' MUHAMMAD KHALID ALVI, J.--- Through this single order we propose to deal with the following civil revisions as common question of law is involved in all these cases:--
(1) Civil Revision No,456-D of 2000, (2) Civil Revision No,457-D of 2000, (3) Civil Revision No,1024-D of 2001, (4)
Civil Revision No,1025-D of 2001, (5) Civil Revision No,1026-D of 2001, (6) Civil Revision No,1027-D of 2001 and (7) Civil Revision No,1208-D of 2001.
2. Brief facts of all these revision petitions are that the respondents filed some declaratory suits against the petitioners, which were decreed by the learned trial Court. Petitioners' appeals also failed; hence, they filed the instant revision petitions before this Court.
3. At the stage of limine hearing, learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the instant petitions are barred, by limitation. The precise argument of the learned counsel was that since section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the revision petitions.
Therefore, the time spent by the petitioners for obtaining copies cannot be excluded.
4. Admittedly, if this argument is accepted, the revisions are undoubtedly barred by limitation. At the same time, if this argument is not accepted, and the time spent in obtaining copies is excluded, the revisions are within the prescribed limitation period.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents had relied upon two judgments reported as Said Muhammad v. Sher Muhammad and 2 others 2001 M LD 1546 and Tehirali and others v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court, Karachi and another PLD 1960 (W.P.) Kar.
795. After hearing the preliminary arguments on this point one of us (Muhammad Khalid Alvi, J.) having tentatively a different view from the one expressed in the above referred judgments vide order, dated 1-3-2002, requested the Honourable Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench. The Honourable Chief Justice was kind enough to fix this case before this Division Bench.
6. The precise objection of the learned counsel for the respondents is that section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the revision petition. He relies on a judgment passed by this Court reported as Said Muhammad v. Sher Muhammad and 2 others 2001 M LD 1546. He also relies on Tahirali and others v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court, Karachi and another PLD 1960 (W.P.) Kar.
795.
7. For ready reference section 12 of the Limitation Act is reproduced as follows:- "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.--- (1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.
(3) Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which, it is founded shall be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(5) For the purposes of subsections (2), (3) and (4), the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, order, judgment or award shall be deemed to be that time intervening between the day on which an application for the copy is made and the day actually intimated to the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery."
8. On the other hand,, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that according to second proviso to subsection (1) of section 115, C.P.C., 90 days' limitation is provided but this 90 days' limitation is subjected to a condition of supply of copy of the impugned order by the subordinate Court within three days to the effected person. His contention is that if such copy is not provided then the limitation of 90 days is not applicable. The relevant provision is as follows:-- "Provided that such application shall be made within ninety days of the decision of the subordinate Court which shall provide a copy of such decision within three days thereof and the High Court shall dispose of such application within three months."
' It is next submitted that in the instant case no copy of the impugned order was supplied by the subordinate Court to the petitioners, therefore, according to him an act/omission of Court should not prejudice the case of the petitioner. He relies on Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Afzal Khokhar 1993 SCM R 1686 and Namdar Khan v. Muhammad Akram Khan and 14 others 1993 SCM R 434. It is next submitted with reference to section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1908 that although section 115 of the C.P.C. Provides a period of 90 days for filing a civil revision as a special law but still under section 29(2) of the Limitation Act the provisions of sections 9 to 18 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the revision which includes section 12(2) of Limitation Act.
9. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties.
10. The following observations were made by our learned brother Muhammad Akhtar Shabbir, J. In Said Muhammad v. Sher Muhammad and 2 others (supra):-- "ls have heard the arguments' of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The Appellate Court has passed the impugned judgment on 25-10-1999. The petitioner filed application for obtaining certified copies on 29-10-1999 and the copy of the judgment was supplied to him on 20-1-2000. The revision petition was filed on 25-3-2000. The limitation for filing the revision petition has been provided in section 115, C.P.C. By Act No,VI of 1992 amendment in section 115, C.P.C. Has been made, whereby the period prescribed for filing a revision petition is 90 days, which is not provided by Limitation Act, subsection (2) of section 12 of Limitation Act has contemplated as under:--'
' In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.'
' The benefit of abovesaid provisions of law is available only in cases where there is an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for a review of judgment. This subsection nowhere mentions revision applications. The omission of the words 'revision applications' in the aforequoted subsection is not accidental. This subsection restricts its application to merely two kinds of applications namely an application for leave to appeal and an application for review of judgment only. The benefit of subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is not attracted to the revision applications. Reference in this context can be made to the case of Tahir Ali and others (supra)."
11. In the other judgment relied by the learned counsel for the respondents i,e, Tahir Ali's case, the following observations were made:-- "There is no doubt that Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953 is a Special Act, section 15 of this Act prescribes 30 days for filing revision application against the order of the Rent Controller. Subsection (2)(a) of section 29 inter alia provides that for the purpose of determining any period of the limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 12 of the Limitation Act will apply. Subsection (2) of section 12 on which Mr. Fakhruddin has based his case, reads as under:-- ' In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.'
' It is clear that this subsection will be available only in cases where there is an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for a review of a judgment. This subsection nowhere mentions revision application. This is made further clear by the expression appealed from or sought to be reviewed, employed in the subsection. The omission of revision application from the subsection, in my opinion, is not accidental. While subsection (1) employs the word 'application' without any qualification, subsection (2) restricts it to merely two kinds of applications . Namely an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of a judgment. There was nothing to prevent the Legislature to mention revision application in the subsection if they so intended.
' I am clear in my mind that subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act was not intended to apply to revision application: Extending the provisions of section 12(2) to revision applications, will, therefore, amount to enlarging its. Scope, for which, in my opinion there is no justification. The petitioner, therefore, cannot avail of .These provisions. That being so, the time spent in obtaining the copy of the impugned order, cannot be excluded when computing the period of limitation. The provisions of section 15 of the Rent Restriction Act prescribing period of limitation areunqualified."
12. With utmost humility and respect for the said judgments, it is to be noted that some provisions of law further required to be examined. As subsection (2) of section s29 of the Limitation Act describes the applicability of sections 9 to 18 of the said Act to suits, appeals and "applications" under the special or local law. The "civil revision being an application" arising out of a special law is not specifically provided in the Schedule of the Limitation Act. In our view, it would be covered under section 12(2) of Limitation Act: Subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation 'Act cannot be read, in isolation from the provisions of subsection (2) of section 29 of the said Act.
13. Clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides applicability of section 12 as a whole for all types of "applications" arising out of any special or local law, therefore, the restrictions contained in subsection (2) of section 12, Limitation. Act with respect to review applications and leave to appeal applications is only applicable to the cases covered under the Schedule of Limitation Act and is not applicable to cases of any special or local law. ##TR##
14. It is also to be noted that except as a title of section 1 [5, C.P.C., the word "revision" is nowhere used in the body of this section. Basically the power conferred on the High. Court under said section is suo motu power under subsection (1), but under first proviso of this subsection this power can also be exercised by High Court on an "application" made by a person. Although commonly, such petitions are known as "civil revisions", but for all practical purposes, in the words of section 115 itself, this is an "application". Limitation of 90 days for such an "application" is provided in the second proviso. Therefore, since a special law provides a limitation for such an application and applicability of sections 9 to 18 of the Limitation Act has not been expressly excluded by the special law i,e, section 115, C.P.C., therefore, under section 29(2)(a) provision of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act would be applicable.
15. For special or local laws, the governing section for the purposes of limitation is section 29. Its subsection (2) includes any suit, appeal or "application" arising out of any special or local laws.
Since an "application' under section 115, C.P.C., is arising out of a special law providing its own limitation, therefore, if an application is to be filed under a law, which provides its own limitation different from the period prescribed, therefore, by the First Schedule of Limitation Act then computation of limitation will necessarily be made under the provisions of section 29(2) of Limitation Act. Thus, in such a case, the restriction contained in subsection (2) of section 12 with respect to applications for leave to appeal and applications for review of judgment would not be applicable and benefit of this subsection will have to be extended to all applications arising out a special or local law. Thus, it is held that provisions of section 12(2) of Limitation Act are applicable to applications/civil revisions filed under section 115, C.P.C.
16. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the limitation of 90 days would only start running if a copy of such decision is supplied by the subordinate Court within 3 days, is not of much substance because this direction and the further direction in the same proviso for disposal of such application by High Court within 3 months, appears to be of regulatory nature.
It is also to be seen that there can be many orders passed by the trial Court, which may fall within the category of "decision" or "case decided". It is not necessary for the trial Court to provide copy of each such order to the aggrieved party. At the same time, it is also not necessary that every such order would necessarily be challenged under section 115, C.P.C. Thus, the period of 90 days' limitation cannot be attached with this condition of supply of copy within 3 days.
17. The result of the above discussion is that all the above-referred civil revisions are held to be within limitation. Resultantly, these petitions shall now be placed before the Single Bench for their disposal in accordance with law.