' SABIHUDDIN AHMAD, J.---The only point involved in this petition is whether the finding of the learned respondent No,2 holding that the petitioner was not a workman for the purposes of Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was legally sustainable. Since we were under the impression that the question was perhaps covered by some reported precedents; we requested Miss Sana Minhas to assist us and she has done so very ably by placing the relevant law on record.
2. Mr. Muhammad Muzaffar-ul-Haq, learned counsel for the petitioner raised, a two-fold contention. In the first instance he argued that the maintainability of, the petitioner's application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, calling in question an order of termination of his service, could only be decided on the yardstick as to whether the petitioner was workman for the purposes of the aforesaid Ordinance. He relied upon a pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in Brook Bond Pakistan Limited v. Government of Sindh (PLD 1977 SC 237), where their Lordships held that a salesman was a workman, as defined in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance.
3. This judgment indeed, supports the learned counsel's contention to the above extent. The crucial question however, appears to be whether definition under the Industrial Relations Ordinance was relevant for the purposes of the controversy before us. It may be observed that section 25-A A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance enables a workman to approach a Labour Court for enforcement of a right conferred by a law settlement or award. On the other hand Standing Order 12 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, specifically, protects workman against unlawful termination of services and clause (3) thereof explicitly requires that a workman aggrieved by the termination of his service, may approach the Labour Court for redress, which will treat his application as one moved under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance.
4. Miss Sana Minhas learned Amicus Curiae brought to our notice that a large number of pronouncements of the superior Courts and in particular the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Matloob Hassan v. 'Brook Bond (1992 SCM R 227), wherein it was held that when an employee complained of violation of the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance, he was required to show that he was a workman under the aforesaid Ordinance and not under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The principle laid down in the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel pointed out, has been followed by the Honourable Supreme Court in a recent case of Yousuf Ali v.
Quetta Sereena Hotel (2001 SCM R 1813). The same view also appears to have been taken in Mustehkum Cement v. Abdul Rahim (1998 SCM R 644).
5. Miss Sana Minhas also pointed out that though the Supreme Court had held salesman to be a workman for the purpose of Industrial Relations Ordinance, it was explicitly held in subsequent case that they were not so in terms of the Standing Orders Ordinance. She further stated at the bar that a different view, to her knowledge, had not been taken by any High Court.
6. In view of the above, we are constrained to hold that the petitioner is not workman for the purpose of Standing Orders Ordinance and the judgment of the respondent No,2 is unexceptionable. We must record our gratitude to Miss Sana Minhas for her invaluable assistance.
The petition is dismissed.