This review petition has been directed against the order of this Court dated 25-6-2003, whereby the petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present review petition, are that the petitioner herein filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, whereas Shahnaz Begum, respondent No,1, also filed a suit for dissolution of her marriage on different grounds, i,e, non-performance of marital obligations, non- payment of maintenance and finally on the basis of `Khula' before the Judge Family Court, Kotli.
The trial Court consolidated both the suits and after taking necessary proceedings decreed the suit filed by Shahnaz Begum, whereas the suit of the petitioner herein was dismissed. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court before the Shariat Court which also concurred with the findings of the trial Court. The Shariat Court maintained the judgment and decree of the trial Court vide its judgment dated 21-4-2003. Against the aforesaid judgment of the Shariat Court, a petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner before this Court which, as stated earlier, was dismissed by this Court vide its order dated 25-6-2003. It is the aforesaid order of this Court dated 25-6-2003, the review of which has been sought by the petitioner.
3. In support of review petition it has been vehemently contended by Ch. Muhammad Riaz Alam, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that this Court in the order under review has held as follows:- - "Even otherwise there is no legal point involved in this petition. Section 14, subsection (5) of the AJ&K Family Courts Act, 1994, Postulates that unless a legal question of public importance is involved in the case, the decision of the Shariat Court is final. This shows that for granting leave in matrimonial matters, there must be a legal question of public importance involved in the matter otherwise the leave cannot be allowed." The above noted findings of this Court, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, are very important and have a great impact not only on the case of the petitioner but also to the general community and public at large and the same should be resolved by. Granting leave to appeal and decision should be made in a regular appeal. The learned counsel submitted that the term 'question of public importance' has not been defined in the Family Courts Act, 1994, therefore, a detailed and comprehensive judgment is required on this point. He in support of his contentions relied upon a case reported as Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and others v.
Kh. Abdul Aziz and others PLD 1982 SC (AJK) 16 wherein it was observed as under:-- "The expression 'public importance' is not capable of any precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion or exclusion and each case has to be judged in the circumstances of that case as to whether the question of public importance is involved. But it is a settled law that public importance must include a purpose or claim in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interests of the individuals is directly and vitally concerned." In the above-referred authority it was further observed that in this case the land was alienated to respondent by different persons and it is not even the case of the Government that the people of Jheeng on the whole were, in any way, interested for holding an inquiry. It was further held that it is significant that facts disclosed in the written statement in answer to writ petition also do not state that the inquiry was launched into a matter of 'definite public importance'. Similarly in the case in hand, it was not the case of the petitioner that due to decree of dissolution passed in favour of Shahnaz Begum, the public at large shall suffer.
4. This Court has already observed in the order under review that for the purpose of granting leave in matrimonial matters, there must be a legal question of public importance involved in the matter as postulated under section 14(5) of the AJ&K Family Courts Act, 1994.
5. Similarly in another case, referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, titled Mushtaq Hussain Khan v. Mst. Hafiza Aziz and 3 others 2002 CLC 730 was held by this Court as follows:-- "A matrimonial dispute between the two parties can hardly be called a question of public importance. The question of law of public importance is only that question which affects and has its repercussions on the public at large." So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned that the findings of this Court have a great impact not only to the case of the petitioner but to the community at large, the learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to explain as to how the order under review is likely to affect the general public at large; upon this, he pointed out that by the findings which have been given by this Court, the women at large will be encouraged and would come forward frequently for seeking dissolution of their marriages.
6. I am of the view that a woman who does not want to live with her husband due to certain reasons, the Court is not vested with any power to compel her to live with her husband under all the compulsions and all the circumstances. However, it has rightly been pointed out in the first referred authority that the question of public importance deffers from case to case.
7. No other point of any substance has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The review petition, therefore, stands dismissed in limine. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.