In the general election held on 10.10.2002 the petitioner and the respondents contested the election for the membership of the Provincial Assembly Punjab i,e, PP-21 Chakwal-II. Respondent No, 1 was declared as a returned candidate and was so notified in the official Gazette. Through this petition the petitioner has assailed the same on the grounds stated in the election petition.
By filing reply, the election petition has been contested. Its maintainability has been objected for non-observance of provisions of Section 55 (3) of The Representation of People Act, 1976 that the same has not been verified in accordance therewith. C.M. No, 1/03 has also been filed under Section 63 of The Representation of People Act, 1976 for the dismissal of the petition. The petition was heard alongwith other connected petitions, such as Election Petitions No, 13/02, No, 40/02, No, 77/02, No, 88/02, No, 106/02 and No, 165/02. However, on 31.7.2003 C.M. No, 4/03 was filed by Respondent No, 1' pleading that the copy of the election petition supplied to him was different than the petition which is before the Tribunal inasmuch as the copy did not bear any verification whatsoever (Annex: 'A') whereas page 10 of the petition before the Tribunal contains a verification, which reads as under:-- "Verified on oath at Rawalpindi, this the 20th day of November, 2002 that the contents of the above Election Petition are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." It is contended by the learned counsel for Respondent No, 1 that clause (b) of Section 54 of the Act makes, it obligatory for the petitioner to "serve personally or by registered post on each such respondent a copy of the petition." It is contended that page 10 of the petition before the Tribunal is different than the one supplied to Respondent No,
1. The photostat copy of the election petition, which was supplied to Respondent No, 1 and has been produced as Annexure 'A' runs into 10 pages, which is copy of a computer print. The election petition before the Tribunal also contains 10 pages but a discrepancy apparent from the record is that the first 9 pages of the election petition are of the same computer print, copy whereof was supplied to Respondent No, 1, but Page No, 10 is different, which is manual typing print. So far as the petition on the record of the Tribunal is concerned there cannot be denial that it contains the verification reproduced above, but the copy served upon Respondent No, 1 is not the same as is before the Tribunal. It is indeed anomalous and smacks of devious means. Be that as it may insofar as the import and effect of Section 55 (3) of the Act is concerned I have dealt with that aspect in some detail in judgment dated 8.9.2003 rendered in the above mentioned election petitions. Part whereof has direct relevance of this case and is reiterated:-- "3. To appreciate the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties in the context of the controversy, the perusal and survey of the relevant provisions of law i,e, The Representation of People Act, 1976, which provides for the resolution of election disputes through an election petition will be of relevance and significance. Section 52 of the Act permits a candidate to call in question the election through an election petition,. which is to be presented before the Commissioner within 45 days of the publication in the official Gazette of the name of the returned confidante. Such an election petition is to be accompanied by a receipt of a sum of Rs, 1,000/- as security for the costs of the petition. Section 53 deals with the presentation of the petition, which can be presented by the petitioner or a person authorized by him in writing or can be delivered through registered post to the Secretary of the Commission. Section 54 makes it incumbent for the petitioner to join all contesting candidates as respondents to the petition and to serve copy of the petition on each such respondent. Section 55 provides for the contents of the petition. Its sub-section (3) lays down that "every election petition and every schedule or annexes to that petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) for the verification of pleadings." Sub-section (1) of Section 56 empowers the Commission to dismiss the petition forthwith if provisions of Section 52, 53 or 54 have not been complied with. If it is not so dismissed it is to be referred for trial to a Tribunal. Appointment of Tribunal takes place under Section 57 of the Act. Section 62 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal. Sub- section (1) thereof enjoins upon the Tribunal that "subject to the provisions of this Act and the Rules every election petition shall be tried in accordance with procedure laid down by the Election Commission." Section 63 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition during the trial if:-- "(a) the provisions of Section 54 or Section 55 have not been complied with; or. (b) if the petitioner fails to make the further deposit required under sub-section (4) of Section 62."
By virtue of Section 64 of the Act the. Tribunal has been vested with "all the powers of a Civil Court trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure."
4. The perusal of the above salient provisions of law would show that whereas the Tribunal while seized of an election petition is vested with the powers of Civil Court trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure and added emphasis has been laid down qua the procedure to be followed by it, vide Section 62 import whereof cannot be overlooked. It needs no reiteration that The Representation of People Act, 1976 is a special Act which provides for the establishment of special Tribunals for resolving election disputes: A particular period of limitation for an election petition i,e, 45 days has been prescribed by the legislature. The Act is a complete and self contained Code. It is a special law dealing with the essential aspects of the election disputes and petitions and the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal. Though the Tribunal is vested with all the powers of a Civil Court available to the said Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 yet the provisions of The Representation of People Act, 1976 have to be kept in view and wherever there be any inconsistency of overlapping the previsions of the later Special Act would prevail. Such a well established statement of law finds mention at page 307 of "Understanding Statutes" Canons of Construction, second edition by S. M. Zafar that "Where general Act is incorporated with a Special Act subsequently passed relating to a particular subject matter, a provision in the Special Act prevails over an inconsistent provision in the general Act."
5. The precedents cited respectively by the learned counsel for the parties tend to show that the view expressed by the learned Tribunals from time to time was not wholly consistent and there had been a cleavage of opinion in their approach. There are however, instructive observations by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Jam Mashooq Ali v. Shahnawaz Jundjo (1996 SCMR 426). It was argued before the apex Court that since the Election Tribunals enjoyed all powers of Civil Court the Tribunal was required to follow the procedure of the trial of the suits. Dealing with such a contention and repelling it, the procedure laid down by the Election Commission under Section 62 of the Act on 17.3.1985 was reproduced in extenso and it was held that "The perusal of Section 62, before the aforementioned amendment and after amendment together with the procedure prescribed by the Election Commission clearly shows that for the trial of Election. Petitions the legislature intended to do away with lengthy procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). Reading Section 62 as amended and Section 64 of the Act, the possible harmonious interpretation thereof would be, that the Election Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure except for the trial of Election Petitions, where the Election Tribunal shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Election Commission." It was held that the framing of issues was not a mandatory requirement of law.
6. Contention that once the petition had been referred for trial to the Tribunal it could not be dismissed for non-observance of procedural requirements, has not impressed me inasmuch as although. the Commissioner has been empowered under Section 56 of the Act to dismiss the petition forthwith in case provisions of Section 52, 53 or Section 54 had not been complied with yet the Tribunal was also vested with such power by virtue of Section 63 to dismiss an election petition during the trial if provisions of Section 54 or Section 55 has not been complied with or the petitioner had failed to make further deposit required under sub-section (4) of Section 62. In Mrs. Syeda Zahida Zaidi v. Hafiz Muhammad Taqi and others (1986 CLC 2066) it was held by the learned Tribunal (Sind) that "The power under Section 56 which authorize the Commissioner to dismiss the petition for non-compliance with the requirements of Sections 52 and 54 is of administrative and ministerial nature. The Commissioner cannot adjudicate or make inquiry into questions of fact or even such allegations which have been made in the petition. For that purpose similar powers have been given to the Tribunal under Section 63 to dismiss the petition if the provisions of Section 54. and 55 have not been compiled with. The power given under Section 56 to the Commissioner to dismiss the petition for non-compliance with Sections 52, 53 and 54 does not take away the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction, where there is non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 54 and 55 of the Act. Therefore, even if, the Commissioner has after scrutiny forwarded the case for trial to the Tribunal, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to look into the matter, and give its own decision under Section 63 of the Act". In Maulvi Abdur Rahim v. Shahzada Mohayuddin (1987 MLD 2460) the learned Tribunal (Peshawar) expressed the view that "The mere fact that the election petition was forwarded to the Election Tribunal with no objection by the Election Commission would not mean that the lapse on the part of the petitioner had been condoned.
There is nothing in law to prevent the Election Tribunal from exercising such powers as were available to the Election Commission to refuse to entertain the election petition." In Asadullah v.
Asghar Ali and another (1995 CLC 150) a learned Tribunal (Balochistan) had taken a similar view observing "In Section 56 learned Commissioner has been given authority to dismiss forthwith the petition if he finds that any provision of Section 52, Section 53 or Section 54 has not been complied with. But Section 55 has not been mentioned meaning thereby that the legislature deliberately excluded Section 55 and in Section 63 this power has been given to the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition if the provisions of Section 54 or Section 55 have not been complied with. The question to see if the petition is not signed or verified in accordance with the provisions of CP.0 is mentioned in Section 55 of the Act its non-compliance and power to dismiss a petition is laid down in Section 63 within exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal." There is thus no obscurity that the election Tribunal is fully vested with the power to examine the petition and to dismiss it vide Section 63 of the Act for noncompliance of Section 55 (3) of the Act.
7. The respondents in these petitions have urged for the dismissal of the election petitions mainly for non-compliance of Section 55 (3), which relate to the verification of the petition, its schedule and annuxures. Since the consequences for non-verification as contemplated by Section 55 (3) have been mentioned under Section 63 of the Act that the petition shall be dismissed for such defect, the question of curability of non-verification or that such a requirement is of directory nature hardly assumes any significance. The law itself having taken care of the situation i,e, dismissal of the petition for non-verification in terms of the law, the requirement has to be regarded as of mandatory nature. In Muhammad Ibrahim v. Muhammad Arif Sardar (1986 CLC 2050) an election Tribunal (Punjab) took the view that "I do not think in the context of election laws, verification of the petition or its annexures was merely a formality as could be supplied later by amendment. Section 63 of the Act leaves no option to the Tribunal to allow any such amendment as its absence shall result in dismissal of the petition. There can be no two opinions about it." It was further observed that "Swearing a separate affidavit and also its verification is evidently not contemplated by the "manner" prescribed for verifying pleadings. It has to be "at the foot" of the petition itself which admittedly in this case is missing. The verification of the contents of the affidavit although reproduction of the petition will not suffice to meet the requirements of Order VI, Rule 15 C.P.C., which insists for the particular manner." In Peter John Sahotra v. Returning Officer and others (1995 CLC 394), it was observed by a learned Tribunal (Punjab) that "The compliance of the provisions of Sections 54 and 55 of the Act 1976 is mandatory. The tribunal has no choice but to dismiss the election petition." In Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani v. Anwar Kamal Khan and 3 others (1997 CLC 1724) a learned Tribunal (N.W.F.P) dismissed an election petition as the same had not been verified in accordance with Section 36 (3) of the Senate (Election) Act, 1975. The view taken by the learned Tribunal was that "Now the question for determination is whether the provisions of Section 36 (3) of the Act are mandatory or directory. Three exists no universal rule or absolute test for determining whether a provision of law is mandatory or directory. The determination is made in view of the intention of the legislature and the language in which the provision is couched but ordinarily where consequence of failure to comply with the provision are not stated the provision is directory and where the consequences are specifically mentioned the provision is mandatory. In Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Raqib (PLD 1974 C.C. 134) it was held that as a general rule a statute is understood to be directory when it contains matter merely of direction, but it is mandatory when those directions are followed up by an express provision that in default of following them the facts shall be null and void. In Faridun-Nisa v. Chairman Federal Land Commission, Rawalpindi (PLD 1984 Karachi 449) it was observed that a provision is mandatory if its disobedience entails a serious legal consequence.. In Major Shjat Ali v. Mst. Surra Begum (PLD 1978 S.C. (AJ&K) 118) it was held that in the absence of a penalty for failure to follow the prescribed procedure the provisions are to be taken to be directory and not mandatory. Another authority on the subject is reported as Muhammad Ismail v. Haji Muhammad and sons (PLD 1978 Karachi 926) wherein it was observed that the normal rule of construction is that when the statute does not provide for consequences of failure to comply with the directions contained in it, such direction is to be interpreted as directory and not mandatory. In the present case the penal provision is embodied in Section 44 (a) of the Act which expressly provides that the Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition if the provisions of Section 36 have not been complied with. Besides, the word "shall" stands out prominently in Section 36 (3) of the Act and the intention of legislature is made manifest by the stringent nature of the provisions of Section 44 of the Act. There is thus no difficulty in holding that the provisions of Section 36 (3) are mandatory and not directory." (It may be noted that the view so expressed by the learned Tribunal was approved and upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of. Pakistan in Engr. Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and others v: Khalilur Rehman and 4 others (2000 SCMR 250).) Reference may also be made to Muhammad Azad Gul v. said Muneer Said and 11 others (1997 CLC 1132) by Election Tribunal (N.W.F.P). In Alam Zaib Khanu v. Muhammad Nawaz Khan and 2 others (1998 CLC 83) dealing with such a defect in the verification of the election petition it was observed by the learned Tribunal (N.W.F.P.) that "In the instant case though the verification has been made and affidavit in support of the petition has also been filed by the petitioner but both the verification as well as the affidavit lack in these basic ingredients necessary for a proper and legal verification/affidavit in addition to the other particulars required for verification and affidavits i,e, the date on which and the place at which it was signed. Moreover, the verification has not been made on oath or solemn affirmation at all and even not before an authority who can administer oath and the affidavit appended with the petition was also not on oath." It was thus held that "the petition filed by the petitioner is not in conformity with the requirements of Section 55 (3) of the Act and the non-compliance has been visited by Section 63 of the Act with the dismissal of the petition." In Khawaja Muhammad Awan v. Alim Adil and 19 others .(1998 CLC 272) again the import and effect of Section 55 (3) of The Representation of People Act, 1976 came to be considered by the learned Tribunal (Sind) wherein the view expressed was that "Section 63 of the Act 1976 provides penal consequences i,e, dismissal of an election petition if provisions of Sections 54 and 55 have not been complied with, or if the petitioner fails to make further deposit as required under Section 62 (4) of the Act 1976. It is due to this provision that strict compliance of Sections 54 and 55 are held to be mandatory. Although, it is provided under Section 55 (3) of the Act of 1976 that every election petition, Schedule and other Annexures attached to such petition shall be signed by the petitioner and are to be verified in a manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 but no consequence is provided in CPC for non-compliance of provisions of Order VI but in the instant case there is a penal consequence as envisaged in Section 63 of the Act, 1976 which, in my considered view, is to be construed strictly. The language of Section 63 leaves no scope for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion in favour of such petitioner who has committed non-compliance of Sections 54 and 55 of the Act 1976." The petition was accordingly dismissed for non-compliance of Section 55(3) of the Act. In Engr. Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and others v.
Khalilur Rehman and 4 others (2000 SCMR 250) Section 36 of the Senate (Election) Act 1975, which is analogous to Section 55 of The Representation of People Act, 1976, (sub-section (3) of Section 36 of Senate (Election) Act 1975 and Section 55 (3) of the Representation of People Act, 1976 deal with the signing and verification of the election petition and schedule or annexes to that petition) received due consideration of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and it was held that "Sub-section (3) of Section 36 ibid clearly requires that every petition and every schedule or annexures shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for verification of pleadings. The verification of pleadings has been provided under Order 6 Rule 15 CPC which when read with Section 39 CPC, clearly shows that the pleadings are to be verified on oath and the oath is to be administered by a person, who is duly authorized in that behalf. It is an admitted position that the petition filed by Sved Iftikhar Hussain Gillani though mentions that it is on oath, the oath was neither verified nor attested by a person authorized to administer oath and as such it could not be said that requirements of Section 36 of the Act were complied with." It may be noted that the election petition in that case had been dismissed by the learned Election Tribunal N.W.F.P. vide (1997 CLC 1724) (Supra). Such a pronouncement by the Hon'ble Supreme Court should clinch and set at rest the controversy. I am, therefore, unable to adopt the contra view taken by the learned Tribunals, and respectfully follow the preponderant and prevalent view quoted above. From the above preponderance of the view the principle unambiguously culled out is that:-- (a) The provisions of The Representation of People Act, 1976 insofar as these relate to the election disputes providing particular forum (Election Tribunal) and procedure are of special nature and will have primacy and overriding effect in case of any inconsistency and conflict with any other law of general nature.
(b) Provisions of Section 55 (3) of the Act read with Section 63 thereof are of mandatory nature and non-verification or defective verification as contemplated by it would entail the consequence of dismissal of election petition.
(c)It is equally an established principle of law that where the law prescribes the method of doing a thing in a particular manner the same has to be done in that manner failure whereof may ensue the legal consequence.
(d) The pleadings are to be verified on oath and the oath is to be administered by a person who is duly authorized in that behalf (2000 SCMR 250) (294).
(e) The scrutiny of the election petition by the Election Commission and its reference to the Tribunal does not denude the Tribunal of the power to dismiss the same for nonobservance of Section 54 or 55 of the Act, otherwise the provisions of Section 63 of the Act would be rendered redundant and nugatory. (f) Although the election Tribunal has powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure yet for the Trial of election petitions the election Tribunal is to follow the procedure prescribed by the Election Commission. (1996 SCMR 426). It is in the light of the above-mentioned principles that the maintainability of the election petition is to be examined and considered. Such a verification reproduced in the opening part of the judgment was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Engr. Iqbal Zafar Jhagra's case (Supra) as violative of Section 36 of the Senate (Election) Act, 1975 which is in parimateria with Section 55 of The Representation of People Act, 1976.
The petition is thus liable to be dismissed for this reason as was ordered in Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani's case (1997 CLC 1724) (Supra), (upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Engr.
Iqbal Zafar Jhagra case (2000 SCMR 250)).
Apart there-from the verification does not meet the requirements of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 of Order VI CPC inasmuch as it does not specify by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the petition what the verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true.
There is an affidavit of the petitioner placed on the record but the failure to verify the petition as mandated by law cannot be cured by filing affidavit nor non-compliance of law can be overlooked or condoned. Even the said affidavit does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 15 of Order VI CPC. It does not specify by reference to the numbered paragraphs "what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true." Since the controversy squarely stand covered by the Judgment in Engr. Iqbal Zafar Jhagra's case, there is thus no escape but to dismiss this petition. As a consequence the preliminary objection prevails and the election is dismissed with no order as to costs.