' The admitted facts appear to be that the respondent No.1 was the tenant in respect of a shop owned by one Noor Jehan Begum along with her son Rizwanullah and daughter Farhat Jehan Begum (collectly referred to as the previous owners). On 11-8-1994 the previous owners entered into an agreement of sale of the building where the premises was located with the petitioner.
However, somehow a registered sale-deed in favour of the petitioner was only executed on 3-5- 2003 as is evident from the copy of said instrument placed on record today.
2. According to the petitioner soon after the agreement of sale he issued notice dated 22-8-1994 calling upon the respondent No.1 to pay rent to him. Another letter was addressed by the previous owner but 23-8-1994, requiring the aforesaid respondent to pay rent to the petitioner as the property had been sold to him.
3. Nevertheless it is admitted that rent for September and October, 1994 was deposited by the respondent No.1 in the Court of Rent Controller in the name of previous landlord from November, 1994 onwards and started depositing rent in the joint names of the previous landlords and the petitioner.
4. The petitioner filed an application, seeking ejectment of the respondent No.1 on various grounds i.e. Default, bona fide personal need, subletting etc. In 1995. The learned Rent Controller granted the ejectment application, but all his findings were reversed by the learned District Judge vide impugned order dated 16-5-2002.
5. The petitioner, has basically assailed the findings of the learned District Judge on the ground of default which also affects the maintainability of the ejectment application. It was held that since the ownership of the property did not come to be vested in the petitioner, therefore, he could not claim the benefit of section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 and could not urge default in payment of rent.
6. Indeed admittedly the petitioner at that time had only premised his right to seeking ejectment on the basis of an agreement of sale in his favour. It is well-settled as has been held by the learned District Judge that transfer of ownership of immovable property of the value above Rs.100 can only be effected through a registered instrument. The registered sale-deed in favour of the petitioner admittedly, came to be executed in May, 2003. Mr. Aijaz Ahmad Khan argued that even if the petitioner had not become the owner of the property he had acquired the status of a landlord which was acknowledged in evidence by the respondent. In the above context however, the provisions of section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 need to be carefully looked at. The plain language of the statute stipulates that only when the ownership of the premises is transferred to another person the new owner can upon service of notice to the tenant, require the latter to attorn to him. The distinct meaning of the expression "ownership" needs to be kept in view as against the broad definition of the expression "landlord" occurring in the Statute. Therefore, Mr. Kanjoo appears to be right in contending that even if the petitioner had acquired the right to demand rent on account of his agreement with the previous owners, the obligation of the respondent No.1 under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, could only arise if actual ownership had been transferred which was only possible through a registered instrument. Learned counsel placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in Muhammad Ashraf Magsi v. Mubarak Ali 1990 CLC 588 and I see no reason for taking a different view. In any event if a default was found it could at best be treated as a technical default as admittedly the respondent No.1 has been depositing rent in the Court.
7. As regards the remaining grounds it may be observed that after the execution of the sale-deed in his favour the petitioner's status has altogether changed. Therefore, I would dismiss this petition, but at the same time leaye it open to the petitioner to move the appropriate Rent Controller for ejectment on any ground available under the law and any finding or observation made in the impugned order will have no bearing upon the decision of the Controller premised on law and evidence.