This petition is directed against an appellate order of the learned District Judge, Karachi (Central) allowing F.I.R. No,386 of 2001 filed by the respondent No,1 and directing ejectment of the petitioner. It may be stated that the respondent No,1 had moved an application for ejectment of the petitioner on grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fide personal need. The learned Rent Controller found that neither of the two grounds could be established and thereupon dismissed the application. This finding was reversed by the respondent No,2 who found the respondent No,1 entitled to relief on both grounds.
2. As regards the question of personal need Mr. Ferzoe Hassan Shaikh argued that the premises in question was owned by the father of respondent No,1 Haji Raees Ahmed Ansari and the aforesaid respondent was merely his rent collector. As such the ejectment application could not be moved without proper authority of the owner and in any event the ejectment order could not be passed on the ground of personal need of the Rent Collector rather than that of the owner himself. As regards the ownership of the respondent's father. Learned counsel contended that the respondent No,1 had admitted the ownership of his father in his cross-examination as has been stated in para.5 of the memo. of petition in the following words:-- "It is correct that the property in question is owned by my father and I am collecting rent only as rent collector of my father."
3. Surprisingly, however, a copy of the deposition was not filed with the memo. of petition. On the other hand Mr. Khalid Javed placed before me a certified copy of such deposition containing statement to the following effect:-- "I use to issue rent receipts to my tenant on his making payment of the monthly rent. The opponent is my only tenant. It is incorrect that the property in question is owned by my father and I am collecting rent only as rent collector of my father."
4. With deep anguish, I am constrained to observe that a greater amount of rectitude and fairness is expected from learned members of the Bar and it is important that instead of there being swa yed by the desires of their . respective clients they ought to accord due importance to the dignity and stature of this noble profession.
Though I am not referring the matter to the Bar Council this time, the above may be treated as a word of caution against repetition of such acts.
5. In any event, even if it be assumed that the respondent No,1 was not the owner but merely a rent collector as alleged by the petitioner, the findings on merits are not affected. In the first place section 2(f) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, which defines the expression 'landlord' expressly includes anybody authorized or entitled to receive rent i.e, a rent collector. Therefore, no serious objection could be taken to the filing of an application for ejectment by the respondent No, 1 even as rent collector.
6. Nevertheless, Mr. Feroze Hassan Shaikh appears to be correct in asserting that ejectment cannot be ordered merely on the ground of personal need of a mere rent collector. Indeed section 15(1)(vii) permits ejectment on the ground of good faith requirement for occupation or use of landlord, his spouses or his children. There is authority for the proposition that the above provision would be applicable only when the premises is required by the owner or his spouses or children and not for an outsider who may be designated as a rent collector. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the record that the respondent No, 1 was admittedly a son of the alleged owner Haji Raees Ahmed and an ejectment application would be competent on the ground that the premises was required for his need in such capacity.
7. It is urged that there is no evidence as to the nature of business required to be performed. This however, is not fatal in view of the pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in Saira Bai v.
Syed Anis-ur-Rehman (1989 SCM R. 1366). I am therefore, satisfied that the respondent No, 1 had made out a case for ejectment on the ground of personal need and no interference in Constitutional jurisdiction is called for.
As regards the ground of default learned counsel argued that the petitioner had been depositing rent consistently in M.R.C. No,738 of 1999 i.e, the entire period of the alleged default. Nevertheless, the question whether this fact was a ground for exercise of discretion in his favour . may require consideration in an appropriate case, but it is not necessary to do so inasmuch as one of the grounds for ejectment has been duly proved before the Statutory Tribunals. This petition is accordingly dismissed in limine. The petitioner may vacate the premises within six months from today subject to payment of rent, failing which writ of possession may issue without notice. The costs deposited with the Nazir with the consent of Mr. Khalid Javed may be credited to the High Court.