1. MUHAMMAD SALEEM CHAUDHARY (CHAIRMAN).-All the above cited appeals raise the common legal issue as to whether this Tribunal has the jurisdic--tion to entertain and adjudicate upon appeals in which the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal established under Ordinance No. XXVII of 1969 or Ordinance No. IV 1970 had passed final orders on the merits of the case. The appeals comprise two sets. The Ist category consists of appeals in which the civil servants aggrieved of the orders of the Civil Services (V) Tribunal had initiated proceedings against such orders before the Civil Courts including the superior Courts and the same abated on the establishment of this Tribunal as required by Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan and section 8 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974 (hereinafter referred to as Act IX of 1974). After the abatement the appeals were instituted before this tribunal as provided in section 8 aforesaid. The second set comprised the appeals in which the appellants had directly challenged the orders of the Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal before us under section 4 of the Act IX of 1974. For facility of reference, section 4 and section 8 of Act IX of 1974 are produced below:- "4. Appeals to Tribunals.--(1) Any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him or within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal: Provided that--
(a) where an appeal, review or representation to a departmental authority is provided under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, or any rules against any such order, no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal unless the aggrieved civil servant has preferred an appeal or application for review or representation to such departmental authority and a period of ninety days has elapsed from the date on which such appeal, application or representation was so preferred ;
(b) no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be appointed to or hold a particular post or to be promoted to a higher grade ; and
(c) no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an. Order or decision of s departmental authority made at any time before the Ist July, 1969.
(2) where the appeal is against an order or decision of a departmental authority imposing a departmental punishment or penalty on a civil servant, the appeal be preferred-- .
(a) in the case of a penalty of dismissal from service, removal from service, compulsory retirement or reduction to a lower post or time scale or to a lower stage in a' time-scale, to a Tribunal referred to in subsection (3) of section 3; and
(b) in any other case, to a tribunal referred to in subsection (7) of sec--tion 3 and where no such Tribunal is established to a Tribunal established under subsection (3) of that section.
2. Explanation:- In this section "departmental authority" means any authority, other than a Tribunal, which is competent to make an order in respect of any of the terms and conditions of civil servants."
3. "8. Abatement of suits and other proceeding.-All suits, appeals and applications regarding any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal pending in any Court immediately before the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal shall abate on the establishment of such Tribunal: Provided that any party to such a suit, appeal or application may within ninety days of establishment of the appropriate Tribunal prefer an appeal to it in respect of any such matter which is in issue in such suit, appeal application."
4. The Government Pleader Mr. A. G. Humayun has raised the objection that under section 4 above a civil servant was entitled to prefer an appeal against the order of a Departmental authority only.
5. The Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal was not a Departmental authority. According to him it was rather a Tribunal very much like this Tribunal with the limitation that its jurisdiction was confined to "seniority" which of course is the only matter in issue in all these appeals. Thus the decisions of such a Tribunal could not be equated with the orders made by the Departmental authorities. As such the second set of appeals filed under section 4 of the. Act of 1974 directly against the order of Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal was untenable. He further contended that his objection was equally applicable to the Ist set of appeals filed by the civil servants. According to him section 4 and section 8 have to be read as complementary provisions in the case of civil servants and appeal filed by them whether under section 4 or section 8 had to satisfy the requirement of section 4.
6. Reliance was placed in this behalf on the decision of Supreme Court of Pakistan PLD 1974 SC 291 in which their Lordships while considering the issue of abatement of the appeal pending before them under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan read with the provision pertaining to abatement in the N. W. F. P. Of Federal Administrative Tribunal Act held that in view of the bar on the powers of Administrative Tribunal contained in proviso (c) to section 4(l) of the relevant Act to hear appeals of civil servants, against an order passed by a departmental authority prior to 1-7-1969, the proceeding before Supreme Court could not abate. The following observations of the Supreme Court at page 295 of PLD 1974 SC 291 were relied upon: "We consider that for the limited purpose of answering this question, it is not necessary to decide, at this stage, whether the appropriate Tribunal for dealing with the claim made by the appellant would be the one established by the Federal Government of Pakistan or the Provincial Govt. Of The North-West Frontier Province, as in either case the law setting up these Tribunals has, in its own wisdom, placed a limitation on the Tribunal's jurisdiction to the effect that no appeal shall lie to the Tribunal against an order or decision of the depart--mental authority made at any time before the Ist of July 1969. In the case of the Federal Tribunal the limitation is contained in clause (e) of subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act (LXX of 1973), as amended by Act XXXI of 1974 with effect from the 6th of May 1974. By a coincidence the same limitation is spelt out in section 4(c) of N: W. F. P. Act I of 1974, as amended by Ordinance VII of 1974, promulgated on the 18th of May, 1974. It would appear, therefore, that the controversy arising in the instant case is not amenable to the jurisdiction of either Tribunal, as it arose much before the prescribed date, namely, the Ist of July 1969. Such being the case the present appeal is not affected by the provisions contained, in the amended Article 212 of the Constitution."
7. According to the Government Pleader this result could only be achieved if in the case of civil servants section 4 and section 8 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, which were in pari materia with section 4 and section 6 of the enactment considered by Supreme Court of Pakistan in the above ruling, were read as complementary. The objection was also supported by the judgement holders from the Punjab Civil Service (Appellate) Tribunal. Syed Afzal Haider, the learned counsel appearing for Dr. Hayat Zafar a respondent in Appeal No. 699/483 of 1974 argued that the departmental authority was a composite expression and has been used to comprehend the various authorities in the Government Departments administering the terms and conditions of the Civil Servants.
8. According to the learned counsel in proviso (a) to section 4(1) the expression "departmental authority" has been used in contra distinction to a "Tribunal". Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel on section 4(2) in which the "Departmental authority" imposing a "departmental punishment or penalty on a civil servant" has been used which implied that departmental authority had no nexus with the judicial institutions like Tribunals or Courts which were not departmental entities and their terms of constitution and the nature of their functions, apparently distinguished them from such authorities. Secondly he invited our attention to the provisions contained in subsection (3) of section 4 and section 12(4) of Ordinance IV of 1970 which is to the following effect:- "Section 4(3).-No suit, appeal, application or other proceedings regard--ing any matter to which this Ordinance applies, shall lie in any Court including a High Court; nor shall any such matter be enquired into, proceeded with, or tried by any Court including a High Court.
9. Section 12(4).- A final order by the Tribunal shall be given effect to by the competent authority and shall not be questioned in may manner or before any Court including a High Court."
10. He also pointed out that corresponding provisions were contained in section 9 of the Punjab Civil Service (Appellate) Tribunals Ordinance No. XXVIII of 1969. Relying upon the above provisions it was argued that the decision of the previous Tribunal was not questionable before any Court of civil jurisdiction and the order was final and could only be questioned under constitutional jurisdiction before the High Court of Lahore of course on limited grounds. The learned counsel contended that in the absence of any specific provision in section 8 of Act IX of 1974 nullifying the finality of the aforesaid judgments the vested rights accruing thereunder to the judgement holders could not be interfered with. The learned counsel decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as relied upon a PLD 1969 SC 322 according to which the past and closed transactions could not be reopened. He also argued that the previous judgment of the Tribunal operated as res judicata. Mr. Masud Ahmad Riaz, the learned counsel appearing for Dr. Shaukat Raza respondent argued that the previous Tribunal was not a departmental authority and that the Department has been defined in the rules of business of West Pakistan Rules of Business, 1962. Clause (viii) of rule 2 of the said Rules defines the Department as under:- "Department means a self-contained administrative unit in the secretariat responsible for the conduct of business of Government in a distinct and specified sphere, and declared as such by Government."
11. He further pointed out that the list of such departments as envisaged in rule 3(3) of the same Rules was contained in Schedule to the aforesaid rules and the Tribunal was not one of the Departments including the said list. He also pointed out that exactly identical provisions existed in the Punjab Government Rules of Business of 1974. Even otherwise, according to the learned counsel, in the ordinary meaning of the word, a Tribunal in no sense could mean a Department. He also referred to the definition of the competent authority as contained in section 2(l) of the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunals Ordinance No. IV of 1970 according to which it meant the appointing authority or such authority as had been delegated the powers by the Provincial Government to fix seniority of a Government Servant under relevant rules which according to the learned counsel implied that the Departmental authority has to be the Government itself or the delegate of the Government in the executive capacity. T-- press home his point the following observations of the N .-W. F. P.
12. Service Tribunal in a reported decision 1976 PLC (C. S. T.) 22 relevant at page 184, were relied upon "The counsel for the appellant has a wrong notion of law in saying that a Court of law, and in the instant case the High Court where the appeal preferred by the appellant was pending could be regarded as departmental authority within the meaning of section 4 of the Act. He seems to have been ignorant of the fact that in explanation under section 4 of the Act, Departmental Authority has been defined to mean any authority, other than a Tribunal, which is competent to make an order in respect of any of the terms and conditions of service of civil servants. The departmental authorities have been designated in the respective rules by which the civil servants concerned are governed and they alone are competent to make an order in respect of any of the terms and conditions of service of civil servant concerned. No Court of law has been designated departmental authority under these rules."
13. He also reiterated the contention advanced by Syed Afzal Haider Advocate that the proviso (a) to section 4 of Act IX of 1974 showed the departmental authority could not be equated with a Tribunal.
14. He also submitted that different expressions have been used by the draftsman in the service laws, namely, the authority, departmental authority, next higher authority, appellate authority, departmental authority, next higher authority but the expression departmental authority was comprehensive enough to include all such authorities. He thus argued that the Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal could not be regarded as a departmental authority. According to the learned counsel the main distinction between departmental authority and the Tribunal3. He relied upon PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 91 in support of the submission that the Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal answered the des--cription of a Court as laid down in the above ruling; and that it was a 'Court'. He also argued that the decision of the previous Tribunal was final as laid down in section 4(3) read with section 12(4) of the Punjab Ordinance IV of 1970. He further argued that although the Act has been repealed but the decisions of the defunct Tribunal continued to be valid under the General Clauses Act. He also-submitted that under the Constitution of Pakistan of 1962, no Writ Petition was maintainable on the issue of seniority. Reliance was also placed in this behalf on 1971 SCMR 291 and PLD 1974 Lab.
90. He further urgel that the only ground on which the seniority could be assailed was the order being without lawful authority, mala fide or coram non-judice. Thus the appeals even if maintainable, could not enlarge the scope of issues involved in the abated proceedings.
15. It was argued by the appellant that there was nothing in section 8 of Act IX of 1974 to imply any embargo on the right of appeal made available to them which otherwise appeared to be unqualified. It was next contended that section 4 and section 8 were independent provisions governing the right of appeal in different situations and the limitations prescribed under section 4 could not be read into section 8. In support of this contention PLD 1975 Lab. 722 was relied upon. It was also argued that PLD 1974 SC 291 dealt with the abatement of pending proceeding in the light of proviso (c) to section 4(1) of the N.W.F. P.J Federal Administrative Act and it did not lay down that in all events section 4 had to be read with section 8 for judging the competence of the appeals filed by the civil servants after the abatement. In other words it is not essential that an appeal under proviso to section 8, like an appeal under section 4 of the Act, be directed against the departmental authority only Mr. Mushtaq Masood the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the present Tribunal is constituted in pursuance of the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan read with the Punjab Service Tribunal Act of IX of 1974. In contrast; the previous Tribunal was established under a sub-constitutional law and thus the present Tribunal could entertain these appeals against the Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal. He also argued that the construction avoiding the injustice and advancing the remedy is to be placed and thus the right of appeal should be presumed to exist in these cases. The following text from Maxwell, 12th Edition at page 208 was relied upon:-- "Whenever the language of the Legislature admits of two construc--tions and if construed in one way, would lead to obvious injustice, the Courts act upon the view that such a result could not have been intended, unless the intention to bring it about has been manifested in plain words."
16. Mr. Shamsi the learned counsel for another appellant argued that there were three provisions in the Service Tribunal Act. 1974 providing for appeals to this Tribunal viz. Under section 4 by a civil servant, under sec--tion 8 by any party to the abated proceedings and under section 10 by the transfer of appeal from the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal. According to him these three sections catered for mutually exclusive situa--tions. He further pointed out that the abatement of the pending proceeding was contemplated under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan read with section 8 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act and the proviso to section 8 provided for the right of appeal. He contended that the legislative intent appeared to be to provide for right of appeal to this Tribunal in all conceivable cases relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants whether fresh or pending before the Civil Courts at various levels. He also argued that the constructions saving the jurisdiction of appeals has to be preferred. He relied upon PLD 1963 Lab. 523 and PLD 1966 Lab. 684 in support of his above contention. He further argued that the present Tribunal being a successor qua pending appeals, was at par with the previous Tribunal so far as the authority, in issue was concerned. The fact that this Tribunal has wider jurisdiction covering all the terms and conditions of service of civil servant did not make any material difference so far as the Constitution and the character of the Civil Service (Appellate) Tribunal was concerned. In support of the maintainability of the appeal he also relied upon 1975 PLC (C. S. T.) 92 vide which an appeal against the order of previous Tribunal was entertained and decided on merits by this Tribunal, although he conceded that the issue as to competence of the appeal was never raised or discussed therein. Raja Mahmood Akhtar the learned counsel for another appellant pressed into service the argument that the interpretation placed by the superior Courts will have to be accepted. According to him since in the High Court all these cases had been declared to have abated, therefore the same were appealable before this Tribunal. He relied upon the commentary in Craw-Ford appearing at page 308 according to which the construction placed by the superior Court becomes a part of the statue. According to the learned counsel there were three organs of the state Judiciary, Executive and Legislature. The interpretation of the statute was the exclusive function of the judiciary and the executive was bound to follow the same. According to the learned counsel this Tribunal falls in the Executive Wing and was therefore bound by the interpretation given by the Civil Courts. He also pointed out that in case of doubt about the competence of an appeal the same has to be resolved in favour of the remedy. Sh. Munir Ahmad, Advocate who also appeared for some of the appellants submitted that even the other group of appeals i. e. Appals filed directly under sec--tion 4 of the Act, was maintainable. He placed reliance upon the explanation of subsection (2) of section 4 read with section 2 (g) of the Act. According to the explanation to section 4(2) the departmental authority "means the authority other than a Tribunal which is competent to make an order in respect of terms and conditions of civil servants" and the definition of a "Tribunal" under section 2(g) of that Act read "Tribunal" means an Administrative Tribunal established under this Act or a Bench thereof". Thus according to the learned counsel a Tribunal other than the one established under this Act could not be excluded from the definition of the departmental authority and thus the appeal against the order of such a Tribunal was obviously maintainable. The following observations of Mr. Justice Shafi--ur-Rehman of Lahore High Court in Writ Petition No. 265-S-74 Ch. Abdul Haq v. Punjab Service Tribunal (order in limine) was also relied upon:- "The only question to examine is whether an order passed by the defunct Tribunal was also in appropriate cases liable to be contested in the Administrative Tribunal set up under Act IX of 1974.
17. The definition of the departmental authority, that an authority by which is competent to make an order in respect of any of the terms and conditions of a civil servant, is wide enough to include the defunct Tribunal and the defunct is not a Tribunal excepted in the explanation of section 4 of the Act IX of 1974 and these orders will also be liable to be scrubby the Administrative Tribunal:"
18. Sh. Munir Ahmad also argued that according to section 4, the previous Tribunal was a departmental authority as the "defunct Tribunal" could not be regarded as "a Tribunal" but it could be regarded as the departmental authority. He also argued that the departmental authority is nowhere defined. He rather attempted to draw the distinction between the use of the words "the appropriate Tribunal" and "a Tribunal". According to the learned counsel under sections 4 and 8 of the Act the appeals lay to "the appropriate Tribunal" and not to "a tribunal". Thus the expression "a tribunal" occurring in explanation to subsection (2) to section 4 was not the tribunal of the kind whose orders were sacrosanct. With these contentions the learned counsel argued that the appeal was not barred. He also pointed out that in Appeal No. 597/444 and 362/85 of 1974 the parties were different and they were never heard by the previous Tribunal. As such their appeal was not barred.
19. Mr. Iftikhar Ahmad Dar., Advocate appearing for one of the appellants also argued that the previous Tribunal was a departmental author--ity and as such the right of appeal was available.
20. After bearing both the parties we are of the view that so far as the appeals filed directly under section 4 are concerned, the same are not maintainable before us: It appears an essential requirement under sec--tion 4 that the appeal must be directed against the order of a departmental authority. We have no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal as constituted under Ordinance IV of 1970 was not a departmental authority. It is common case that the present Tribunal is not a Departmental Authority, however it was urged that the Tribunal established under the Ordinance IV of 1970 or Ordinance XXVIII of 1969 was a departmental authority. Thus in this context it becomes necessary to examine the provisions of Ordinance IV of 1970. The aforesaid Tribunal while deciding the cases before it had the power under section 11 to receive evidence viz. Documents, witnesses and affidavits and could issue necessary process as if the proceedings were a suit. The judgment and directions issued by the Tribunal were affective under sec--tion 12 and section 7 respectively by its own force and the same were binding upon the competent authority and it was final and could not be interfered with by any Court except in writ jurisdiction established under the Constitu--tion, and that too on grounds specified thereunder. So far as the character of decisions of the previous Tribunal is concerned we do not find any distinction between our jurisdiction and tbat of the previous Tribunal. The Tribunal aforesaid conformed to the test of a Court as laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in PLD 1957 SC 91 and by the West Pakistan High Court Lahore Bench in PLD 1958 Lah.
153. We are also in agreement with the contention of the objectors that the words "a tribunal" in explana--tion to section 4 of Punjab Service Tribunal, Act, 1974 has been used in contradistinction to the departmental authority which evidently meant any Tribunal including the one established under Ordinance No. IV of 1970. We are not inclined to read the same in terms of definition clause as per section 2(g) of Act IX of 1974 as for the reasons stated hereinafter, to ascribe such meaning to the words "a tribunal" occurring in explanation to sec--tion 4(2), was repugnant to the text. The Departmental authority, a term employed for the first time under Act IX of 1974, clearly implied an executive authority within the department, designated as such under the rules or the law, framed to administer directly (such as by Chief Executive of the Province or the President of Federation) or through their delegates, the terms and conditions of service of Government servants. In any case the depart--mental authority whether it is the authority, appellate authority, the next higher authority, all of which in our opinion were covered by expression departmental authority in no sense of the connotation could be termed as synonym of a judicial authority or a Court authority. The view is clearly supported by the following observations of the Lahore High Court appearing in In re: Muhammad Aslam Bajwa v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1974 Lah. 545) The relevant observation appears at page 564:- "The word departmental authority" if it has any reference to the word "department" appears to us an authority different from what is known as judicial authority, or Court authority just as there are departmental proceedings, judicial or Court proceedings."
21. Thus respectfully following the above view we hold that Punjab Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal cannot be equated with the departmental authority The definition of department in the Punjab Rules of Business as framed under Article of the Constitution of Pakistan, by not including the Tribunal in the list of Departments, lends substantial support to the view that the Tribunal is not a Department authority. It never derived any power to adjudicate upon the cases before them from any departmental authority nor has it been designated as such anywhere. We also agree in this regard with the view of N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunal in 1976 PLC (C. S. T.)
22. The judgment in the case relied upon by the appellant decided by Mr. Justice Shaft-ur-Rehman vide Writ Petition No. 265-S of 1974 dated 14-9-1974 appears to overlook the above cited Division Bench authority from the same High Court to which Mr. Justice Shaft-ur-Rehman himself was a party. We are, therefore, not inclined to follow the said Single Bench decision in preference to the view expressed by the Division Bench of the same Court referred to above. It appears that the Division Bench decision dated 12-7- 74 referred to above was not brought to the notice of the High Court deciding Writ Petition No. 265- S/74 on 14-9-1974. Similarly the decision of this Tribunal reported as 1975 PLC (C. S. T.) 92 is also of no assistance as in the aforesaid case admittedly no such issue was ever raised or discussed.
22. Needless to observe that the right of appeal is the creation of the statute and in this case we .Are distinctly of the view that under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act the Legislature never intended to create any right of appeal in favour of the persons who were aggrieved by the orders of the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate Tribunal). In this view of the matter the appeals are not maintainable and the same are hereby dismissed with costs which are fixed at Rs. 100 in each cases.
23. So far the appeals falling under the second category are concerned, we are of the view that proviso to section 9 independently created a right of appeal in the cases the proceedings abated under the main clause of sec--tion 8 aforesaid. The right of appeal did not appear to be hedged by any other requirement. The argument of the learned Government Plead.-r that sections 4 and 8 should be read as complementary is not borne out by any authority. The Supreme Court judgement relied upon by the learned Government Pleader had to be restricted in its application to the question decided in the judgement itself. In the case in hand there is no dispute about the abatement of the proceedings. The argument of the learned Government Pleader therefore as based upon the aforesaid judgement of Supreme Court is hypothetical and could not be accepted.
24. As such the controversy as to whether the previous Tribunal was the Departmental authority or otherwise does not arise in the context of the appeal preferred under section 8 of Punjab Service Tribunal Act which is quite independent of section 4 and the view is clearly supported by the following observations appearing at page 564 of PLD 1974 Lab. 545:- "Even otherwise section 6 (in this case section 8) gives an independent and additional right of appeal with regard to pending matters of the present kind and well covered the present situation."
25. In fact the right of appeal created under section 4 and section 8 coverall vastly varying situations.
26. Section 8 operates only in consequence of the abatement of the pending proceedings and the right of appeal is available to C "any party" including Government and the civil servants. The right oil appeal under section 4 is available to "civil servants" alone and against the orders of departmental authority only,. But it is wrong to suggest that the cases are not conceivable under section 8 of the Act where in the Civil Court only, the civil servants could be arraigned before the Civil Courts in either capacity viz. Plaintiff or defendant. Cases were conceivable where a civil servant successfully defended the order of departmental authority in his favour before the trial Court but lost before the Ist Appellate Court and consequently challenged the order of lower appellate Court before the High Court when the abatement took place. Could, in such a case, the right of appeal be denied to him merely because he was not aggrieved of any order of departmental authority as envisaged under section 4 7 Is such a civil servant not covered by the words-'any party to the proceedings 7 In our view the answer was plainly in the favour of civil servant concerned. Thus section 8 also provided for appeals against the decision and judgement passed by the Courts of general jurisdiction. 'here appeared to be nothing in the Supreme Court judgement to suggest otherwise. The ruling aforesaid could not be extended to the extent canvassed by the Government pleader. As such it is difficult to read the Supreme Court Judgement as laying down that the requirements as to the orders of departmental authority provided under section 4 had to be read in section 8 in all the appeals preferred by the civil servants. Further the period of limitation for filing appeals under sections 4 and section 8 was different. As such no analogy appears to have been envisaged by the Legislature while providing for appeals under sections 4 and 8. We are also not impressed by the argument of the objector that the judgement of the previous tribunal assumed absolute finality under section 4(3) of the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate Tribunals) Ordinance. No. IV of 1970, or that it cooperates as res judicata. In view of the clear provisions granting the right of appeal in section 8, the pleas with regard to finality of the judgement or .The past and closed transactions has to be read subject to the provision of section 9 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act. The Legislature when it created the right of appeal, is presumed to know the existing state of law and had the power to disturb the existing right under the judgement if any. There is nothing in the Act to circumscribe the right of appeal created under section 8 of the Act IX of 1974. 1n fact the proviso to section 8 as it initially existed in Punjab Ordinance No. IV of 1974 and the word "civil servant" was substituted by "any party" with the manifest intention to make the right of appeal available to all the parties to the proceeding. Even otherwise we agree with the appellant that if two views were possible the one which favours to save the right of appeal had to be accepted. The view is supported by the following observations in para 25 of the judgement of the Division Bench of Lahore High Court, PLD 1966 Lab. 684, which is supported by Full Bench judgment of Lahore High Court in PLD 1963 Lab. 523: "Lastly, assuming that the right of appeal is not so apparently visible and the existence of such a right is not free from doubt, we are inclined to agree with the view taken in AIR 1950 Assam 22, and would hold that such a right does exist. The learned Judges placing reliance on Salim-ud-Din Ahmad v. Rahim Shaikh held "that where the existence of a right is in doubt, the benefit ought to go to the appellant." In the latter authority their Lordships observed as follows:- "In a matter which relates to the curtailment of right of appeal, if there is the slightest doubt to one's mind, the benefit of doubt should go to the party who seeks appeal."
27. We may also add that the appeals in which appellants were not heard by the Civil Services (Appellate) Tribunal as they were not parties to such proceedings, they were not bound by such decisions and thus they had the right of appeal. Before parting with this judgement we may notice the argument advanced by Raja Mahmood Akhtar, Advocate, for the appellant that this Tribunal being part of the executive organ of the state, was bound to follow the interpretation placed by the Civil Courts, may be the Court with the lowest jurisdiction. The argument did not appear to us to be well directed. In the first instance the provisions regarding the constitution of this Tribunal appear to fall in party V1I of the Constitution which carried the caption of Judicature, Article 212 itself which contains the provision precisely applicable to this Tribunal, occurs in Chapter 4 of Part VII of the Constitution which sets forth "General provisions relating to the judicature", Thus the tribunal was established by a law framed under Art. 212 and the exclusive jurisdiction of this Tribunal was specified by the Constitution itself under the said Article. In fact in Article 212 the expression Tribunal or Court has been used as permissible alternatives. The law which created this Tribunal, merely because it so chose to describe it, does not imply that it was not of the nature of a Court. In this context the argument did not sound impressive enough to merit acceptance. The proposition is amply established that a Court has the power to determine the issue relating to its own jurisdiction.
28. There is also a practical difficulty in adopting the argument advanced by the learned counsel.
29. Under section 8 appeals lay to this Tribunal against the orders of Civil Courts. The right of appeal as created did not limit the grounds upon witch the right was available. In the absence of any such specification, it is legitimate to assume that a plenary jurisdiction was available. As such the decisions by civil Court on points of law were equally open to appeal. If the plea canvassed by Raja Mahmood Akhtir, the learned counsel for some of the appellants, were allowed to prevail this Tribunal will have to deny the appellant concerned the right of appeal against any decision on question of law whereas most of the cases are likely to involve the interpretation of law. Our read-- ing of section 8 did not find it susceptible of any such limitation. The argument is thus repelled. As regards the contention of Mr. Masud Ahmad Riaz with regard to the scope of the appeal under section 8, we reserve our views till such time the appeals are considered on merits. We according-- by hold that appeals under section 8 are maintainable. Consequently we direct that all such appeals be fixed for hearing on merits before this Tribunal by the office in due course.