KARAM ELAHEB CHAUHAN, J.--The dispute in this case is about a shop bearing No. 143, situated in Shah Alamgir Market, Lahore. Muhammad Irshad (hereinafter called the landlord) filed an application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)
(hereinafter called the Ordinance) for the eviction of Hakam Din, tenant --petitioner, on the ground that he reasonably and in good faith required it for his own use and also because the tenant had not paid or tendered the rent for the last two months and had damaged the property and was keeping sub-tenant under him. The petition was accepted and the learned Rent Controller, by the order dated 10-2-1965, directed eviction of the tenant from the aforesaid shop.
2. The tenant/petitioner filed an appeal but without any success, as the same was dismissed by the learned District Judge on 26-4-1965. A second appeal being S. A Q. No. 258 of 1965 also met the same fate and was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on 15-7-1966. The petitioner, then, filed a letters patent appeal being L. P. A. No. 1104/1966 which, too, was dismissed by a learned Division Bench of that Court on 19-12-1975. The petitioner has come up in a petition for special leave to appeal against the same to this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that, no doubt, his client was a tenant in this shop under the landlords, which was a firm by the name "M. Fayyaz Brothers". A copy of the relevant rent note, dated 4-1-1956, has been paced on the record at page 50 of the paper book. However, there was executed on 1-4-1961 a deed of partnership between (i) Muhammad Afzal, (ii) Msr. Ghularh Fatima, (iii) Mr. Saif-ud-Din Bihari, (fv) Qazi Akbar Hussain, and (v) Qazi Altaf Hussain in which it was recited that the aforesaid persons had been carrying on business in partnership along with Messrs Muhammad Irshad and Mst. Sardar Begum who after having settled their accounts with Mr. Muhammad Afzal (partner No. 1) have withdrawn themselves from the affairs of the partnership and that it was now resolved by the above-mentioned partners that the partnership shall be continued and carried on the terms mentioned in that deed, namely:
(a) "that the name of the firm shall continue to be Messrs M. Fayyaz Brothers;
(b) that the Goodwill of the firm shall be the exclusive right of partner No. 1 and that no other partner will have any right to the use of this name;
(c) that the shop which was built by Messrs Muhammad Afzal and Muhammad Irshad has been taken over by the outgoing partner Mr. Muhammad Irshad and that the firm or any other person has no claim against the same.
4. Learned counsel has argued that the aforesaid clauses of this document show that the shop was built by two persons, namely, Muhammad Afzal and Muhammad Irsbad and belonged to them, but had been taken over by Muhammad Irshad as a result of the settlement contained in that deed.
'This document, according to the learned counsel purported to transfer the ownership of the property to Muhammad Irshad, but as the said transfer had not taken place by a registered deed but by a simple unregistered partnership deed, therefore, the same was ineffective under section 17 of the Registration Act XVI of 1908 (as amended up-to-date).'
5. He then referred to the statement of Muhammad Irshad (respondent) who appeared as P. W. 1 and deposed that the shop was the ownership of the firm Messrs M. Fayyaz Brothers and that in the face of the aforesaid oral statement of P. W. 1 any different recital in the partnership deed was from that point of view even otherwise false especially when in the rent note dated 4-1-1956 executed by the petitioner/tenant he i. e. The petitioner had also recited that the shop was of the said firm (as it was then constituted). However, according to him, looked at from whatever angle, Whosoever was the earlier owner of the shop the broad fact remains that transfer by that owner has not been made by a registered instrument in writing and therefore the title of the respondent being imperfect and nullity he had no locus standi to apply for the eviction of the petitioner.
6. The finding of the learned Division Bench of the High Court, however, was that the partnership deed by itself did not purport to transfer the property to Muhammad Irshad, but that it was only an acknowledgement of his right and title therein, and as such, it did not require registration. We have gone through the document and we are agreeable to the construction placed by the learned Division Bench that this document does not by itself purport to transfer the shop to Muhammad Irshad but only recites the result of some arrangement whereby the shop had been taken over by the outgoing partner Muhammad Irshad, by acknowledging, his previous title.
7. When confronted with this situation learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that if the aforesaid partnership deed was a mere acknowledgement of some previous title of the respondent, then a question arises as to by which document he acquired title thereto and from whom and when. If there is no document showing transfer of title to him then obviously it means that be acquired title from that firm or the other co-owners by some oral deal, which according to the learned counsel again would be ineffective because section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) being applicable within the municipal limits of Lahore where the shop was situated, no oral transfer of a property worth more than Rs. 100, would have taken place.
8. We are of the opinion, that it is not necessary to go into these niceties because the original firm of which the petitioner was the tenant no longer exists in that form due to change and shift in its members. The newly-constituted firm no doubt carries the old nacre and continues the same business but it has acknowledged that the shop belonged to the respondent and has been taken over by him. How originally the original firm became its owner, when, through and from whom by an oral deal or by an instrument in writing, registered or unregistered is not proved on the present record. Similarly how the respondent originally became its owner is not so well clear and all we have before us are the few acknowledgements, mentioned above, the latest being from the firm itself admitting that the shop belonged to and had been taken over by the respondent while going out of the partnership. The question, as is obvious, was thus between the firm and the respondent and if the former acknowledged and accepted the previous title of the respondent and severed all connection and concern with this shop, we think it is not for the petitioner to quibble with the inter se relations of others, and b all he was concerned with was to know that his own previous landlord, namely the firm acknowledging the previous title of the respondent has given up it concern and connection with the shop and has allowed the previous owner to take over the same. The respondent then informed the tenant about his title and issued notice or notices to him pointing out that now be was his landlord under section 13-A of the Ordinance. The receipt of such notices has not been denied before us. In these circumstances the petitioner cannot go behind the previous title of any of the two, if we can use these words, previous owners, so as to find out as to who out of them was the true or real owner and how. His role starts only after the execution of a rent note by him on 4-1-1956 in favour of the firm, which on its own part acknowledged certain set of facts and circumstance with reference to its one outgoing partner. The petitioner in view of this peculiar circumstance had no justification to go behind the above-mentioned acknowledgement of his previous landlord, through and from whom he himself had obtained the tenancy and who acknowledged that now he had in recognition of some previous title of its outgoing partner disassociated himself from this shop. It is to be noticed that it is not a case where two persons are claiming rent from him or each of them is asserting him as the owner of the property or the landlord to the exclusion of the other. It is a simple case where the person who is admitted as the original landlord and who is being put forward as owner by the tenant, has himself acknowledged the previous title of the respondent and accepted him as owner, and on that basis has disassociated himself from the shop. It was therefore not a case of creating any new right or title but simply of acknowledging a previous title of one about whom earlier apparently there may have been certain different admissions or recitals but which were set right by the latest acknowledgment on the subject.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner in a very frank and fair manner, conceded that if his aforesaid pleas were not accepted, he had nothing to urge as regards the grounds on which eviction of his client had been directed. He reiterated that his sole objection was with regard to the title of Muhammad Irshad regarding this property and particularly the mode and the manner in which transfer was made to him. We have already expressed our opinion on this aspect of the matter, with the result that the liability of the tenant to pay the rent to Muhammad Irshad and his failure in fulfilling that liability having been fully legally established on the record, the order of eviction passed against him remains unexceptionable.
10. The result is that this petition has no merit and is dismissed.