' IJAZ-UL-HASSAN KHAN, J.---Noor Nawaz Khan and his son Amir Nawaz petitioners, through instant writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seek cancellation of F.I.R. No.174 registered at Police Station Batkhela, Malakand on 7-11-2001, under sections 419/420/406/471/468/34, P.P.C., at the instance of Noorul Ahad, complainant-respondent.
2. Precisely narrated the facts are that petitioners are businessmen at Batkhela Bazar and were appointed sole distributor for Malakand Agency by Ravi Liquified Gas Company vide Agreement Deed dated 12-7-2000. Petitioner No.1 started business for the distribution of LPG Gas Cylinder at Batkhela in the name of Amir Traders and General Merchandize and appointed respondent Noorul Ahad as sub-distributor for a specified area per agreement dated 17-7-2000. Noorul Ahad deposited a sum of Rs.7,31,500 as security etc. The business continued for sometime but, thereafter, a dispute arose between the petitioners firm and Ravi Gas (Pvt.) Limited on the ground of allowing another sole distributor in the area and demanding more capital from the petitioner firm. As the supply of Gas Cylinders was stopped the petitioners firm was obliged to file a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge Batkhela to redress their grievance.
3. Mr. Javed A. Khan, Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, mainly contended that the matter between the contesting parties is purely of contractual obligation to be resolved through civil proceedings and the registration of the F.I.R. Was not only illegal, without lawful authority but is based on mala fides which is purely abuse of the process of the Court and requires interference by this Court through exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction.
4. On the contrary Sardar Shaukat Hayat, Additional Advocate-General for respondents Nos.2 to 4 assisted by Mr. Muhammad Waris Khan, Advocate for respondent No.1, controverted the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners and contended that no case for quashment of the F.I.R. Has been made out and that the writ petition has been filed with mala fide intention.
5. The jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 199 of the Constitution is an extraordinary jurisdiction which can be invoked only to meet extraordinary situations. This jurisdiction is or and was never meant to be treated as an additional or as "another" remedy provided by law. It was essentially for this reason that Article 199 of the Constitution specifically provided that this Court shall have jurisdiction under the said provisions of the Constitution only when the law from which a matter emanated did not provide any other adequate remedy to cater for the problem in issue. Therefore, the prime question in every case of Article 199 of the Constitution as also in the present case is whether an aggrieved person who resorts to the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, has or has not any other adequate remedy available to him under the law.
6. It needs no reiteration that under section 154, Cr.P.C. When an information is received by an officer Incharge of the Police Station with regard to the alleged commission of the cognizable offence, it becomes the duty of the Investigating Officer to endeavour to collect material and to opine whether in his view the information was or was not correct. He has powers under section 169, Cr.P.C. To release an accused person if the Investigating Officer was of the view that sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds justifying the forwarding of an accused person to a Magistrate, were not available. A remedy is also available to an accused person under section 551, Cr.P.C. To approach the senior Police Officer regarding investigation or conduct of the Investigating Officer to ventilate his grievance. The accused person can also seek his discharge from a competent Magistrate under section 63 of the Cr.P.C. If he could demonstrate that the accusations levelled against him were unfounded. The accused person can also have recourse to section 190 of the Cr.P.C. When he is in position to demonstrate to the Magistrate, seized of the matter, that the allegations levelled in the F.I.R. Were false or that sufficient material was not available on record implicating him with the offence allegedly committed by him. It would, thus, be. Noticed that after registration of ,an F.I.R. a person falsely accused of the commission of an offence, has remedies open to him at every step and at every stage during the course of investigation or during the course of a trial. It is not denied that this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 199 of the Constitution would not, ordinarily, embark upon an exercise to determine intricate, contested and complicated questions of fact. Resolution of such-like controverted issues is ordinarily left to the proper forums prescribed by any given law bicause indulging in such an exercise would have the effect of pre-empting and encroaching upon the jurisdiction lawfully vesting in the competent officers and Courts.
7. The F.I.R. Sought to be quashed prima facie discloses commission of cognizable offence which requires investigation to be conducted in order to find out truth and the same could not be stifled or killed in 'Constitutional petition as rightly urged on behalf of the respondents. In the present case we find that during the subsistence of first agreement between the petitioners and respondent No.1, the petitioners have entered into another agreement dated 19-7-2002 with one Haji Gul Zaman proprietor Shah Corporation Batkhela and received substantial amount from him. Haji Gul Zaman is also stated to have been kept in dark about the first transaction. In these circumstances we do not feel inclined and are extremely reluctant to utilize our powers vested under Article 199' of the Constitution so as to interfere in the Ordinary course of criminal proceedings. Prima facie criminal offences have been made out against the petitioners and it cannot be said that either the petitioners are innocent or there is no possibility of any conviction whatsoever. So far as the institution of civil suit is concerned it poses no insurmountable obstacle in the way of respondent No.1 and apparently has no nexus with the present case.
8. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the writpetition and decline to quash the F.I.R. In question.