forum. Respectfully following the above dictum we are of the view that the instant application is without merits. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine alongwith listed applications.
10. These are the reasons for the short order announced in Court on 4-12-2002.,