' MUSHIR ALAM, J.--This execution application came up before us, seeking enforcement of order dated 29-7-1991 passed by Full Bench of Honourable Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.8-K of 1978 (Inamur Rehman v. Fedetation of Pakistan and others).
2. Briefly stating facts giving rise to the present execution application are that consequent upon the fall of East Pakistan on 3rd August, 1972 the Foreign Exchange (Prevention of Payments) Ordinance (XXX of 1972), was promulgated, as amended by Foreign Exchange (Prevention of Payments) Act, 1973, whereby State Bank of Pakistan was empowered to call for the amount of repatriated Foreign Exchange and any other amount payable on account of such repatriation from any authorized dealer. The decree-holder, had declared a sum of Pound Sterling, 1,70,000 which were held by him in the two accounts maintained with National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. And the then Standard Bank Ltd. (later on merged with H.B.L.).
' Pursuant to direction of the State Bank of Pakistan, said amount was called from decree-holder's bank and deposited in the State Bank of Pakistan. Decree-holder feeling aggrieved by the action of the State Bank of Pakistan, questioned the vires of the relevant provision of law through Writ Petition No.780 of 1973 wherein the petitioner had made the following prayers:--
(a) The petitioner prays that this Honourable Court may be pleased to declare that the Foreign Exchange (Prevention of Payments) Ordinance XXX of 1972, the Foreign .Exchange (Prevention of 'Payments) Act XXII of 1972 and all the amendments made therein are ultra vires of the law making authorities and that in any case all actions taken or purporting to have been taken under the above law or laws are ab initio, void, illegal, without lawful authority and are mala fide and discriminatory and of no legal effect.
(b) Alternatively, the. Petitioner prays that this Honourable Court may be pleased or declare that the directions addressed by the Second respondent to respondents 2 and 3 requiring them and each of them to deposit with the State Bank of Pakistan the funds held by the petitioner in his respective accounts with the said Banks is ultra vires, without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
(c) In either case, the petitioner prays for an order directing the respondents and each of them and all those claiming through or under them as well as their agents, servants and assigns to restore to the petitioner the full amount expropriated as above with interest due thereon at 10% per annum from the date the said funds were frozen.
(d) Petitioner also prays for the costs of this petition.
However, said petition was dismissed vide judgment dated 4-7-1977 by a Division Bench of this Court. Said judgment was assailed before Honourable Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.8-K of 1978. The apex Court struck down various provisions of the Ordinance, vide judgment dated 29-7- 1991 operative part thereof reads as follows:- "Since the entire appeal is liable to be disposed of on the conclusion arrived at by us on the aforesaid arguments, we deem it unnecessary to consider any other contention. In the result this appeal is allowed and -- the provisions of the Act are declared void and of no legal effect to the.
Extent as mentioned here. In-above,. Likewise, all consequential actions taken sir purported to have 'been taken pursuant to the above-said provisions of law and still pending or continuing in effect, are also declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
' In the circumstances of this case, we leave the parties bear their own costs."
Mr. Muhammad Ali Sayeed, N learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since the Constitutional petition was allowed by the Honourable Supreme Court, the interest claimed at the rate of 10% per annum from the date the funds of the decree-holder were frozen, till the same were paid to him, is to be paid. Admittedly principal amount of Rs.40,45,684.26 was paid by the State Bank of Pakistan to the decree-holder. Execution only relates to the interest claimed by the decree-holder on the amount frozen up to the date of execution. From the record it appears that the State Bank of Pakistan had credited the principal amount on 14th July, 1998 in the account of decree-holder.
Messrs Liaquat Merchant and Naeem Ahmed objected to the execution on two fold grounds i.e. In amount by way of interest was determined or allowed by the apex Court therefore, the question of payment of interest did not arise, secondly, that the execution is time-barred.
4. Before adverting to the merits of the petition we deem it appropriate to deal with the question of limitation. The judgment of the Supreme Court is dated 29-7-1991. Execution was filed on 22-5-1999, Messrs Muhammad Ali Sayeed and Fazle Ghani Khan submitted that, on account of family feud litigation followed, wherein, restraint orders, against the decree-holder restraining him to withdraw said amount were made. Such injunctive orders ceased to be operative on 23-5-1997 and 20-5- 1998 when litigation came to an end, therefore, the present execution application was well within time.
5. Limitation to enforce an order of Supreme Court is six years from the date of such order, as provided under Article 183 of the Limitation Act. Period of limitation under Article 183 is further regulated by a proviso, which runs as follows: "Provided that when the judgment, decree or order has been revised, or some part of the principal money secured thereby or some interest on such money has been paid, or some acknowledgment of the right thereto has been given in writing signed by the person liable to pay such principal or interest, or his agent, to the person entitled thereto or his agent, the six years shall be computed from the date of such reviver, payment or acknowledgment or the latest of such revivers, payments, or acknowledgments, as the case may be."
'From the admitted document, available on record (at pages .187 and 189) it is evident that State Bank credited two amounts of Rs.2,090,486.76 and Rs.1,955,197.49 in the decree-holder's account maintained with National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. And Habib Bank Ltd. Respectively, on 14th July, 1998 as notified vide its letters both, dated 15-7-1998.
6. It is not, considered appropriate to go into the detail and merits of litigation and restraining' orders in various proceedings, as there appears to be some dispute regarding nature and duration of such restraint orders. Computation of period of limitation is to be made keeping in view the Proviso to Article 183 of the Limitation Act, as reproduced above. Principal amount admittedly was paid to the decree-holder on 14-7-1998, six years of limitation would commence from the date of such payment, therefore, in our view/ execution application filed on 22-5-1999 is well within time.
7. Now adverting to the merits of the claim. It is to be noted that, decree-holder in his petition before this Court had prayed for the recovery/payment of the full amount appropriated by the S.B.P. With interest due thereon at 10% per annum from the date said fund were frozen till the date of payment. The petition was, however, dismissed by this Court, as stated above. However, the petition was allowed in terms of the orders of the apex Court dated 29-7-1991 operative part whereof, has already been reproduced in the narrative above. The payment of interest and mark- up in a suit or proceeding is governed and regulated by section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code which reads as follows:-- "34. Interest:---"
(1) Where and insofar as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit.
(2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such aggregate sum as aforesaid from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefore, shall not lie."
' From a bare perusal of the above-quoted provision it is crystal clear that interest, as may be adjudged by the Court on the amount claimed and decree by the Court is paid at such rate as the Court deem, reasonable. Subsection (2) to section 34 provides that where the decree is silent with respect to the payment of interest the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest.
Viewing case of the decree-holder in the light of the above-quoted provision, it was observed that the apex Court in its judgment, in the operative part had merely declared the provision of the impugned enactment as void and of no legal effect. All actions pursuant thereto, were also declared to be without lawful authority, the parties were left to bear their own cost and not a word was said relating to the entitlement of the decree-holder to receive interest on the amount frozen.
8. Contention of Mr. Muhammad Ali Saeed was that, in the petition filed in the High Court interest was also claimed and as the same was allowed by the Honourable Supreme Court as prayed, therefore, it would be deemed that the Supreme Court has allowed the claim of interest. Such contention from the record appears to be incorrect. The judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court is confined to the vires of the impugned legislation, while disposing of the petition it was also observed "We deem it unnecessary to consider any other contention". The interest as claimed by the petitioner, under. Circumstances would be deemed to have been refused by the Honourable Supreme Court. The decree-holder was deprived of the use and enjoyment of his money on account of impugned legislation, till it was struck down by the apex Court on 29-7-1991 but being the Executing Court, we cannot go behind the judgment in view of the provision of section 34(2), C.P.C. The decree-holder in our view ought to have approached the Supreme Court in this regard.
The Execution Application, in the circumstances, is dismissed with no order as to costs. company for one year on payment of Rs. 9600 per month---Defendant finding said three guards untrustworthy and not up to the standard, after three months of contract, terminated contract with 14 days clear notice explaining cause for doing so through a letter-Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of amount of remaining nine months on ground that parties had entered into agreement for one year---Neither any clause existed in the contract which could forbid either party to terminate contract nor there was any penal clause in the said contract-Plaintiff had failed to prove any loss or damage for unilateral termination of