' Petitioners Qambar Ali and Muhammad Ramzan seek qashment of case F.I.R. No. 132 of 2004 registered under section 489-F, P.P.C. At Police Station Shandara, District Lahore.
2. The ground urged before me is that offence under section 489,-F, P.P.C. Was not part of the statute, when the alleged cheque was issued. Cheque was issued on 21-7-2002 and section 489-F, P.P.C. Was inserted on 25-10-2002. The learned counsel has placed reliance on 1988 SCMR 7 I 5 and 2004 PCi.LJ 263 to argue that in such-like circumstances F.I.R. Was liable to be quashed.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at length and perused the record of the case.
4. By issuing a cheque if the amount was not available in the account or the payment was not stopped by the accused it was an offence which may be under different sections, therefore, it is for Investigating Officer who had to add the relevant sections in the F.I.R. Even if it was not an offence under section 489F, P.P.C., at least it could be an offence under section 420, P.P.C. Or 406 P.P.C. (as per transaction between the parties). The allegations against the petitioners are that they issued three cheques to clear their obligations/liability but those were not encashed. According to the petitioner one cheque was issued on 21-7-2003 and the other two were, dated 30-7-2003 and admittedly section 489F, P.P.C. Was inserted through Ordinance No.XXXVI of 2002 on 25-10-2002 which shows that the cheques were bounced at the time when the said provision was part of the statute and the language of section 489-F, P.P.C. Is that "whoever dishonestly issues a cheque towards the repayment of loan or fulfillment of obligation which is dishonored on presentation", therefore, it is clear that when the cheques were bounced the offence under section 489F, P.P.C.
Was part of the statute and the argument of the learned counsel is not relevant. Even otherwise I have held in Writ Petition No.2583 of 2004 (Haji Amjid Ali v. State etc.) on the strength of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme. Court of Pakistan in "Khan Asfandyar Wali and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others" (PLD 2001 SC 607) that it does not create a new offence with retrospective effect but it is an offence which in its nature is in continuation as 'wilful default' of loan. The facts of the case referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners reported in 2004 PCr.LJ 263 are different. In view of the above I do not find force in the instant writ petition and the same is dismissed.